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EAST ASIA SECURITY OUTLOOK 2010

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SHHBIDSS invites internationally renowned academicians and practitioners to present and write on the different issues surrounding the East Asia Security Outlook. This publication is based on presentations delivered by SHHBIDSS's invited speakers on the 7 January 2010.

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Contents

Preface i

List of Acronyms ii

Introduction iv

1. **Strategic Environment of East Asia: An Overview** 1
   Tang Siew-Mun

2. **Regional Cooperation: Current and Emerging Security Architecture** 6
   Pushpa Thambipillai

3. **Regional Conflict: Current and Emerging Security Challenges** 18
   Masashi Nishihara

4. **Global Economic Downturn** 24
   Charles Adams

5. **Security and Military Trends and Developments in Northeast Asia** 30
   Yao Yunzhu

6. **Military Developments and Relations in Southeast Asia** 40
   Rommel C Banlaoi

7. **Energy Security in East Asia** 56
   Hooman Peimani

8. **Contagious Disease in East Asia: Securitizing Response Strategies** 68
   Catherine Lo Yuk Ping and Nicholas Thomas

Contributors 91

Preface

This publication is the outcome of the East Asia Security Outlook (EASO) seminar conducted on the 7 January 2010 by Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS).

The main objective of EASO seminars is to share views, perspectives and outlooks on the current security environment of East Asia. The contributors in this publication have covered an array of security issues in East Asia ranging from traditional security issues such as the North Korean nuclear issue up to the non-traditional security issues such as financial crises. The topics and issues addressed reflect the diversity and fluidity of security challenges faced by the East Asian region.

SHHBIDSS would like to thank the contributors, its staff and all others who are involved in making our EASO this year a success.

Hamzah Sulaiman
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List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADMM	ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting
AFP	The Armed Forces of the Philippines
APC	Asia-Pacific Community
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASC	ASEAN Security Community
ASCC	ASEAN's Social-Cultural Community
ASEAN	The Association of the Southeast Asian Nations
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CLCS	United Nation's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DIB	Defence Industrial Base
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAS	East Asia Summit
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
ERIDs	re-Emerging Infectious Diseases
EU	European Union
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FPDA	Five Power Defense Arrangement
FSWs	Female Sex Workers
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDUs	Injecting Drug Users
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JMSU	Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking
KMT	Kuomintang
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
MSDF	Maritime Self- Defense Force
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBN	National Broadband Network
NEA	Northeast Asia

NFU	No-First-Use
NPA	New People's Army
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTS	Non-Traditional Security
OFWs	Overseas Filipino Workers
OIE	Organisation for Animal Health
PDA	Presidential Drawdown Authority
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime Minister
PMC	Post Ministerial Meeting
PROC	People's Republic of China
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCS	South China Sea
SCSD	South China Sea Disputes
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIPRI	The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMEs	Small, Medium Enterprises
SPT	Six Party Talks
ST	Singapore Technologies
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TMD	Theater Missile Defence
TNOC	Transnational Organised Crime
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation
UN	United Nations
US	The United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFJ	US Forces in Japan
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Introduction

There is a general consensus that East Asia is a fairly stable region with long-standing border and maritime issues characterising disputes. Instances of armed fighting are small-scale and infrequent. China, the DPRK, the Prear Vihear Temple, South China Sea, Taiwan and civil conflicts remain the flash points of East Asia. Bilateral relations and security arrangements are established to calm any animosities and generate stability in the region.

Tang Siew Mun believes that the situation in East Asia is under control despite China's and North Korea 'threats'. It is important for China to respect the existing status quo and to continue to maintain trade and diplomatic ties that it has benefited so much from. North Korea uses nuclear arms as a bargaining chip for a secure economy and position in the region. Therefore, there is no reason to be overly alarmist over the China and DPRK issues. If East Asian leaders can agree to this, they will cease from pursuing unilateral action and utilise the region's security instruments to negotiate their national interests with each other.

The ARF is the closest that can be described as a security body in East Asia. Pushpa Thambipillai observes that other groupings come in the form of forums and dialogues addressing specific security issues, usually with global players like the UN and also countries in the geopolitical circle. A future East Asian security architecture will employ participation from states outside the region and regional and global institutions.

An example of such participation can be in the form of alliances. US-led bilateral alliances, such as the US-Japan alliance, provide the much-needed security and stability in the region. Masashi Nishihara argued that country leaders should look at closing the income gap between contending groups in the Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines to resolve ethnic tensions. States should be ready to work together to combat non-traditional security threats such as water conflicts. The Mekong River, Southeast Asia's largest waterway, which runs through all the countries in the mainland, can easily cause disagreements over development projects in the river.

East Asia entered a challenging year in 2009 with the global economic slowdown affecting the region. Charles Adams maintains that states are now aware of the need to address factors leading to the crisis and to better manage such crises when they occur. Meanwhile, Yao Yunzhu presents what is probably one of the most important relationships defining security not only in Northeast Asia but also the whole region: US-China relations. Both recognise each other's positions and roles on the regional and global stage; although hiccups exist between them due to misinterpretations over China's military modernisations and US' arm supply to Taiwan.

Security dilemma ensues as other states are anxious as to whether military expansions made are offensive or defensive, driving them to upgrade their own military capabilities and inevitably dragging the region into a cycle of actions and reactions of military and defence modernisations. Rommel Banlaoi reiterates the importance of bilateral and multilateral relations, active participation and dialogue in regional groupings such as ASEAN. They are integral in assuring states of each other's intentions and military developments.

Hooman Peimani delves into another security issue affecting East Asia today: Energy Security. East Asia is the largest energy-consuming region yet resources are limited. Importing energy is an inevitable necessity and energy supplied from countries hostile to the US would wither existing bilateral relations. Other forms of tension may arise from the need for energy security and will be an additional factor affecting relations between states.

In addition, the destructive character of contagious diseases makes it a security threat. The more countries recognise this, the more willing they will be to coordinate response with other states. The SARS crisis of 2003 is a blinding proof of the importance of openness and cooperation between states to contain something that has no respect for time and national borders.

The security prospect for East Asia is an optimistic one. States, including China and North Korea, are aware of their surrounding and the regional and global players who will intervene to prevent any tilting of balance of power. It is therefore vital for regional countries to be engaged in discussions, not only to resolve long-standing inter-state and civil conflicts, but also emerging non-traditional security threats. Only then can the region prosper and focus unhindered on their trade, environmental and non-proliferation of arms endeavours.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF EAST ASIA: AN OVERVIEW

Tang Siew-Mun

Introduction

The East Asian region witnessed some of the most horrific armed conflicts after World War II – the Korean and Vietnam wars. Long after these wars ended, the region was still bitterly divided between communist and non-communist states. The scars of the Cold War are still evident today, with the 39th parallel dividing the North and South Koreas. The region's security architecture owes its origins to the Cold War. Bilateral security arrangements augment the deterrence and provide the foundation of the region's security and stability.

This paper presents an overview of the region's strategic outlook and is divided into two sections. In the first section, the paper examines the "myth" of the Chinese threat. It argues that analysis premised China's increased military capabilities is erroneous and misses the mark that it is in China's interest to help maintain and prolong the peace and security through the region to facilitate its economic growth. The second section examines five major strategic issues that are likely to have a bearing on the region's security in the near term.

"Threats" to Peace and Security: The "Usual Suspects"

It is beyond any doubt that China remains the "elephant in the room". The Chinese military budget grew by 14.9 percent in 2009, compared to 2008, marking a consistent effort by China to continue upgrading and modernise the People's Liberation Army (PLA). According to calculations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), growth for military expenditure outpaced Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. From 1996 to 2006, China recorded an average GDP growth rate of 9.2 percent (adjusted for inflation), compared to 11.8 percent for military expenses. China's defence budget does not tell the full story of the development of the PLA as these figures does not include expenses for strategic forces and paramilitary forces, foreign military acquisitions, military-related research and development.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) lists China's military expenditure second only to the US (2008). What do the numbers mean? Is China a threat to regional security? At face value, there are certainly grounds for caution. China's unstoppable rise up the economic ladder means, among other things, that the PLA would most probably continue to receive the economic resources needed to transform itself into firstly a regional and later a global military power.

Is China a threat to regional security? Is China the enemy? To be sure, the Chinese military modernisation is forcing regional actors to re-examine their respective military posture vis-à-vis the PLA. It is erroneous to be overly alarmist about the Chinese military buildup. China's military expansion ought to be seen from Beijing's strategic perspective. As a trading nation and a nation with global aspirations and inevitably, responsibilities, Beijing deems it necessarily to augment its growing diplomatic influence with military power. This does not mean that China harbors offensive or aggrandizement intentions. Far from it, China's phenomenon economic growth since it embraced the world economy is predicated on a stable and peaceful international environment. Nevertheless, the long-drawn threat of piracy in the Gulf of Eden (and its surrounding waters) laid bare China's inability to respond effectively to threats beyond its territorial waters. It is similarly fallacious to be alarmist on China just by looking at its increasingly modern and lethal battle-of-order. Capabilities are an indicator of a state's military might. It is, however, a poor determinant of a state's intention. Why would China want destabilise the international trade order that it had benefit enormously in the last twenty years? Responding to China's capabilities is doubly dangerous as it might strengthen the hardcore "Cold Warriors" within the higher echelons of power in Beijing. In other words, if we perceive Beijing as the enemy, it may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Developments to Watch

China-Taiwan Relations

Cross-Straits relations have never been this good in the last decade. President Ma Jing Jeou's conciliatory posture towards China had reaped enormous benefits that helped reduced military tensions across the Straits, although hundreds of Chinese missiles are still targeted at Taiwan, and vice versa. As a mark of the thawing ties between Beijing and Taipei; China gifted a pair of pandas to Taiwan. Shipping, postal and air contacts were resumed. Taiwan also allowed Chinese tourists on the island. All these were possible because President Ma dropped Taiwan's independence initiatives from the national agenda. Beijing reciprocated with enhanced socio-economic ties. However, the Beijing-Taipei rapprochement suffered a setback with Washington's proposed US$6.5 billion arms sales to Taiwan. China protested by freezing all military ties with the US until Secretary Hillary Clinton's visit to Beijing in February 2009. The Obama administration is expected to proceed with the planned arms sales. The sale is unlikely to have a significant or lasting material impact on Sino-US ties. As long as the Ma administration refrains from supporting any pro-independence initiatives, Beijing is not going to punish Taipei severely for the arms purchases.

India's Strategic Outreach in Southeast Asia

The fact that India, being an extra-regional actor, has inked a Strategic Partnership

with Vietnam in 2007 is illustrative of India's strategic concerns. Relations between the two states have blossomed since the late 1990s. Lead by Indian economic stalwarts, Tata Steel and ONGC Videsh Limited, Indian investment in Vietnam is growing. Strategically, India has assisted in the training and maintenance of Vietnam's military hardware. It has repaired and upgraded some 125 Vietnamese MiG-21 and provided more than 120 tonnes of spares parts for the Petya-class warships.

The close relations were further cemented by the close diplomatic collaboration between the two countries, with Vietnam supporting New Delhi's membership in the East Asia Summit (EAS), while blocking Pakistan's joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). On its part, Delhi supported Hanoi's ascension into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its campaign for the rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council.

India's strategic outreach to Vietnam is directed at China. Delhi sees Vietnam as a natural ally to balance against the rising power of China. In this regard, it is an easy courtship given Vietnam's traditional and historical unease with China. In April 2009, the INS Mumbai and INS Ranvir docked at Dinh Vu port in the northern city of Hai Phong. India had harboured hopes that Vietnam would grant the Indian Navy berthing rights at Cam Ranh Bay. It would have been a coup if the rights were granted as it would have provided the Indian Navy a foothold in the Southeast Asia, and perhaps creating their own "string of pearls." Nevertheless, Vietnam put the matter to a rest when it announced in 2004 that Cam Ranh Bay would not be a "military base." The fact that Vietnam continues its close collaboration with India is sure to elicit a response from China. India has made it clear that its strategic objective is to balance against China. Would Vietnam's historical animosity and fear of China drive it into the open arms of Delhi? If Hanoi shares the same strategic outlook with Delhi vis-à-vis Beijing, what are the implications (if any) for ASEAN and the regional organisation's engagement with Beijing?

Territorial Claims in the South China and East China Seas

The South China Sea (SCS) is one of three long standing regional flash points – the other two are Taiwan and North Korea. The scene is perhaps set for a fresh round of friction and confrontation. In May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam lodged a joint submission to the United Nation's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to lay their claim over an area that extends beyond the 200 nautical miles. Earlier, the Philippines passed Archipelagic Baseline Law to reinforce Manila's claims to the Kalayaan Islands. China reacted to the Malaysian and Vietnamese submissions with a strong protest to the UN Secretary-General, while denouncing Manila's actions as "illegal and invalid."

The stakes for the Spratlys are high as it is reckoned by the Chinese Geology and Mineral Resources Ministry that the Spratlys contain the fourth largest reserve of oil and gas in the world – surpassing that of Kuwait. In recent years, China had been strengthening its military presence in the area, with the SCS Fleet, reportedly to receive the lion's share of the PLAN budget. Jane's reported in April 2008 that the new naval base at Hainan Island is equipped to berth up to twenty submarines. Along with other naval and air assets based in the Island, the PLA has to ability to undertake a major military operation to secure the Spratlys if need be. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS is impotent to prevent China from exercising the military option if it considers its national interest imperilled. The submissions of the 2009 claims and passage of a new legislation by Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines are at the very least, increasing the political tension among the claimants. The Spratlys is a powder-keg that may undo decades of constructive engagement between ASEAN states and China, unless handled delicately.

The US-Japan Security Treaty: The Okinawa Issue

The US military presence in the region is – and has been – the bedrock of regional security and stability. US military engagement is largely facilitated by the US-Japan Security Treaty which enables the US to forward deploy its military assets in the region. In comparison to US troops in South Korea, US Forces in Japan (USFJ) is more strategic as the former are tied down solely for defending the South against any predatory attacks by the North. USFJ, on the other hand are highly mobile and had been used in support of US missions in the region and in the Indian Ocean. Although the current debacle on the relocation of the Futenma Air Marine Corp may not have a huge impact US military effectiveness in the region, it may have a deleterious effect on US-Japan relations and ultimately on the stability of the security treaty.

UK's newspaper Guardian reported that US Secretary of State had told "the Japanese ambassador to Washington, Ichiro Fujisaki, that Japan must honour a 2006 agreement to move the Futenma airbase", signaling a hardening of the US position. Domestically, the Hatoyama administration had seen its support plummeting and is backpedalling over its electoral pledge to conduct a more independent security policy from that of the US. US military presence is often taken for granted, and had played a pivotal role in stabilizing the region. Any fallout of the current debacle that would put into question US's long term military presence in the region; would compel regional states – including Japan – to rethink their security posture and policy. Such a reorientation may lead to a regional military buildup.

North Korea: Brinkmanship Again?

The Obama administration's special envoy, Stephen W. Bosworth's "exploratory meeting" with senior North Korean officials is a small but nevertheless significant

in the long saga of Pyongyang's nuclear program. That Washington is open to having direct talks with Pyongyang itself is laudable instead of the sabre-rattling that we are so used to hearing from both parties. Pyongyang has indicated that it "might" return to the Six Party Talks (SPT), or at least conceded that the talks are useful in resolving the present conundrum. That North Korea is improvised is common knowledge.

Nuclear weapons – to Pyongyang – are not to wage war against the Japanese or other nations, but merely a tool to gain attention and a lifeline to prolong Kim's regime. It is the only bargaining chip it possesses. Understanding and accepting that Pyongyang – even nuclear-armed – is not a threat to regional security is key to disarming North Korea. What Pyongyang wants is a security guarantee and aid and assistance to rebuild its economy. North Korea is a country trying to find a way to survive. Brinkmanship is Pyongyang's way of crying for help. To be sure, lobbing missiles over the Sea of Japan is hardly going to ender North Korea to potential benefactors like Japan.

However, the cycle of responding to Pyongyang's threat with a tighter noose around the North Korean economy is only going to push Pyongyang over the cliff. The issue at hand with regard to the nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsular is not strategic but regime security, specifically Pyongyang's regime security.

Conclusion

The strategic outlook for the region in 2010 is optimistic and peaceful. To be sure, the region would continue to be beset with minor disruptions such as the ongoing Thai-Cambodian standoff. The Preah Vihear temple conflict was further inflamed with the appointment of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin as special economic adviser to the Cambodian government. The long standing conflicts in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines (Mindanao) remain a source of concern for all the neighbouring countries. It is hoped that the latest round of political wrangling over the Spratlys would not develop into an armed conflict. Likewise, the simmering conflict between South Korea and Japan over the Takeshima Islands (called Dokyo by South Korea) is a torn in the bilateral relations of both countries.

By no means is East Asia a conflict-free region. However, it is noteworthy that very few of these conflicts have been militarized. Part of the success of the region to "deal" with conflicts is containment. Conflict claims over the Spratlys have not prevented ASEAN and China from creating the ASEAN-China free trade area which went into force on 1 January 2010. By channelling resources and energies into collaborative ventures, zero-sum approaches to problems are minimized. There is an implicit understanding in the region that conflict and competition is counter-productive.

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA: CURRENT AND EMERGING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Pushpa Thambipillai

Abstract

Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, (East Asia), have been moving closer together in recent decades strengthened by interactions across various dimensions. Economic issues remain crucial in their relationship. However political and security issues have also become significant as the states contemplate a regional vision for East Asia, partly prodded by external interests. East Asian governments have created a web of relationships that engage various regional linkages but which ensure that a win-win situation will be maintained to protect their national interests. The presence of a wide dichotomy of political issues and security threats, actual and perceived, however, has not resulted in a corresponding level of multi state security institutions to address them. It can only imply that: one, the states underplay the seriousness of the issues, or two, the leaders are more comfortable dealing with them through bilateral means than through multilateral security oriented institutions. However, the scenario may transform in the future. This article offers an overview of the policy cum institutional processes and trends in regional cooperative schemes and explores whether it will meet the needs of the changing geopolitical environment in East Asia that may have to address both traditional and non-traditional security issues in a comprehensive security framework.

Inevitability of International Regions

Regions are significant components within the international system where actors are engaged in various forms of interactions, from friendly pursuits to violent conflicts. States have occupied the premier position as the legitimate actors ever since the system of states were recognized, at least in its modern form, about 350 years ago. However the concept of regionalism is fairly recent, perhaps in the last 50-60 years, when independent states, three or more, decided to forge closer ties with their neighbors based on mutual interests. Over years, and after continued activity, a regional identity and focus merged, strengthening a dual system of actors in the international system, that of the independent, sovereign state, and that of the states participating within a region with a special group identity. However, the group identity varied according to the commitment and perceived strength of the grouping, the number of units involved and the basic goal, whether to engage in a simple association or in a multifaceted integrative scheme.

Whether regionalism refers to loose association of states interacting with each other or to a formally instituted group of states, some basic features are essential

to promote a region's identity. Inherent geographical and socio cultural factors have been acknowledged as essential; for example, physical contiguity among units is important but may not be the only necessary factor in advancing regional cooperation. Shared history, common colonial past, cultural similarity and familiarity, including in language and religion, and prolonged movement of goods and peoples may provide an inbuilt strength in cementing the foundation for a regional grouping of states. A common perception by the states vis-à-vis the external environment is also a strong incentive for states' shared outlook and thus initiating common political and economic initiatives.

From a geopolitical perspective, a region may also be characterised for its lack of interaction and worst in generating negative atmosphere, as much as for opportunities in positive vibes in inter-state relations. Non-violent or even violent conflict is often characterised amongst states that are reluctant to overcome their ideological, territorial or other political differences according to acceptable norms of conflict settlement. Conflicts arise from competition over territory, resources, or more fundamental issue of dispute over the seat of government that may seek external support. Location within a geographical proximity renders those states more susceptible to such conflicts when conciliatory or congenial attitudes amongst the leaders are absent.

Equally viable is leaders' positive relationships that offer cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally within an identifiable region. This is usually the result of specific decisions and actions adopted by the states' leadership, in pursuing cooperative relationships. Subsequently, identifiable regions with certain shared features as discussed earlier, are conducive in promoting the joint interests of states by collectively pursuing areas of cooperation, through strengthening and expanding existing formal or informal structures and processes and continually exploring new areas for collaboration.

Thus, the rise of 'regions' - as in 'regional cooperation' - beyond the mere location of states in a vicinity, where a number of states agree to forge multilateral relations, in an organized and permanent manner according to a shared vision, and in line with their own national and regional goals. It may not be the only option for states. States have other multilateral means to forge ties and seek mutual interests through international organizations and regimes. However those are mainly functional in nature, and do not provide the identity and scope to tasks as represented by regional groupings; thus the prominence of regions and regional organisations as the premier choice of states for group based economic, political and security cooperation. The long term results of these regional groupings extend beyond the basic functional cooperation, to become indispensable as a source of commitment and identity, without losing each component's national interests or political independence. How and to what extent states are linked will also signal

the 'region' to external actors who may then perceive and interact accordingly with each or with all collectively.

An East Asian Region

Before any serious discussion on architecture for East Asia can be undertaken, there needs to be a discussion on the basis for such a 'region', whether there is an East Asian region or whether it is merely a reference to the collection of states constituting a geographical reference to East Asia. In the latter case, it is generally accepted that East Asia extends from Japan in the north east to Indonesia in the south east, though in certain usage, East Asia is limited in its coverage (to only the northeast). Geographically and politically East Asia can be considered as two distinct sub regions, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. It is also evident that there is a more frequent reference to the concept of Southeast Asia than of Northeast Asia; if at all in use, the latter has been one of outsiders' perception of a geographical area than a self identity of those in that area, due to historical and political experience among the parties. Nevertheless, under current exogenous influences, especially originating from Southeast Asian states' involvement, Northeast Asia is evolving, albeit slowly, into an identifiable constituent within the East Asia context. Perhaps the main stimulant towards that embryonic identity could be the result of the strong surge of state-grouping within Southeast Asia and its formal engagement with states in northeast Asia. They are also seen as distinct from the major part of Southeast Asia, with their own characteristics, geographically and culturally and representing the industrialized economies with large national GDP.

Nevertheless, one can argue for an East Asian entity along several overlapping identities, emerging with the core members: Southeast Asia Ten, Northeast Asia Three (China, Japan and South Korea), then extending to cover others at the periphery that may regard themselves as part of East Asia, for example, China's northern neighbor Mongolia. It is inevitable that eventually North Korea, if and when it changes its political and economic outlook, will be included as an active Northeast Asian member beyond just its geographical consideration. However, any study of regional security architecture cannot be strictly limited to the membership of those states mentioned above. States and regions are inextricably linked to certain other actors, especially major actors, who influence actions and outcomes, both within or outside their own geographical span.

This article's scope therefore covers the entire area from the western borders of Southeast Asia (which corresponds to ASEAN's) to the north eastern reaches of the Asian continent, from the eastern Indian Ocean to the western Pacific Ocean, as geo strategic issues do not necessarily follow strict political lines, even if state memberships in groupings tend to follow that. Besides, issues outside a specific regional grouping will have spillover effects on neighboring states; repercussions

and reactions will then need to be weighed into the process of institution building.

The concept of a region is thus not as easily defined as it may appear from a physical perspective, but may involve other features, for example, the geopolitical theatre that the member states subscribe to. Again, it must be pointed out that as in the case of East Asia, there may not be just one identifiable geopolitical environ, as each sub region's peculiar composition (within Southeast Asia or Northeast Asia) may entail other extended geopolitical interests, but for the main, East Asia can be argued as geopolitically and economically connected within itself, despite the other important external linkages. This positive disposition can be expected to continue into the next decade or so, barring sudden political upheaval and changes within a major component state. For the short and medium term, it is viable to consider East Asia as an entity for cooperation even if critics may query the difficulties in precisely defining a region. The preceding discussion is pertinent to the larger topic at hand: 'security architecture'. What kind of security? What type of architecture? Who is responsible for it? Who is it protecting and against whom?

Multiplicity of Forums, Organisations and Interest Areas

Current levels of cooperation among the states of East Asia actively involve them in several interstate organizations, regionally, inter regionally and globally, across a variety of functional areas that show the popularity of international cooperation through an alphabetic potpourri of linkages. The list includes the United Nations (UN) and related institutions, numerous other global organizations, inter regional ones like ASEM and APEC, and other region-specific ones like ASEAN where the majority of states from East Asia are involved. However, only those directly associated with the ASEAN organization carry some form of group association, for example, the ARF, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the EAS as they are region specific with ASEAN as the initiator. These institutions are yet to play any direct security role in the area. But have in fact associated with global players like the UN. (Consider, for example, the diplomatic role of ASEAN in the Cambodian issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s; it was the UN's commitment that assumed the strong presence to settle the problem. In the case of the East Timor issue in the late 1990s, ASEAN would/could not get involved because it was deemed an internal issue of a member state until Australia and the UN stepped in to seek a settlement).

Another transnational forum that is addressing an East Asian security issue is the SPT, a semi regularized high level meeting specifically targeting security issues in the Korean Peninsula to address North Korea's aggressive military and nuclear programs. The SPT is issue and member specific, though four of its members are specifically in East Asia and the other two are major players in the region -

the US and Russia - that would also like to be considered 'Asian' according to the geopolitical circumstances of the issues that they are associated with. The particular SPT process does not engage other actors from the region or beyond except the UN; but it is significant enough to involve and retain the interests of the concerned East Asian states in a security dialogue with the two major powers. It has not evoked much interest outside of Northeast Asia, and unlikely to be an issue of common concern in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, universal issues of peaceful coexistence and weapons non- proliferation would generate keen interest, if and when the Korean peninsula has direct bearing outside its immediate arena; then it may be a central issue of interest and occupy a multilateral arena wider than the SPT and when it is not directly associated with the interests of only the big powers.

Another grouping of significance is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with China and Russia as the major players. It was initially called the Shanghai Five when it was established in Shanghai in 1996, and assumed its new name when it was reorganised with six members in 2001. (Members are: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Its core membership and focus of interest is oriented towards Central Asia, security being a major area of cooperation, besides economic and cultural interests. The SCO is unlikely to include other states from the East Asian region in the near future, with the exception of Mongolia that currently holds observer status. An interesting development is that three South Asian members in the ARF (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) have also established formal links to the SCO.

Despite the presence of some processes and institutions at the margins, a dedicated organization that addresses broad security issues affecting the entire East Asia region has been absent; the exception being the ARF that may approximate such a body if it was reorganized. The ARF originated in 1994 in Bangkok where 18 foreign ministers gathered to discuss their concern over security issues. It began as a forum of ministers from ASEAN, its dialogue partners and specific invited states. It provided a mechanism for addressing regional security issues in the post Cold War, post Cambodia environment. The ARF was later extended to include other interested states from a wider geographical area (that cannot possibly be termed as of East Asian location), swelling its membership to 27. The guiding principle was that it was an ASEAN based organization and ASEAN occupied the 'driver's seat'; the Chair of ASEAN Standing Committee is also the Chair of the ARF according to ASEAN's annual rotation of chairs. ASEAN would thus steer the focus towards issues of East Asian and Western Pacific interests like arms buildup, piracy and international terrorism. Its 'modes operands' include the promotion of transparency through dialogue and exchange of information in security related issues. Multilateral confidence building and preventive diplomacy would lead to a more peaceful East Asia according to the ARF strategic vision. It can be argued that actions in fact fall short of the vision.

Another 'indirect' way of including security issues in a non security focused structure is the metamorphosing of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, to include a selected array of security related matters like maritime security, specifically after September 2001. Observers have argued that APEC is not the arena even if some leaders seem keen to want it to be more comprehensive than just restricting it to issues of open regionalism in trade and economic relations. In addition, APEC represents states (and economies) from both sides of the Pacific, and thus represents an inter continent, rather than an inter-regional participation; its diverse membership alone would create obstacles for any effective security architecture.

The discussion on security architecture thus has to review existing mechanisms that include security related issues even if the institutions concerned were not specifically established for that purpose (like the Manila Pact of 1954 that created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO, 1955-1977, the only security alliance for the region with membership from within and without). Another relic of the past, but which has adapted into a multilateral training platform is the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) that was established in 1971 from existing agreements between the United Kingdom and Malaysia, and United Kingdom and Singapore. It did not endear favorably with its neighbors, especially in the 1980s when Indonesia objected to its existence and questioned its need within the supposed friendly ASEAN framework. Yet FPDA continues as a useful vehicle of cooperation amongst its partners, possibly extending into areas like air reconnaissance for regional maritime piracy. The five parties have also occasionally included Brunei as an observer to their exercises, since Brunei pursues a special defense relationship with the UK, but has chosen to stay outside the FPDA.

Related to cooperative training, another arrangement that ought to be cited here is CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), a US sponsored military exercise with selected partners in the region. In 1995, the US Pacific Command, under its Seventh Fleet, reorganized and coordinated the various bilateral exercises it had led with allies. It scheduled a series of exercises, including with new partners like Brunei, to promote military-to-military cooperation and to assure regional maritime interoperability. These were enhanced through training between the US navies and the armed forces of partner countries. One of the goals of CARAT was to ensure the safety and security of the sea lanes of communication, vital not only for American interests but also for many other users. In a 2009 CARAT exercise with Brunei forces, the emphasis was on disaster relief operations, a task increasing in demand for the local and regional military forces. However, both the FPDA and CARAT are not in themselves indicators of regional security architectures; rather, they enhance regional preparedness and broaden the involvement of traditional external partners that share mutual interests with their allies in Southeast Asia.

Minimalist Architecture

Despite national and regional security being high on the agenda of East Asian states, a survey of the various cooperative schemes reveals a meager picture on security. As seen earlier, the closest to a multilateral structure appears under the ASEAN framework. Even within the ASEAN Ten itself, security cooperation appears at a minimum, despite the fact that ASEAN after 43 years should have progressed beyond the simple 1967 ASEAN Declaration that referred to ASEAN's role in promoting peace and development. The ASEAN Charter of 2008, in Article 1, states that one of the purposes of ASEAN is to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability; another purpose is to enhance regional resilience by promoting political, security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation. Guiding a largely political-diplomatic organization, the Charter does not spell out the mechanisms for cooperation in the security areas. Related issues are to be addressed by the Summit of Heads of Governments and the ASEAN Coordinating Council comprising of Foreign Ministers. In addition, there are the ASEAN Community Councils, one of which is the ASEAN Political-Security Council, corresponding to one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community introduced in 2003.

Under the ASEAN structure, there is provision for other ASEAN ministerial bodies, for instance, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), who have instituted a regular regional meeting since May 2006, and the Ministers of Home Affairs who are also entrusted with cooperating in certain areas of non-traditional security matters, especially in transborder issues. Each of these important bodies within ASEAN is also linked to the counterparts in the APT set up. These inter region linkages have evolved from an informal beginning in the late 1990s to a regularized dialogue sessions after the APT was recognized as an important enlarged grouping, bringing together leaders at the Summit and at other ministerial meetings. Thus the intra regional ASEAN structures together with the corresponding structures in the APT countries constitute the overarching cooperative structure between the Southeast Asia and Northeast Asian states, representing the rudiments of a trans-regional mechanism for addressing mutual concerns. The APT mechanism appears to have a more positive acceptance within the region as it is located within its geographical area and relates to substantive areas of common interests. However, it is no surprise that the issues covered are selective and do not dwell on contentious areas in keeping with the ASEAN dogma of non interference, conveniently subscribed to by ASEAN's partners through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The same applies to the ARF, the only trans-regional forum for discussing 'general security' issues, (and not specifics like territorial claims in the SCS that were kept off the agenda), and thus falls short of being a regional security structure. It is, as it name reads, a forum to encourage a degree of transparency and confidence building among participating states as claimed in its Concept Paper, and has not been keen in its third vision of preventive diplomacy.

Can ASEAN's initiative in the guise of the ARF be transformed into regional security architecture? The ARF origins explain part of its continued ineffectiveness. It evolved from the successful management of ASEAN's relations with its dialogue partners (seven developed states in the 1980s), specifically in turning the Post Ministerial Meeting (PMC) of Foreign Ministers into a political arena in the 1980s over the Cambodian issue (after Vietnam invaded and over threw the Khmer Rouge government in late 1978, and established a pro Vietnamese regime there while retaining several thousand Vietnamese troops to ensure the Khmer Rouge did not resurface). Encouraged by its role in championing its political cause, initially with its Dialogue Partners, thereafter with the Permanent Five of the Security Council, ASEAN was receptive to ideas for a forum for security issues; thus emerged the ARF in 1994. Over the last 16 years it has been fortunate in not witnessing any regional war, but, in accordance with its mandate, has kept its distance from bilateral conflicts and sporadic violence especially over territorial claims, as well as 'domestic' issues like the East Timor strive for independence from Indonesia. Detractors are not satisfied with the ARF roles and contributions, and the process managed in ASEAN's style through consensus and persistent adherence to the non interference policy. Besides, its increased membership has only added to its lethargy, encompassing contentious states in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Australasia, Europe and North America. On the positive note, its expanded interactions has involved various participants from the ministerial, senior official and expert levels for the various working groups under its jurisdiction, thus widening the scope of its mandate. It also provided eminence to the Track II non-governmental organization made up of academics, government officials in their personal capacities and representatives of research institutes, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) that has been around since 1993. It is guided by its own Charter, and meets regularly to discuss current issues and research agendas. The CSCAP acts as an expert resource forum parallel to the ARF that has also set up large networks of experts on regional security issues.

The experience of security related structures reveal a slow and inconsistent process of dialogue, far from any form of institution building. This in particular applies to the ARF assuming it is recognized as the most viable multilateral vehicle in East Asia. It also reveals the predominance of ASEAN in the initiatives, mainly because Southeast Asia is able to be represented by a unified organization, whereas, Northeast Asia is unable to provide any workable collective structure at the present. Any initiative originating from an individual actor like China or Japan would be viewed with caution or even suspicion by its other neighbor in northeast Asia. Thus the bigger states in East Asia seem to have accommodated some of their interests through the combined efforts of the smaller developing states in Southeast Asia.

Another outcome to be acknowledged is how bigger states' proposals in the past were not successfully received in their original forms. For instance, in 1990, prior to the formation of CSCAP and the ARF, there were several suggestions spearheaded by some Australian and Canadian observers for an Asia Pacific institution fashioned after the European model of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). These proposals were not well received by the smaller states, while some of the bigger states like the US were non committal; the US was not enthusiastic in such a plan, perceiving perhaps the potential disintegration of its important bilateral arrangements with regional partners. However, those ideas were floated at the height of the fluidity in the international system caused by the fading Cold War; similar concepts have occasionally resurfaced and my have valuable insights for a revisit in the light of renewed interests in security architecture for the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Directions for a New Deal

It is inevitable that security architecture for East Asia has to take into consideration regional identities and commitments. Southeast Asia has advanced towards a collective community formation, setting on target an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 and an ASEAN Community by 2020. Similar perceptions or community building schemes are missing in Northeast Asia due to historical and other Second World War experiences. It should be recognized that without ASEAN and the APT, an East Asia comprising the major Asian states would have taken longer to evolve. Thus the role of ASEAN as a major player has to be given due recognition.

Recent attempts at trilateral summit dialogues among China, Japan and South Korea held in 2008 and 2009 have been viewed positively by other regional and global players as it indicates a trend towards political and security cooperation, above existing bilateral economic linkages. However, any discussion on security cooperation would be unlikely to originate from those three states without their initial engagement in more 'comfortable' socio cultural and economic areas of multilateral cooperation; hence the need for the centrality of ASEAN's efforts towards a possible framework for security by co-opting all interested actors to pursue East Asian cooperative efforts.

Another major consideration in the security architecture would be the strong bilateral military relations with western powers for almost all the important players in the region with the exception of China. Even though the only collective security pact in the region was disbanded in 1977, various forms of bilateral treaties exist, ranging from troop commitments to port visits along the rim of the western Pacific. Japan and South Korea are hosts to one of the largest concentration of American forces in a non combat zone, originating in agreements from the 1950s

and 60s. Others like Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines have close military cooperation with the United States for varying purposes. Brunei Darussalam is home to the battalion from the UK, tracing back to the role the troops played in squashing the abortive coup in 1962. The other countries in the region may not host foreign troops but receive some form of military aid, training, port visits or mutually beneficial cooperation, for instance in addressing terrorism or piracy. The US has continued to be engaged in East Asia, and has not really left the region, contrary to some observers' assertions in the last decade. Other major states like Australia and France are also engaged in security cooperation with their allies. Thus the security needs, if any, appear to be met in part through the alliances with external partners, in part through the states' own initiatives in arms buildup, defense and security dialogues with neighbors, and through bilateral diplomatic channels to address their special concerns.

Leadership roles and expectations are crucial in determining the evolution of the East Asian security architecture. Who can lead? Or at best, who can activate the process? ASEAN has assumed a confident role, not only being in existence for over four decades, and topping it with a much awaited Charter; it has also extended its reach to new member states, dialogue partners, and the structurally strong APT. China may not currently see itself playing a major role as it waits out its strategic plans for becoming the second largest economy within the next decade; besides, it realizes the possible negative reactions from its neighbors and may privately explore its strategic plans before making a public commitment. Japan on the other hand, is susceptible to varying domestic political changes and has wavered in providing any leadership role for the rest of Asia despite commanding economic respect from the region. A strengthening of the current architecture, heavily associated with the ASEAN system, even if not strictly committed to the security framework, is likely to prevail in the absence of a concrete proposal from within the region; this does not imply that there are no proposals from outside ASEAN.

Looking Ahead

The East Asian region is a fairly stable environment compared to some other parts of the world, despite the existence of issues ranging from a potential nuclear disaster, continuing border and territorial claims and terrorist threats. Although faced with some violent (for example, over the border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand, and the North Korean provocative actions against the South) but mostly non violent disagreements between states, there appears to be no uniform threat perception among all the states in East Asia strong enough to warrant serious security architecture in the near future. Bilateral issues are seen as 'strictly' bilateral, and states do not see such issues as having any cause or impact on a wider security architecture. The United Nations or the International Court of Justice for legal disputes appears to be the preferred choice of states. The issues

of the post Cold War era are quite distinct and thus dilute security concerns, different from the ideological rifts that encouraged bi polar security mechanisms. Besides, East Asian members are engaging in diplomatic initiatives amongst themselves; ASEAN's efforts in community building within the Southeast Asian region will bind the Northeast Asian region in a set of intertwining diplomatic and economic linkages. To Southeast Asia and other neighbors, China may symbolize the potential threat in the future, but currently it cannot be singled out as one. Geopolitical adventurism is not limited to only big states; hence individually all the states in East Asia foresee the need to be more comprehensive in their strategic outlook, utilizing bilateral, multilateral, regional and global institutions to secure their interests.

There have been several proposals from outside East Asia to engage the states in a broader Asia Pacific security architecture. One of it has been proposed by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia in 2009; it appears to have the support of other big states like the US and Canada while those in ASEAN have been cautious in their approach. Some observers from East Asia regard it as an initiative for the big and middles states to engage or encircle East Asia on the assumption of a security network, and in the process curtail the rise of potential military powers. Another proposal by Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama referred to an East Asian Community but again lacks specific details and thus may fail the opportunity to convincingly market it to the prospective members.

East Asia is characterized by its heterogeneity in economic, socio-cultural and political features. The concept of a 'region' will be one of complex identities, overriding the geographical setting. Each constituent in the regional map views its security interests from a distinct platform, though not without some shared perspectives. A future East Asia cooperative mechanism may be possible with the participation of relevant partners, either strictly from within the region, or with other non Asian states that have had a strong link and commitment with the region. Meanwhile in the absence of security architecture, cooperative security that has been the norm in the past decades will likely continue.

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Endnotes

[1]There is a common tendency by some writers to refer to East Asia as only comprising China, Japan and Korea. But two examples may strengthen the argument in favor of East Asia as more inclusive: in 1990 former Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia proposed the East Asia Economic Grouping (Caucus) that invited the members of ASEAN together with Japan and South Korea. It did not happen at that time, but the later in the decade it became a reality when APT came into being. In 1998 the ASEAN Summit approved the establishment of the East Asia Vision Group and in 2000 the East Asia Study Group, representing the ASEAN and northeast Asian states. One of its recommendations was the holding of the East Asian Summit of leaders from ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea (EAS). But now the EAS has gone beyond East Asia to include states from South Asia and the Pacific. International organizations have also varied in their usage of the concept. However in a monumental study by the World Bank in early 1990s, the states in Northeast and Southeast were included in understanding the *East Asian Miracle*.

[2]It is interesting to note the attendees at the inaugural meeting. Russia and China, though not dialogue partners, were present at the meet; however, India was not. Perhaps it reflected the ARF's East Asia tilt at that time, and the leaders' regarding of China and Russia as states with important stake in the broader regional security.

[3]Details of its aims and actions can be found in The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, 1995. More details on current activities are available at www.aseanregionalforum.org

[4]See the APEC Leaders Statement on Counter Terrorism, Shanghai, 21 October 2001.

[5]International security cooperation received major attention after 9/11. For a review of security issues in the region and the perceived role for APEC, see, John McKay, "APEC's Role in Political and Security Issues" in Richard E Feinberg (ed.), *APEC as an Institution. Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp 229-266.

[6]Since its inception the FPDA has evolved in tandem with the geopolitics of the region. But for its initial strategic reasons see Chin Kin Wah, *The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System, 1957-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)

REGIONAL CONFLICT: CURRENT AND EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Masashi Nishihara

The security environment of East Asia today is less tense than that of South Asia and Southwest Asia. For sure, North Korea's nuclear and missile development poses serious security concern for Northeast Asia. Yet there is no actual war-fighting in Northeast Asia, as compared with the other side of the Asian continent, where NATO and American forces are fighting fiercely with the Taliban and where Islamic terrorists were active in hitting important places such as Mumbai and Islamabad. There are no large-scale armed conflicts in East Asia today; nonetheless, some serious concerns draw attention.

North Korea's Defiant Acts

Probably the most serious security concern in East Asia today is about North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Pyongyang tested nuclear weapons twice, in October 2006 and May 2009, while it tested medium-range and longer-range missiles several times. Its nuclear arms, still being unsophisticated and heavy, cannot be deployed easily. However, the range of its medium-range Noedong missiles can cover Japan as well as South Korea.

North Korea secretly has developed nuclear arms, despite strong warnings by the international society. Faced with Japan's and the US' voluntary sanctions as well as the UN sanctions, North Korea's leadership is concerned about its own survival. Demonstrating its own nuclear capability may be the only way for Pyongyang to prevent the US from waging a possible attack. The current political relations between North Korea and South Korea are tense, as is shown by the unilateral announcement about its western sea area to be used for military activities. Despite Washington's and Beijing's efforts in persuading North Korea to return to the SPT, Pyongyang remains defiant.

Shooting incidents have occurred in the disputed maritime boundary of the west coast of the peninsula in the past. In early November 2009 the naval clashes badly damaged two North Korean ships. On December 22 North Korea then threatened to fire shells into waters off the same area. These incidents may develop into larger armed conflicts.

China reportedly has deployed armed forces along the border with North Korea, to prevent North Koreans from fleeing across into China in case the collapse of the regime or other calamities may force its people to leave the country. This would

cause clashes between the PLA and North Korean refugees.

North Korea's defiant links with Iran and other countries such as Pakistan and Syria pose additional security concern in terms of nuclear and missile proliferation and arms supply. China's continued substantial support of North Korea's economy defies the UN Security Council's resolutions on sanctions, questioning whether Pyongyang is really being isolated.

Cross-Strait Relations have Improved, but...

Relations between mainland China and Taiwan have improved under the government of President Ma Ying-jeou. Since he took office in May 2008, active cross-strait engagements have begun with swift surge in trade, transportation, and communications. Some 40 percent of Taiwan's exports and 80 percent of its investments go to the mainland. About 300 weekly flights are being serviced across the strait.

Yet "Taiwan identity" remains strong and grows stronger among the Taiwan people, and it tends to prevent the Kuomintang (KMT) government from developing closer political links with the mainland. As a result the recent cross-strait talks on an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) have stalled with a fear on the island that an economic integration would lead to a political one. Despite President Ma's and the Beijing government's opposition, Reverent Dalai Lama was invited to Kaohsiung, a southern city, in late August 2009, to pray for victims of typhoon. Kaohsiung is a stronghold of the opposition Democratic Progress Party.

Today there is no prospect of armed clashes between the mainland China and Taiwan. In fact the two sides have exchanged their military officers and held joint seminars. However, the US expresses its concern about China's over 1,000 missiles along the Pacific coast facing Taiwan. Washington sees that the balance of power across the strait is tilting toward the mainland. It intends to observe its Taiwan Relations Act and to provide necessary "defensive" arms to Taiwan such as PAC-3 Patriot anti-air missiles. Taiwan's military will continue to be vigilant about the People's Liberation Army's moves.

Japan-China-US Relations and China's Military Buildup

The three big powers across the Pacific, Japan, China, and the US, maintain relatively stable relations. In economic areas their deep interdependency requires the three nations to sustain cooperative relations. In political areas as well, the three nations have incentive to work together at the SPT. The US needs China's help in stopping North Korea's nuclear programs as well as Iran's suspected ones.

The US and China, being the largest emitters of green house gas in the world, have to cooperate with each other for reducing their emissions.

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's government claims that it attaches importance to Japan's relations with China as well as to the alliance with the US. President Barack Obama likewise considers Japan as an important ally and China as a vital partner. Relations with Japan and the US are similarly very important to President Hu Jintao.

Nonetheless, Tokyo and Washington entertain their concern about China's military buildup, which Beijing now admits is the second largest military power in the world. According to its newly published 2010 white paper on international affairs, it claims to possess 7,580 tanks, 1,700 fighters, 144 ships, 8 nuclear-powered submarines, and 240 nuclear bombs. As was mentioned earlier, the cross-strait balance of power is now tilting toward China. Beijing's naval expansion is also impressive, with its current plan to build aircraft carriers. Likewise, its cruise missiles, whose range is 2,000 km, can reach Japan and the US aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific.

There is no ground to suggest that China will have a large-scale war against the US or Japan in the foreseeable future. However, as China's military power becomes stronger, the likelihood of skirmishes will become higher than before. It was shown in China's harassment of American air force planes and naval ships operating near the Hainan Island in April 2001 and March 2009, respectively. Naval incidents in the Pacific now show realistic prospects. Japan is also concerned about China's increased ability to take over the disputed Senkaku/Daioyudo Island.

Territorial and Maritime Disputes as Sources of Armed Conflicts

One of the traditional sources of armed conflicts is related to territorial and maritime disputes. This is no exception in East Asia, where the states uphold the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Most of the disputes have been contained from developing into armed clashes, although there always is potential for armed disputes, as in the case of the Korean Peninsula.

Japan has territorial disputes with Russia, South Korea, and China/Taiwan. The Northern Territory has been a major area of contention between Tokyo and Moscow since 1951, preventing the two countries from achieving closer political and economic partnership. Japan and South Korea have quarreled over the tiny Takeshima/Dokdo islands since the end of World War II. The islands are under South Korea's control, but South Koreans easily become emotional over Japan's claims. China's claim over the Senkaku began only after 1972 when it was returned to Japan's administrative responsibility by the US occupation authorities. Both

Takeshima and Senkaku pose potential danger of shooting incidents and some armed clashes.

China and the nations around the SCS (Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia) have overlapping claims over the Spratly and the Paracel islands, which are expected to be resource-rich. Since November 2002 ASEAN and China have adopted a code of conduct, in which they have agreed to refrain from building new military structures. However, China appears to continue to build its military structures. In March 2009 Manila issued a new law, legalizing its long-standing claims to parts of the Spratly islands. It prompted protests from Beijing, which responded by sending a large retired naval rescue vessel to the area. China's dominance in the SCS would raise concern to Japan and the US interested in the freedom of navigation and the safety of the sea lines of communications.

One important flashpoint over territorial disputes in Southeast Asia is the Preah Vihear Temple, which both Thailand and Cambodia have claimed over the years. The two countries have occasionally exchanged fires. Since November 2009 the two armies have faced each other again over the temple.

State rights, derived from the continental shelf and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) approved in 1982, have become a source of international tensions. One outstanding dispute now is between Japan and China over oil and gas exploration in the East China Sea. The two nations have conflicting claims on their maritime boundary.

Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Religious Tensions and Terrorism

Having diverse ethnic minorities, most East Asian countries accommodate with their claims for better status, but often suffer from conflicts between ethnic majority and minority groups. The latter often pursue political claims for autonomous region, separate status, or independence, thus clashing with the authorities. Inter-ethnic tensions tend to be combined with inter-religious tensions and even terrorist activities.

This category of conflicts includes: the revolt by Tibetans and Uighurs in China, the Abu Sayyaf extremist group in Mindanao, and terrorists in southern Thailand. Northern Sulawesi has also had tensions between Moslems and Christians, while Chinese people and North Korean immigrants in northern China have had tensions as well.

Past terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta, -- and perhaps in southern Thailand as well, -- were connected with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), radical Islamic terrorist groups. Although JI activities have been relatively unnoticeable in Southeast Asia in recent

years, they still have the potential to cause large-scale disturbances.

An indispensable approach to the resolution of potential regional conflicts may lie in the sustainable economic development of the region, a development that will close income discrepancy between contending ethnic groups and religious groups. Conflicts in the southern Thailand and southern Philippines stem from inter-religious tensions based on large economic gap. Improverished Moslems in southern Thai towns take hostile posture toward Buddhists, while poverty-stricken Moslems in southern Philippine villages, taking similarly hostile attitudes toward better-off Catholics, demand an independent Islamic state.

Non-Traditional Sources of Conflict Emerging

It has become increasingly important to pay attention to non-traditional security threats, such as piracy, drug and human trafficking, climate change, pandemics, etc. Since these threats are not sponsored by states, they tend to encourage those concerned nations to work together rather than to cause conflicts among themselves. Yet some of them may give rise to interstate conflicts. If the Mekong River's water level should sharply fall, there may be regional conflicts over access to water supply. If forest fires in Kalimantan should cause heavy haze on a large scale in Malaysia and Singapore, affecting the health of inhabitants, they may become regional conflicts.

Regional Conflicts and the Role of the Japan-US Alliance

Since regional conflicts are multi-faceted, approaches to the resolution of such conflicts should be multi-layered. East Asia has a loose multi-layered architecture for regional security: bilateral alliances led by the United States, sub regional mechanisms such as the SPT and ASEAN, and regional mechanisms such as the ARF, EAS, and perhaps APEC. In addition, the UN functions as a global mechanism for regional security.

This architecture is not a satisfactory one. The SPT has failed to stop North Korea's nuclear development and its hostile and defiant behavior. ASEAN has failed to mediate between Thailand and Cambodia. None of the ARF, EAS and APEC has intervened in these regional conflicts.

Thus it is only US.-led bilateral alliances that are promising in coping with some of the regional conflicts. The US-ROK alliance primarily protects South Korea from North Korea's aggression, while the US-Japan alliance primarily defends Japan from any external attacks. This alliance also helps ensure the security of the long sea lines of communications between Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The alliance may play a role in maintaining regional stability in the SCS as well as

in the Indian Ocean. The US-Singapore security partnership similarly plays an important role in maintaining regional stability. The Visiting Forces Agreement, under which US forces can stay in the Philippines, helps maintain Manila's security. In addition, the FDPA (among the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) may also serve as a kind of alliance in case of regional conflicts in Southeast Asia.

The multi-layered architecture works primarily as confidence-building measures, while the key mechanism for regional stability is the network of the US defense arrangements in the region.

On the whole, as the rise of China becomes prominent, the US and its allies and like-minded nations will have to be vigilant and ready to balance China's power in the Western Pacific and the SCS. This hedging strategy, supported by the Japan-US Alliance, is a key to the stability of East Asia and the balance of power therein. The balance of power theory is an old concept, but it is still a useful and operating one. The partnership among the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region is indispensable, but the ability to balance potential hostile forces is equally indispensable.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND RECOVERY

Charles Adams

Abstract

The world economy is recovering from the 2008-09 global economic crisis. Following very steep and synchronized contractions, real GDP and world trade have been bouncing back, especially in Asia, and projections for near-term economic growth in both the advanced and emerging market economies have been marked up. Compared with the situation at the end of 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financial conditions in the global economy have stabilized, financial markets have been coming back to life, and the risks of systemic collapse have been curtailed. Notwithstanding these positive developments, however, the global economic recovery remains fragile and is proceeding at an unbalanced pace across the advanced and emerging market economies; in addition, a number of challenges – most importantly those associated with the global current account imbalances – remain, and will need to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of the recovery. At the same time, new risks associated with high levels of public debt in several countries and large and potentially volatile capital flows have been emerging. Looking beyond the ongoing recovery, attention is increasingly being paid to the financial and other reforms needed to reduce the likelihood of future financial crises and better equip national authorities to manage them when they occur. The outlook for international capital flows will depend importantly on the pace of the global recovery, the progress in global rebalancing, and the scope and nature of cross-border financial reform efforts.

When the US subprime crisis first erupted during 2007, the widely held expectation was that Asia would escape the worst of the crisis as a result of its improved macroeconomic and external fundamentals and its strengthened and largely bank-based financial systems that had only limited exposure to subprime products (IMF (2010), Adams (2008)). In addition, the growing importance of intra-regional trade was seen as reducing the dependence of the region on final demand in the advanced countries of North America and Europe, implying that it could weather a slowdown in these countries in line with the decoupling hypothesis.[7] Effectively, Asia was regarded as being out of the "eye of the storm" and well positioned to ride out the global economic crisis with only a relatively modest slowdown in growth. In the event, and following continued relatively rapid growth through the early stages of the subprime crisis, the region was very adversely affected after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the second half of 2008. Most significantly, as both world trade and industrial production collapsed and international financial markets seized up, the spillovers to the region rose dramatically (IMF (2010)). Generally, countries in the region that were most adversely affected were those that were very open to international trade, and those that exported high-end products subject to sharp discretionary cutbacks in advanced country spending

(ADB (2008, 2009)). Conversely the less open economies in the region, or those exporting basic goods such as food and textiles, were much less affected, and domestic spending in these economies tended to show resilience. In the case of countries such as China, the effects of a sharp slowdown in exports on GDP were masked to some extent by very large and successful fiscal and monetary stimulus packages. All round, however, and reflecting the region's tight integration with the global economy, the spillovers to the region from the collapse of world trade during the global crisis were very large.

Financial market spillovers to the region also increased sharply in the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008. These, however, turned out to be quite short lived and were somewhat easier to manage than the spillovers from the collapse of trade (IMF (2009)). Reflecting sharp increases in uncertainty and counterparty risk, international financial flows to the region fell sharply in late 2008 and incipient shortages of US dollars began to emerge in parts of the region. Both to limit spillovers to domestic financial markets and in order to maintain exchange market stability, many countries in the region adopted a range of financial and other support measures that included heavy intervention in exchange markets, and, in several cases, national authorities extended official liquidity and guarantees to financial sectors. For the most part, the measures were successful in managing the heightened financial pressures, and in protecting local financial systems (IMF (2009)). In countries such as Korea and Indonesia, however, currencies fell sharply in late 2008 and early 2009 and assistance from outside the region was needed to provide the US dollar liquidity required to stabilize exchange rates.[8]

Reflecting the adoption of huge macroeconomic stimulus and financial support measures, the global economy began to stabilize during 2009, and has subsequently been recovering from one of the sharpest economic slowdowns in the post WWII period (IMF (2010)). In its latest update on the world economic outlook released ahead of its 2010 Spring Meetings, the IMF has revised upward its projections for global growth but has remained relatively cautious about the prospects for a strong, self-sustaining and balanced global recovery.[9] The caution is related, inter alia, to ongoing weaknesses in some advanced country financial systems as well as the continued relatively weak growth in private spending in these countries. In addition, new risks have arisen associated with high levels of public debt in a number of countries and increases in tensions about currency values. Moreover, the IMF has noted that advanced countries in particular will face a number of challenges unwinding macroeconomic stimulus packages, and in getting the balance right between "going too slow" and "going too fast". In addition, some countries in Europe (notably Greece) are facing severe fiscal pressures.

The broad features of the IMF's latest projections for the world economy are as follows. Following a contraction of a little over 1/2 percent in 2009, world GDP

is expected to advance by a little over 4 percent in both 2010 and 2011, which suggests that recovery is becoming more entrenched. While this projection for global growth is considerably higher than a year ago, however, it is still well below the global growth rates of 5 percent or more recorded in the years before the crisis, and the projection masks very different expected performances across countries. Within the projection of more than 4 percent global growth for this and next year, the IMF expects the advanced countries to grow by only 2 to 2½ percent in 2010 and 2011—which would imply that economic slack in these countries would only be reduced very slowly—while the emerging and developing countries are forecast to experience growth of almost 6½ percent in both these years. Indeed, according to the IMF, the emerging and developing countries of Asia will lead the global recovery with the region's GDP forecast to increase by a shade above 8½ percent in each of 2010 and 2011. As in recent years, Asia's strong performance is seen as being led by "supercharged" growth in China and India together with rapid bounce backs in economic activity in the newly industrializing economies of Asia, and in some of the middle income ASEAN countries.

Against this background, macroeconomic policymakers around the world face a number of formidable challenges in the coming years, and there may be marked divergence in policies between the advanced and the emerging and developing countries related to their different recovery speeds (IMF (2010)). One key challenge concerns macroeconomic policy "exit strategies". On the one hand, nurturing the fragile recovery in the advanced economies, in particular, would be expected to call for the continuation of relatively high levels of macroeconomic and other policy support until such time as the private sector is able to become source of self-sustaining growth. On the other hand, the advanced countries will need as soon as feasible to unwind their large fiscal stimulus packages in order to stabilize public debt levels that are increasingly posing risks to medium-term fiscal sustainability. And, in addition, monetary easing will, at some point, need to be unwound with a view to avoiding threats to medium-term price stability. Conversely, with their economies already powering ahead and, in some cases, risking overheating, many developing and emerging market economies have already began to unwind their monetary and fiscal stimulus programs. Potentially, these different macroeconomic situations may lead to a sharp divergence in macro policies and conditions across the advanced and emerging market countries, with implications for international capital flows and exchange market pressures. As it recovering at a much faster rate than many of the advanced economies, Asia, in particular, will need to carefully manage large inflows of financial capital into the region that are searching for yield and are being driven by continued very accommodating monetary policies in many of the advanced economies.

There is also the challenge in many countries, especially the advanced countries, of removing the web of financial system guarantees and supports introduced during

the crisis with a view to transferring risk back to the private sector and limiting moral hazard. Achieving the correct timing on these exit strategies will not be easy given the high degree of uncertainty about the economic outlook and the need to avoid placing too much pressure on still fragile financial systems. Some degree of international policy coordination would be particularly important in removing these supports given the potential for adverse spillover effects linked to the removal of official guarantees in some countries but not others.

Large and persistent global current account imbalances contributed to the global economic crisis and will need to be addressed if the global economy is to sustain the rapid rates of growth experienced before the global crisis. Based on analyses by international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, Asia can make an important contribution to reducing the global imbalances by moving towards better balanced structures in which domestic as well as external demand are significant drivers of growth, and local consumption becomes a more important source of demand. Not only will such rebalancing help the world economy sustain the recovery, it will also be in the best interests of Asia and help it achieve its longer term development goals. Such rebalancing, however, will take several years to be undertaken and will involve comprehensive structural, macroeconomic and exchange rate polices. In the meantime, many Asian economies are likely to face the challenge of managing large and possibly volatile capital inflows related, inter alia, to divergences in macroeconomic policies and conditions vis-à-vis the advanced countries and, in some cases, undervalued exchange rates.

Looking beyond the global crisis, there is a need to address the financial and other weaknesses that contributed to the crisis. Under the G20 and IMF, a comprehensive set of national reforms is being considered to: expand the perimeters of supervision and regulation to ensure appropriate oversight of financial systems; address distorted incentive systems that contributed to excessive risk taking; deal better with systemic risk as well as risk at the level of individual institutions, markets and instruments; better coordinate the supervision and regulation of cross-border financial firms; and help reduce the current strong pro-cyclicality of financial systems through measures such as countercyclical regulatory capital charges (Adams (2010)). There is in addition discussion about the possible introduction of taxes or levies on financial institutions to reflect systemic risk and help fund official financial support during future crises.

Given that it will never be possible to fully avoid financial crises, efforts are also being made to better manage crises when they do occur through expanding the range of crisis management tools and seeking to make systemically important financial institutions "safe to fail" without threatening to bring the entire financial system down (Adams (2010), IMF (2009)). All countries share a strong common interest in meaningful and far reaching reforms to improve financial sector

robustness and better manage financial crises when they occur.

Against this background, the outlook for international capital flows is subject to a range of conflicting influences over both the short and medium term. In the near term, the most likely scenario is one of continued large gross capital inflows to the emerging markets, especially in Asia, punctuated by periods of volatility associated with the pace of the global recovery, and possible spillovers from concerns about elevated public debt levels in a number of advanced countries. In particular, as noted earlier, a likely trajectory is where a tightening of macroeconomic policies in the emerging markets and continued very accommodating policies in the advanced countries drives large capital inflows to regions such as Asia. Managing such inflows and seeking to ensure that they will not lead to a buildup in vulnerabilities will present formidable challenges for policymakers.

The outlook for both gross and net capital flows to the region over the medium term will depend importantly on the progress reducing global imbalances and the scope and nature of financial reforms. To the extent to which the large current account surpluses in the region are narrowed, Asia would tend to reduce its role as a net exporter of capital and make greater use of saving in the region. Accordingly, there may be a reduction in both the scale and destination of capital flows to the extent to which global imbalances are reduced. And, to the extent to which the emerging markets reduce their recent strong appetite to accumulate international reserves, there may be significant changes in the composition of capital flows away from liquid US dollar assets. In the period leading up to the global crisis, not only was Asia a major exporter of capital to the rest of the world but it was also undertaking a considerable amount of the lending through official international reserve accumulation and/or through Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). The evolution of global imbalances over the medium term has significant potential implications for the role of such official flows. In addition, the prospects for capital flows over the medium term are likely to be influenced importantly by the scope and nature of financial reform and the manner in which current weaknesses in overseeing cross border financial intermediation (especially in periods of stress) are addressed. Sustaining open international capital markets will require that significant progress be made in better managing and resolving cross border financial stress, and avoiding, solutions that involve building up separate and fragmented pools of international liquidity.[10]

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[7]For further discussion, see the Asian Development Bank's development outlook for 2009.
[8]This included, in the case of Korea, access to a US currency swap facility at the US Federal Reserve.
[9]See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2010.
[10]This would include reforms that require international banks to be established as standalone subsidiaries in different countries (IMF (2009)).

SECURITY AND MILITARY TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Yao Yunzhu

To assess the security trends and developments in Northeast Asia, we usually look at two hot spots and two sets of relationships. The two hot spots are the DPRK nuclear issue and the Taiwan issue. The two sets of relationships are those between the US and its Northeast Asian allies and that between the US and China. In that framework, the year 2009 has witnessed a fairly stable Northeast Asia. The nuclear stalemate with DPRK continues, neither turning for the better, nor for the worse. The tension cross the Taiwan Strait has been reduced substantially, but it needs more creative and bolder steps to eliminate such tension all together. The bilateral relationship between the US and its Northeastern Asia allies---Japan and the ROK remains stable and robust, even though some initial frictions show that government changes in Tokyo and Washington had some negative impact on ally relation. China and the US have interacted positively in most regional as well as global affairs, and tried hard to build upon an already mature relationship. On the whole, the two major hot spots are in a subdued state, and the bilateral, trilateral and multilateral relationships among all or any combinations of the Northeast Asia players, remain balanced and stable.

Of all the dynamics in Northeast Asia, the defining one is the interaction between China and the US. The relative decline of US leadership in the region, and the rapid rise of China presents something new for all Northeast Asian players to take into consideration. However, it will be too soon and too far-fetched to assert that a power shift, particularly a military power shift has taken place that will result in a rearrangement of regional order.

I. The DPRK Nuclear Stalemate Continues without Further Deteriorating

In the first half of 2009, we saw the DPRK taking one provocative move after another:

- On 5th April, the DPRK declared a successful launch of a communication satellite, though the US, Japan and the ROK insisted what the DPRK launched was a ballistic missile. Before the launch, there had been rumors about possible missile defense interception operations in Japan and the US.
- On 14th April, the DPRK declared withdrawal from the process of six party talks and reversal of the disabling process of its nuclear facilities.
- On 25th May, the DPRK exploded its second nuclear device, causing strong international responses.
- On 26th May, the ROK announced its decision to join the US sponsored PSI

regime.

- On 27th May, the DPRK declared withdrawal from the Armistice Agreement in Korea *(Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea)*, signed in 1953 at Panmunjom, which is the current legal document guarantee peace on the Peninsula.
- In a period of 6 days after the nuclear test on May 25, the DPRK test fired 5 short ranged missiles.
- On 12th June, the UN Security Council passed the UNSC resolution 1874 anonymously, strongly denouncing the DPRK and launched a new set of sanctions against it.

Although domestic considerations can be cited as major incentives for these provocations, external considerations cannot be excluded. These considerations include: getting more attention from the newly sworn in Obama administration, who had expressed willingness to be more engaging and flexible in its North Korean policy; taking a harsher stance against the ROK, whose President Lee Myung-bak had given up the "sun-shine policy" toward the North adopted by his two predecessors, and asserting the DPRK's nuclear weapon status.

After the UNSC resolution 1874 was passed, other players of the 6 party talks seemed to come to the consensus that they, while putting more concrete and stronger sanctions in place, could shelf the DPRK nuclear issue for a moment. Indifference to the DPRK provocations in the following months featured the crisis management process in 2009. However, by August, the DPRK signaled its readiness for another round of bargaining and began to reach out. Diplomacy picked up momentum gradually. In early August, former US President Bill Clinton visited North Korea and secured the release of two American reporters sentenced to 12 years of hard labor for illegally entering the country. On the 13th of August, Hyundai Group chairwoman Hyun Jung Eun visited Pyongyang. She was received by Kim Jong Il who virtually agreed to all her requests including the release of a Hyundai worker detained by the North, the lift of border restrictions with South Korea to allow reunions of separated families, and the resumption of stalled tourism ventures in Diamond Mountain resort and ancient sites in Kaesong in the North. Along with the lessening of tension between the two Koreas, China increased its effort as a mediator. It sent several delegations to Pyongyang. From 3rd to 5th October, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid a state visit to the DPRK and Kim Jong Il promised him that the DPRK remained as committed as ever to the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.[11] Later, North Korea received President Obama's special envoy Stephen Bosworth for a three-day visit, which ended on 10th December. Bosworth stated that North Korea and the United States

shared an understanding of the necessity but not the timing of reconvening six party talks and carrying out the September 19th agreement reached in 2005 to dismantle the North's nuclear weapons programs.[12] Although both visits failed to bring the DPRK immediately back to the SPT, they helped to set up the stage for a more comprehensive international effort. The security situation, tense as it had always been, has come to the point where some new initiative might prove fruitful. The most recent reaching out action from the DPRK can be found in a New Year Message released by its official news agency on January 1st, calling for an end to hostile relations with the US, and reiterating its commitment to making the Korean peninsula nuclear-free through negotiations. The regime of SPT, having withstood the numerous setbacks, proved itself to be the vehicle that all sides would accept to deal with the DPRK nuclear issue. And the Northeast Asia players, in solving the nuclear issue, have developed a way of cooperative interaction, an approach of seeking common security interests and a relationship that proves to be strong, mature and enduring.

In future discussions, in addition to the continued implementation of the 2005 September 19th agreement, some longer term issues should also be addressed, including when and how the US can begin direct bilateral talks (even within the framework of SPT) with the DPRK on normalization of relations, whether and how the 4 concerned parties (North Korea, South Korea, China and the US) can replace the current armistice treaty with a peace treaty, how Japan can solve its abduction issue with the DPRK and normalize relations, and how the two Koreas can reconcile with each other and interact more constructively in their relationship.

II. Taiwan Strait Tension Reduces but More Creative Thinking is Needed

The Taiwan issue is another hot spot in Northeast Asia. It is the major obstacle for China to develop relations with the US and Japan and also a potential flash point where conflicting interests can possibly drag the two nuclear powers face to face into a war. Since mid-1990s, the Taiwan authorities began to seek independence. The two previous Taiwanese leaders, Li Denghui and Chen Shuibian, manipulated the issue of independence for partisan politics. By doing so, they not only split and polarized the Taiwanese society, but also alarmed the US who had ambiguously committed itself to the defense of Taiwan by a domestic law entitled "Taiwan Relations Act" in 1979. In playing up the independence issue, the two previous Taiwan "presidents" deliberately provoked the PRC to react strongly so that the US would get involved. At the end of Li's term, the US had taken him as a trouble maker and tried several times to keep him down. And the Bush administration got so impatient with Chen that when he tried to hold a referendum to provoke China, Bush made a public statement when meeting the visiting PRC Premier that he thought the referendum was an attempt to change the status quo, which the US opposed.

The election of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in 2008 provided a chance for both sides to stabilize the situation and reduce cross-strait tension. The issue of independence has been played down and efforts diverted to economic and cultural interaction. Cross strait trade in 2008 amounted to 129.2 billion, a 3.8 percent increase over 2007, with a 77.4 billion surplus for Taiwan. Taiwan is China's 7th trade partner, 9th market and 5th importer. Half of Taiwan's investment is in the mainland and more than one fourth of Taiwan's trade surplus is from the mainland. An estimated one million Taiwanese live, study, do business or travel in China every day. Many of them have chosen to live on the mainland more permanently. Taiwan opened tourism to mainland Chinese in July 2008 and over 100,000 mainlanders toured Taiwan in 2008. For 2009, the estimated number is at nearly one million. Exchange in every field is just a daily occurrence. Increased interdependence strengthened the bond between the two sides.

However, more creative and bolder steps need to be taken to eliminate military tension and establish a stable peace regime cross the strait. On 31st Dec, 2008, PRC President Hu Jingtao announced a "Six Point Proposal" to solve the Taiwan issue. The last point is to end the state of hostility and reach a peace agreement, for in theory, the two sides are still in a state of war since the civil war started more than 60 years ago. To achieve this, he also suggested that military confidence building measures be promoted. The Taiwan leader has so far made no explicit response to this point. In the first *National Defense Report* release on 20th October 2009 by the Ma Ying-jeou government, "the promotion of cross strait CBMs" has for the first time been included and several concrete measures such as the setting up of a defense hot line, the discussion about code of conduct in the strait for military aircraft and ships, and the reduction of military deployment confronting each other are mentioned.[14] However, both Ma Ying-jeou and the *National Defense Report* have requested the mainland to withdraw the missiles against Taiwan and renounce the use of military means as a last resort against Taiwan independence, before starting peace negotiations and set up CBM regimes. The basic conclusion drawn by the *National Defense Report* is "in the near future, the state of hostility will not be terminated with the thawing of cross strait relations".[15] It is no easy job to do away sixty years of hostility and distrust overnight. However, both sides are probing all possibilities in establishing military contacts. One such step is meetings between retired general officers who have met in the mainland and on Taiwan.

III. US Relation with its Northeast Asia Allies

The year 2009 has seen a strengthening of US led alliances in Northeast Asia. Three major drivers are at work in transforming the cold-war-era alliances to ones that can better confront the 21st century challenges: the first is the current security concern about the DPRK. The second is the need to better deal with new security challenges which are transnational in nature, such as terrorism, natural disaster,

energy security, proliferation of WMD, and environmental degradation. The third has to do with a mid- to long-term anxiety about the possible change of power balance between the US and China in Northeast Asia and Asia-Pacific. The need to hedge against a rising China, and particularly a militarily rising China looms larger and larger in US-Japan and US-ROK alliance relationships.

The US-ROK alliance

The US-ROK alliance strengthened steadily with the coming into power of South Korea's Grand National Party in 2008. President Lee Myung Bak shows more willingness to partner with the US in peninsula, regional and even global security affairs. The new vitality in the relationship was best illustrated at the June 16, 2009 summit of Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung Bak in Washington DC, which produced a joint statement titled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea".

Concerning the DPRK, the ROK has two worries. The first is that the US would tolerate North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapon state and shift its policy from denuclearization to non-proliferation. The second worry is that by returning the OPCON to the ROK military by 2012, the US would reduce its defense commitment to the ROK. The joint statement addressed these two issues by emphasizing the importance of the US-ROK alliance as the "cornerstone of the U.S.-ROK security relationship, which has guaranteed peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for over fifty years". And the US reassured the ROK by stressing the extended deterrence, including a nuclear umbrella to the South Koreans, and the determination to achieve "a complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile programs"[16].

The ROK is also concerned that the US, in the long run, will have to retreat in face of China's rise, and abandon its defence commitment to ROK. This concern pushes it to place greater emphasis on the alliance relation with the U.S. and cooperation with US in security affairs beyond the Peninsula. Included in the Joint Vision, is also the willingness on both sides to enlarge the strategic alliance to "bilateral, regional and global scope", which has been exemplified by ROK's troop support of US military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan[17].

These developments shows South Korea moving away from the role of a Northeast Asia "balancer", proposed by President Roh Moo-hyun a few years ago, to a role of closer ally of the US.

The US-Japan alliance

On August 30, 2009, Japanese legislative election brought the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) into power for the first time. This unprecedented change in government set the stage for changes in foreign policy. Some recent events raised speculations about the future of US-Japan alliance.

- In late October, Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba stated his intention to withdraw the Maritime Self- Defense Force (MSDF) from the fueling mission in the Indian Ocean for the US-led military operation in and around Afghanistan when the mission expires this month (January 15 2010). The refueling mission began in 2001 by a Japanese law on special measures against terrorism. The law was lastly revised to extend the mission to another 6 months on 15 July 2009.
- The new Japanese government delayed the relocation of Futenma US marine airbase and thousands of troops as requested by a 2006 agreement between Japan and the US. Prime Minister Hatoyama faced domestic political pressure to reconsider the decision. However, the US is firm and demands the Japanese to comply with the previous agreement. On 22 Dec 2009, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the Japanese ambassador to Washington Ichiro Fujisaki, that Japan must move the Futenma airbase from a crowded city on Okinawa to the island's remote east coast as planned.
- The new DPJ government also conducted an investigation into a secret pact between the two nations, whereby US military vessels or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons could stop over Japanese territory. Such an accord goes against the three principles of not possessing, manufacturing or permitting nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. Previous Liberal Democratic Party governments had repeatedly denied the existence of such a tacit agreement.
- Some statement by Japanese high ranking officials suggested fundamental shifts in long held government policy. For instance, Foreign Minister Okada has called for the US to declare a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear posture, and questioned the justification of Japan's requirement for US nuclear extended deterrence. [18]

Despite of all these contentious interactions between the newly elected DPJ government and the US, drastic change will not take place in Japan-US alliance. The shared security interests remain unchanged, which provide a firm foundation for the alliance. It is believed that after some initial minor frictions, the relationship will be back on track. We should watch what will happen when the US and Japan get together in celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan signed on the 19th of January, 1960.

One last point I need to discuss concerns China. On the one hand, China's rise is one of the major drivers for alliance transformation. On the other hand, such transformation has profound implication to China's security and military calculations. The US, Japan and the ROK, while strengthening ties among them, have to avoid being perceived by China as taking "containing" or even "encircling" efforts against it.

IV. Security and Military Interactions between China and the US

Compared with the other three security variables in Northeast Asia, Sino-American interaction in security and military fields is by far the most defining one. Final solution of the two hot spots, building up of mutually beneficial relationships, and peace and stability in the region, would all depend on the future interactions of the two great powers. Along with the rise of China, the talks of G2[19] emerged. And a new term "Chimerican"[20] was coined to emphasize the importance of Sino-American relationship. Although I personally doubt very much both concepts, I agree that the importance of Sino-American relation cannot be overemphasized. In China's foreign policy, a stable relationship with the US has been the single most important objective for two decade. In recent years, the US began to echo China in defining its relationship with China as the most important. Important as the relationship is, it takes great sophistication and wisdom to manage.

Early last year, President Obama took over from President Bush the most stable Sino-American relationship since the end of the Cold War, and started to build up it. In view of his different approach in international affairs--- to be more engaging in posture, more consultative in attitude, and more attentive to differences, further improvements in the bilateral relationship are to be expected. In President Obama's recent visit to China (November 15–18, 2009), the two sides described their bilateral relationship in very positive terms as can be seen in the joint statement.

> *"The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs."* [21]

By saying that, the American President assures China that the US does not consider a rising China as a threat or potential threat, and will not try to contain its peaceful rise.

Another sentence in the joint statement defines China's perspective of the US.

> *"China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region."*[22]

By saying that, China assures the US that in the process of its rise, it would not

challenge, or to put it in a more affirmative way, it would accept the leading and dominant role of the US in the Asia Pacific region. History has not repeated itself so far, when fierce conflicts occurred between a rising power and a status quo power, which in most cases had led to wars. China wants to incorporate itself into the existing international order from which China has benefited a lot. And the US wants to bring China into the existing international order in which it plays a dominant role. As we can see from history, a better overall relationship has a defining positive impact on security and military relations. The year 2009 witnessed the gradual improvement of military to military relationship between China and the US, which had suffered a major setback in October 2008 when the Bush Administration decided on a whole package of arms sale to Taiwan.

While China shares increased common interest with the US in solving global issues like financial crisis, climate change, energy security, nuclear non-proliferation, counter terrorism, and other non-traditional security issues and increased common interests with all Northeast Asia states in maintaining a peaceful and stable region, some fundamental conflicts remain. These include America's involvement in Taiwan, the orientation of US military alliances in Asia Pacific area and the realignment of US military presence in Asia-Pacific region, disputes over maritime rights and demarcations, and most importantly, strategic distrust resulted from different political systems and values.

The strategic distrust, translated into security and military interactions, frequently presented itself as negative interpretations of each other's military moves. The US and its allies in Northeast Asia, are concerned about Chinese military modernization and its impact on the military power balance in Northeast Asia. To them, some of China's military developments are particularly challenging, including anti-space weapons, advanced land attack ballistic missiles, new classes of submarines and surface ships, new generation of fighters, and possible ballistic missile capability to hit ships at sea.[23] Some alarmists even think that China's military programs "are designed to re-order the balance of power in China's favor by diminishing American strategic mobility and free access to Pacific waters, Pacific airspace, and the 'high terrain' of space and cyberspace… And this puts at risk American influence, regional security and alliance interdependence".[24] Some other analysts would use historical analogy to predict the inevitable clash between China (the continental power), and the US, or the US-Japan alliance (the maritime powers) when the former tried to challenge the vital interests of the later by going to sea. They regard China's naval buildup as the beginning of a great power conflict in the future.[25]

In my view, the talk about a military or maritime power shift that will rearrange regional order in China's favor, are only wishful or fearful (depending on where you stand) speculations. The reasons are: firstly, the political relationship as

I mentioned before is improving steadily. This is a defining factor. After three decades of complicated interactions, both the US and China have learned to accommodate future uncertainties while working together for current common interests. For the US it means to engage and hedge at the same time. For China, it means to cooperate and challenge at the same time. Both have and will continue to use the whole set of tools for national security, including cooperation, consultation, deterrence, prevention, assurance, persuasion, dissuasion, confidence building, signaling, show of will and even of force. However, because of the huge stakes, both would be very cautious to stop short of a military conflict. Secondly, The US is and will for a long time in the future remains the world No. 1 military power, the only great power with global force projection capabilities. China has not even developed a regional power projection capability, let alone those confronting the US globally. The exaggerated descriptions of Chinese military capabilities are some time pure imagination. Thirdly, China's grand strategy is to develop peacefully, by incorporating itself into the world order led by the US. It will be against China's interest to upset such an order from which it has benefitted a lot. And lastly, the process of China's rise and integration into the world order will parallel the process of socialization for China, the US, and other Northeast Asia players to interact with each other. A new regional configuration featuring multilateralism; bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally balanced power structure; shared interests; cooperative approach; and win-win mindset would in the future emerge in the Northeast Asia region. And all the players will find themselves comfortably fit into this configuration.

Finally, I would wrap up by arguing that security and military trends and developments are generally positive in Northeast Asia in the year of 2009. The two hot spots, though remained unresolved, were subdued. The US has kept strong and robust ties with its allies, which is the foundation for maintaining current power balance. Sino-American relations kept improving, while doubts remain as to possible future power shift.

Endnotes

[11]China's Xinhua reported on October 6th that Kim Jong Il stated that "realizing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula was the instruction of the late DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and the DPRK's commitment to realizing the denuclearization of the peninsula remains unchanged." Based on this commitment, Kim pledged in his meeting with Wen that that "the DPRK is willing to attend multilateral talks, including the six-party talks, based on the progress in the DPRK-U.S. talks." KCNA reported that "the hostile relations between the DPRK and the United States should be converted into peaceful ties through the bilateral talks without fail. We expressed our readiness to hold multilateral talks, depending on the

outcome of the DPRK-U.S. talks. The six-party talks are also included in the multilateral talks."

[12]Choe Sang-Huna, The New York Times, December 11, 2009, page A6.

[13]Associated Press January 1, 2010.

[14]中华民国国防部，"第八章，开创和平，《国防报告书》，2009年10月20日，http://163.29.3.66/index_01.html

[15]中华民国国防部，《国防报告书》，2009年10月20日，http://163.29.3.66/index_01.html

[16]The White House Press Office, "JOINT VISION FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA", June 16, 2009.

[17]The White House Press Office, "JOINT VISION FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA", June 16, 2009.

[18]On 18th October, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada called on the United States to make a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in Kyoto. Okada made the remarks when the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) opened the fourth session in Hiroshima. He criticized Japan's inconsistence on the issue, saying: "It is very debatable whether there is a discrepancy for (the Japanese government) to argue strongly, on the one hand, for the elimination of nuclear weapons while also saying to please use nuclear weapons as a first strike for Japan. China Daily, October 19th, 2009.

[19]Zbigniew Brzezinski first comes up with this concept in his article "The Group of Two That Could Change the World", Financial Times (UK), January 14, 2009.

[20]A term coined by Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick describing the symbiotic relationship between China and the United States. Ferguson describes Chimerica as one economy which "accounts for around 13 percent of the world's land surface, a quarter of its population, about a third of its gross domestic product, and somewhere over half of the global economic growth of the past six years.

[21]"*U.S.-China Joint Statement*", Beijing, China, November 17, 2009.

[22]"*U.S.-China Joint Statement*", Beijing, China, November 17, 2009.

[23]Paul S. Giarra and Michael J. Green, "Asia's Military Balance at a Tipping Point", *The Wall Street Journal*, July 17 2009.

[24]Paul S. Giarra and Michael J. Green, "Asia's Military Balance at a Tipping Point", *The Wall Street Journal*, July 17 2009.

[25]James Kraska, "How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015", *Orbis* Winter 2010 pp 35-45.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Rommel C. Banlaoi

Introduction

Compared with South Asia, Northeast Asia and West Asia, the security environment in Southeast Asia has been relatively more peaceful and stable since the end of the cold war. Though the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks made Southeast Asia the second front in the American-led global war on terrorism, the norm of regional cooperation fostered by the ASEAN has created a more benign regional security architecture compared with other sub-regions in the Asia Pacific.

However, Southeast Asia continues to face several sources of regional instabilities emanating from long-standing border and maritime boundary disputes. These boundary disputes foment bilateral and multilateral tensions encouraging armed forces in Southeast Asia to upgrade their military capabilities, which, in turn, exacerbate regional strategic anxieties that enormously affect the dynamics of inter-state security relations. These regional trends and developments perpetuate the security dilemmas facing Southeast Asia in the 21st century.[26]

Security Dilemma: A Framework for Analysis

Security dilemma is an appropriate framework to analyze military developments and relations in Southeast Asia. Security dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state create an un-resolvable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether those preparations are for "defensive" or "offensive" purposes.[27] With the concept of security dilemma, states are always in a "guessing game" situation where security officials desperately speculate on the strategic intention of their neighbors whether their military preparations are benign or malign. States perceptions of security dilemma create a great paradox in which states perceive, whether rightly or wrongly, that their security inevitably requires the insecurity of others.[28] This difficult situation inevitably occurs because of the anarchic nature of international system where there is a terrible absence of an overarching authority that can effectively regulate the inward-looking and selfish behavior of sovereign states.

In an anarchic international environment, states constantly compete with one another in order to protect their sovereignty and to pursue their national interest vis-à-vis other states.[29] Though other theories of international relations contend that the state of anarchy can also encourage states to cooperate with each other

by building international regimes[30] or constructing international norms,[31] it is, however, lamentable that mutual suspicions continue to describe the grim reality of international politics.

Thus, security dilemma is a gargantuan tragedy because war can occur between and among states though none of them desire such a tragic outcome.[32] Because each state is mandated to pursue its own national interests, security uncertainties pervade in the relations among states. Uncertainties also create security anxieties among states. This situation, in turn, exacerbates the security dilemma in the anarchic system. With the perception of a security dilemma, states are trapped in a reality where they build military capabilities to make themselves secure, which, unfortunately, makes others insecure.

Military Strengths and Capabilities of Southeast Asian Countries

Southeast Asian countries have different military strengths and capabilities. Though all of them are pursuing force modernization programs[33] as a result of their economic growth, they all claim that their forces are meant for defensive and not for offensive purposes; directed against internal rather than external threats; and, intended to bolster their capabilities to respond to current and emerging non-traditional security challenges.[34] In fact, all states in Southeast Asia have expressed no intention of invading their neighbors despite the unresolved bilateral tensions among them.3[5] They all uphold the regional principle of pacific settlement of disputes, which means that they all agree to manage their existing disputes without the use of their military forces.

Since the end of the cold war, Southeast Asian countries have been increasing their individual military power as part of their nation-building and sovereignty-enhancing efforts. Though the 1997 Asian financial crisis strongly disturbed the momentum of their military capability development programs, the security implications of the aftermath of 9/11 have encouraged these countries to continuously upgrade their armed forces by building up their military personnel and by allocating budget for defence procurement.

Table 1 shows the ratio of military personnel in Southeast Asian countries against their total population and land area. From Table 1, it can be seen that in terms of absolute number, Vietnam has the largest armed forces in Southeast Asia followed by Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Laos, Brunei and East Timor.

Table 1

Ratio of Military Personnel in Southeast Asia Against Total Population and Land Area, 2009

Countries	Land Area (SQ KM)	Total Population (Estimate)	Active Military Personnel (Estimate)	Ratio of 1 Military Personnel to Population	Ratio of 1 Military Personnel to Land Area in SQ KM
Brunei	5,271	381,371	7,000	54	1
Cambodia	176,519	14,241,640	124,300	115	1
East Timor	14,609	1,040,880	1,286	809	11
Indonesia	1,811,831	237,512,355	302,000	786	6
Laos	230,800	6,677,534	29,000	230	8
Malaysia	328,549	25,274,133	109,000	232	3
Myanmar	657,741	47,758,181	406,000	118	2
Philippines	298,171	92,681,453	106,000	874	3
Singapore	624	4,608,167	72,500	64	0
Thailand	511,771	65,493,298	306,600	214	2
Vietnam	325,361	86,116,559	455,000	189	1

Sources: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2009*.
PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, January 2010.

Figure 1
Ranking of Armed Forces in Southeast Asia as of January 2010



Sources: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2009*.
PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, January 2010.

Figure 1, on the other hand, shows the ranking of armed forces in Southeast Asia as of January 2010. This figure clearly indicates that the largest concentration of armed forces in Southeast Asia is in the Indochina region where land border disputes are serious. But in terms of land area, Indonesia has the largest territory to defend followed by Myanmar and Thailand (Figure 2). Singapore has the smallest

Figure 2
Ranking of Southeast Asian States in terms of Land Area



Source: PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, January 2010.

land area to protect followed by Brunei. Getting the ratio of the size of armed forces with the land area, Singapore has the most ideal armed-forces-land-area ratio followed by Brunei and East Timor (Figure 3).

Figure 3
Armed-Forces-Land-Area Ratio in Southeast Asia



Source: PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, January 2010.

In terms of the number of population to be protected, Indonesia has the largest population while Brunei has the lowest population in the region (Figure 4). In terms of armed-forces-population ratio, Brunei has the most ideal situation followed by Singapore, Cambodia and Myanmar. The Philippines has the worst armed-forces-population ratio followed by East Timor and Indonesia (Figure 5). These figures demonstrate that in terms of the ratio of their armed forces vis-à-vis

population and land area, Brunei and Singapore are in the most ideal situation. Even in defence spending, Brunei and Singapore have overpowered larger states of Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines.

Figure 4
Ranking of Southeast Asian Countries in Terms of Population



Source: PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, January 2010.

Figure 5
Armed-Forces-Population Ratio in Southeast Asia



Source: PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, January 2010.

Since 2001, defence spending in Southeast Asia has been substantial in order to support the purchase of military equipment, which, according to their governments, aims to increase military capability to combat terrorism and to deal with internal armed challenges. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, Singapore and Brunei, despite being small geographically, have the biggest military expenditures in Southeast Asia as a percentage of their GDP and in terms of US dollar value from 2001-2007.[11]

Table 2
Military Expenditures in Southeast Asia
As Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 2001-2007

Countries	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Brunei	5.2	5.3	5.1	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.6
Cambodia	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1
East Timor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	1	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2
Laos	.7	.6	.6	.5	.4	.4	.4
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	1	1	1	.9	.9	.9	.9
Singapore	5	5.1	5.1	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.1
Thailand	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.3
Vietnam	-	-	2	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.1

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2009.

Table 3
Military Expenditures in Southeast Asia In US Million Dollar, 2001-2009

Countries	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Brunei	234	249	260	205	249	260	268	266
Cambodia	78.4	71.9	72.3	70.1	70.6	76.5	85.5	-
East Timor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	2,367	2,486	3,319	3,653	3,571	3,802	4,131	3,824
Laos	15.9	14.8	12.8	12.1	11.7	11.9	11.8	-
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	794	833	920	857	865	880	1,034	920
Singapore	4,741	4,999	5,048	5,143	5,464	5,670	5,806	5,831
Thailand	2,063	2,087	2,058	1,962	1,977	2,060	2,569	3,003
Vietnam	-	-	910	906	945	1,112	1,274	1,327

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute , 2009.

From Tables 2 and 3, Brunei and Singapore are the top military spenders in Southeast Asia. In fact, Brunei and Singapore belong to the top 15 military spenders in the world in 2008 based on the data generated by SIPRI (Figure 6). Military spending in Southeast Asia is used to fund purchase of military equipment and to support the morale and welfare of their armed forces personnel. In the case of Singapore, military spending aims to sustain its defense industrialization programs.

Figure 6
World's Top 15 Military Spenders in 2008



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2008.

With the exemption of Singapore, and to a certain extent Indonesia and Malaysia, Southeast Asian countries still have embryonic national defence industries. Despite the efforts of Southeast Asian countries to modernize their armed forces, their defence industrial base (DIB) remains generally weak and is considered to be in its lower stages of industrial development (Table 4).[37]

Table 4
Defense Industrial Development of Southeast Asian Countries

ASEAN Countries	Defense Industrial Environment
Brunei	Undeveloped. It buys weapons primarily from UK and France.
Cambodia	Undeveloped. It buys arms primarily from China.
Indonesia	Developing. But it continues to rely on the procurement of weapons from US, Holland, Russia, Israel and France.
Laos	Undeveloped. It buys weapons from China, France and Russia.
Malaysia	Developing. Though it produces small arms and 105mm artillery shells, it continues to rely on foreign sources, primarily from the United Kingdom. It also buys weapons from Russia and France.
Myanmar	Undeveloped. It even has a limited capability to purchase weapons. It buys weapons from Russia and barters some from North Korea. But China is its major sources of cheap weapons.
Philippines	Undeveloped. Though it has the Government Arsenal, it continues to import weapons primarily from the United States.
Singapore	Developed. It is considered as the role model of developing countries in the area of defense industry. It has a strong arms industry that caters to domestic and exports needs. The Singapore Technologies (ST) is the holding company for most of its arms industry.
Thailand	Undeveloped. Although it produces some ammunition, it heavily relies on foreign sources for virtually all defense-related equipments. It buys weapons from the US, China and UK.
Vietnam	Undeveloped. It buys weapons from, France North Korea and Russia.

Source: Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Globalization's Impact on Defense Industry in Southeast Asia", in Geoffrey Till, Emrys Chew, Joshua Ho (eds), *Globalization and Defense in the Asia Pacific: Arms Across Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

Based on Keith Krause's linear stages of defense industrial development, most countries in Southeast Asia are still in stages 1-5 of defense industrialization. Malaysia was considered to have already reached stage 6, while Indonesia stage 7. Singapore has the most developed DIB reaching stages 8-10. In fact, Singapore is the only country in Southeast Asia belonging to the top twenty countries with the largest arms industries in the world. The ST is the country's pre-eminent defense firm that has developed capabilities to produce arms not only for domestic but also for global markets.

Force Modernizations Drivers

From the aforementioned figures and tables, Southeast Asian states have been modernizing their military on the basis of their economic growth. There are at least three major drivers of military modernizations and development in Southeast Asia: 1) Bilateral tensions among ASEAN countries; 2) Maritime Boundary disputes in the SCS; and 3) Military Rise of China. Other issues like non-traditional security threats and internal security concerns also affect, in a varying intensity, force modernization trends in Southeast Asia – but they are beyond the scope of this paper.

Bilateral Tensions among ASEAN Countries

ASEAN states have long-standing bilateral tensions as a result of border and maritime disputes. Malaysia has border and territorial disputes with Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Thailand has border disputes with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam while Vietnam has border disputes with Cambodia and maritime disputes with Indonesia. These unresolved bilateral disputes are occasional sources of irritants among Southeast Asian countries.[41]

Table 5
Bilateral Border/Territorial Disputes in Southeast Asia

Malaysia – Thailand	Dispute over their land boundary as well as over the demarcation of maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand.
Malaysia – Indonesia	Dispute over the ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan islands.
Malaysia – Singapore	Dispute over Pedra Branca island.
Malaysia - Philippines	Dispute over Sabah and Sulu Sea.
Malaysia – Brunei	Disputes over Limbang and maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, including Louisa Reef.
Thailand - Myanmar	Dispute over their land boundary.
Thailand – Laos	Dispute over their land boundary.
Thailand – Cambodia	Dispute over their land boundary.
Indonesia – Vietnam	Maritime dispute over Natuna island.
Vietnam – Cambodia	Conflict over the Puolo Wai and Tang islands.

Source: Narayanan Ganesan, *Bilateral Tension in the Post-Cold War ASEAN* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).

Despite these lingering bilateral tensions, Southeast Asia countries have prevented military conflicts among them as a result of unique institutional mechanisms and frameworks for regional security cooperation and conflict management guaranteed by the idea of an ASEAN security community.[42] Under the rubric of ASEAN, a Southeast Asian security system is established and this diminishes the likelihood of inter-state wars in the region.[43]

Figure 7
Territorial Disputes in Southeast Asia



Source: PIPVTR Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies, January 2010.

Maritime Disputes in the SCS

Among the territorial disputes in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea Disputes (SCSD) is the most influential driver of military modernizations in the region. The SCSD continues to serve as one of the potential sources of military conflicts in the Asia Pacific region. The SCSD also remains a source of maritime security dilemma in Asia and continue to play a destabilizing role in the security of the Asia Pacific region.[45]

But the various confidential building measures being initiated by all stakeholders are positive trends towards the peaceful resolution of the disputes.[46] The signing in 2002 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS by China and all ten member-states of ASEAN was a very important achievement to prevent the escalation of conflicts in the disputed area.

However, regional tensions in the SCS re-emerged in 2007 when the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PROC) declared Sansha as part of its Hainan province. Vietnam, which also claims the island, strongly protested, but to no avail as China reiterated its territorial rights and stressed its sovereign power to use force to protect its territories.[47] In 2008, another tension occurred in the South China involving the Philippines and China on the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) issue. Oppositions claimed that the JMSU was a "sell-out" of Philippine territory in exchange of Chinese aid. The issue created a huge national scandal in the Philippines prompting the Philippine government to scrap China-funded projects in the country particularly the National Broadband Network (NBN) project worth US$329.5 million. Even the North Luzon Railway (NorthRail) project, worth US$503 million, was put on uncertain ground because of the JMSU controversy.[48]

But the most controversial incident that caught the world attention on the SCS was the disclosure in mid-2008 of a China's Naval/Submarine Base in Yulin (Sanya) island of Hainan province. The existence of this naval base is a clear indication of China's growing naval power capabilities in the post-9/11 era.

Figure 8
China's Naval Base in Sanya/Yulin Island in the South China Sea

Source: Federation of American Scientists, 2008.

Military Rise of China

There is no doubt that China is the fastest growing power in the world today. Its phenomenal economic growth of almost 9 percent annually since 1979 is giving rise to China as a comprehensive power.[50] This draws Southeast Asia countries into free-trade agreements, strategic partnerships and military exchanges and security dialogues. China is presently using its economic leverage and other soft-power capabilities to increase its influence in Southeast Asia and demonstrate its growing great power status not only in Asia but also in the global community

of nations.[51] China's burgeoning economic power also has spillover effects on China's expanding military power causing security concerns in Southeast Asia.[52] In 2007 alone, it has been noted that China's defense budget has reached US$ 44.94 billion, representing an increase of 17.8 percent compared to 2006 (Figures 9 and 10). The 2006 military spending has in fact doubled the defense budget in 2000. In 2009, China's defense budget grew by 14 percent, which is equivalent to US$70 billion.

Figure 9
China's Defense Budget, 1999-2008
In billion US $



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense - *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China* 2008.

Figure 10
China' Defense Spending, 1996-2008



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense - *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China* 2009.

If the current rate of China's defense spending continues, it is projected that China's defense expenditure will reach threefold or US$185 billion by 2025 (Figure 11). It is even forecasted that by 2025, China will become the second largest economy in the world with a status of leading military power in Asia.

Figure 11
Projected Rise in Chinese Defense Spending, 2003-2025



Source: National Intelligence Council, *2020 Project: Mapping the Global Future*, 2004.

China has also been rapidly developing its naval capabilities causing security anxieties in Southeast Asia. China now has at least 60 submarines including 13 Song class submarines 2 Yuan class submarines. China was also expecting delivery of additional 15 Kilo class submarines from Russia. It has also adopted a plan to develop an Aircraft carrier creating security tensions not only in Southeast Asia but also in the entire international community. Tensions escalated on 8 March 2009 when US naval ship, Impeccable, came close to collision with Chinese Navy in the contested waters of the SCS just 120 km south of Hainan Province. Five Chinese boats reportedly harassed the US ship. The *Impeccable* incident renewed the maritime rivalry between the US and China in the SCS.

On 10 March 2009, China deployed its largest and most modern naval ship, *Yuzheng 311,* to patrol China's exclusive economic zone and strengthen fishery administration in the SCS. The deployment of this ship to the SCS was in reaction to the US Navy surveillance ship, *Impeccable*, which according to Chinese officials, were navigating illegally in China's territorial waters. The ship deployment alarmed Southeast Asia, particularly the claimant states. It coincided at a time when the Philippines signed into law in March 2009 its archipelagic baselines law declaring some parts of the Spratlys as integral part of its territory. China vehemently denounced the Philippine archipelagic baselines law and declared Philippine claim as "illegal" and "invalid." The deployment of *Yuzheng 311* to the South China Sea was an indication of China's readiness to use its military might when the twin-issues of state sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake.[54]

Force Modernization Updates

Bilateral tensions among ASEAN countries, maritime boundary disputes in the SCS, and the military rise of China are drivers of force modernizations and developments in Southeast Asia.

When the issue of Yulin (Sanya) Submarine Base in Hainan Province became controversial in mid-2008, it raised alarms in Southeast Asia as it was reported that the Sanya Submarine Base had a Jin Class type ballistic missile submarine that could enhance China's sea-based deterrent capability. As a reaction, Southeast Asian claimants became more serious in their programs to upgrade their naval capabilities. Though military upgrade in Southeast Asia maybe regarded as a reaction to China's growing military power in the region, it also created impacts on intra-ASEAN security relations because of existing bilateral tensions.

Among countries in Southeast Asia, Vietnam and Singapore took external defense more seriously compared with other states in the region. It is even argued that "Of Southeast Asia's 11 states, both Vietnam and Singapore have good reasons to feel strategically uncomfortable in relation to their larger neighbors and consequently take external defense more seriously than other Southeast Asian states". [55]

Vietnam, for example, ordered in 2007 two Gepard Class frigates from Russia. Vietnam also decided in December 2009 to procure six Kilo-class submarines from Russia to increase its maritime capabilities. It has also been reported that Vietnam has signed in February 2010 a contract to purchase 12 versatile SU-30 Russian fighter jets as part of Hanoi's US$1 billion (S$1.42 billion) agreement with Moscow.[56] The purchase of these fighter jets was intended to bolster Vietnam's air capability in the light of the rising security tensions in the SCS. Since 2001, in fact, Vietnam defense procurement has focused on increasing its naval capabilities with the local construction of three corvettes, refurbishment of three Petya-class frigates and modernization of its coastal-surveillance radar system.[57]

Singapore, on the other hand, has been steadily investing in defense since 2001 to enhance and its military capabilities. In August 2008, Singapore received the delivery of six Formidable-class frigates, which were all commissioned in 2009. Singapore also ordered 24 F-15SG combat aircrafts.

Reacting to the military upgrade of China, Vietnam and Singapore, Malaysia has seriously engaged in defense capabilities development. Since 2001, Malaysia "has invested significantly in re-equipping its armed forces."33[58] The Malaysian Navy continues to receive submarine training in France. Malaysia also started the local manufacturing of four Meko-100-type large patrol vessels, which are all expected to be commissioned in 2010. It also acquired in October 2009 a Scorpene Class submarine to bolster its capability to guard its waters.

Brunei has also purchased three offshore patrol vessels in 2009 stationed at Muara naval station facing the South China Sea. Since 2001, Brunei has acquired three F-2000 Corvettes, three Waspada guided-missile Patrol Crafts, three Perwira-class inshore Patrol Boats, two Amphibious Warfare Crafts, two Landing Crafts, 17 small-armed river crafts, and 23 Marine police patrol boats, among others.

Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand also have their own military modernization programs. Because of budgetary challenges, their defense procurement was largely limited to second-hand equipment. The Philippines, for example, continues to rely on Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from US. Since 2002, the Philippines has received from the US a total of only $20M from the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) that was used mainly for the maintenance of equipment and transport of EDA acquired UH-IH helicopters. In 2003, the Philippines received from the US one Cyclone Class Patrol Boat worth $15 million. To strengthen its capability for maritime security, the Philippines is implementing the Coast Watch South Project with a U.S. military assistance worth $48.82 million only. Australia is also assisting the Philippines enhancing its maritime security capability by donating in 2007 a total of 28 high-speed gunboats.

Conclusion

Southeast Asian countries have been engaged in force modernization programs since the end of the cold war. But only countries with sufficient military budgets are able to pursue these programs as planned. Among the eleven countries in Southeast Asia, only Singapore and Vietnam have taken external defense more seriously compared with their neighbors. It is also interesting to note that with the exemption of East Timor, smaller countries in Southeast Asia, namely Brunei and Singapore, have the larger defense budgets in the region.

Bilateral tensions among ASEAN states, maritime boundary disputes in the SCS and the military rise of China are the principal drivers of force modernizations in Southeast Asia. Because states in Southeast Asia are enhancing their military capabilities, there is a continuing security dilemma in the region.

But the idea of an ASEAN security community ameliorates this security dilemma. Military developments in Southeast Asia may cause security irritants among states because of long-standing differences on sovereignty issues. But the norm of pacific settlement of disputes has been practiced in ASEAN since 1967 and this makes Southeast Asia more peaceful and stable than any sub-regions in the wider Asia Pacific.

Endnotes

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[35]Narayanan Ganesan, *Bilateral Tensions in the Post-Cold War ASEAN* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).

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ENERGY SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

Hooman Peimani

Undoubtedly, energy is a major necessity of every economy whether large or small. This is especially true for growing economies whose continued growth is geared to the availability of adequate amount of energy. For such economies, certainty about the availability of energy supplies is a major preoccupation due to the fact that an interruption in supplies will surely slow down, if not stop and/or reverse, their growth with obvious negative economic consequences. These consequences usually contribute to social and political instability of different scales and scopes to bring about unwanted changes in the status quo.

Against this background, energy security constitutes a major objective for especially large and growing economies. Its specifics and forms of manifestations may vary from one country to another depending on the particular needs of a country at a given time. However, its essence is always the same. Accordingly, as an objective, energy security aims at securing the availability of adequate amount of energy in desired forms for a given period of time whether through domestic productions, imports or a combination of the two.

Yet, energy security is pursued within the existing international system with all its restrictions and opportunities. For this matter, the rising and consolidating multipolar international system will affect this objective given its emerging poles are engaged in an unannounced rivalry over supremacy geared to economic gains and political influences. As a necessity for their economic survival, growth and prosperity, energy has become a major issue for these poles to contribute to disagreements, tensions and conflicts in their bilateral and multilateral relations since the global fossil energy resources are finite. Such resources have remained the major source of energy despite the introduction of non-fossil energy. This reality will remain in place in the foreseeable future notwithstanding an urgent need to decrease greenhouse gasses for their damaging effect on the environment and particularly their contribution to global warming. The limited fossil energy resources will therefore intensify competition between and among the poles throughout the world.

Within this context, energy security in East Asia can be analyzed. Excluding the small and troubled economy of North Korea, this region houses three large economies of China, Japan and South Korea. Despite differences between and among them in terms of their economic performance and thus economic growth rates, the three rising and consolidating poles have at least one thing in common: large and growing consumption of energy. All indicators suggest that their pattern of energy consumption will remain the same in the foreseeable future corrected for short periods of lower consumption caused by economic downturns. Therefore, energy security is and will

remain a major objective of crucial importance for the three East Asian countries.

However, their pursuit of energy security will likely negatively affect their bilateral relations with the two Western poles in search of consolidation of their status in the emerging multipolar international system: US-led North America and the European Union (EU). Such development will be more visible in the bilateral relations of China with the latter in the near future although it will also become gradually evident in those of Japan and South Korea.

The Soviet Union's fall in December 1991 ended the bipolar international system in place for about five decades. The US has since sought to establish a US-led unipolar international system, which has proven to be unsuccessful. Instead, a multipolar one has gradually been emerging, which is now in the process of consolidation. This multipolar international system has certain characteristics. The emergence of poles in just about all major regions/continents is of course one characteristic. As a matter of definition, poles are those countries, which have achieved a high level of economic, technological, scientific and military capabilities translated into a significant degree of political influence enabling them to affect the pace of events in one or a few regions in their proximity.

Having this definition in mind, there are five rising poles in Asia, namely, Iran, China, India, South Korea and Japan each prominent in its respective region. In Latin America, there are currently two emerging poles, Brazil and Venezuela, although, potentially, Argentina could become one, but not in the foreseeable future. In North America, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been melting Canada, Mexico and the US into a US-led pole since its conclusion in 1990. In Eurasia, Russia is a surfacing pole in search of restoring its lost superpower status, which demands addressing its various shortcomings, a lengthy undertaking. In Europe, the EU has been striving to turn itself from a simple grouping of European states with common economic interests in certain areas into a cohesive and united pole. This is yet to be achieved for various reasons, first and foremost, its internal divisions. Finally, in Africa, there is not any pole, but there are two potential ones, Egypt and Nigeria, whose ascension to that status in the foreseeable future is highly unlikely because of their various shortcomings.

Another major characteristic of the emerging multipolar system is the rise of Asia as the powerhouse of the 21st century. Asia is also rising as the world's largest energy consumer whose consumption will increase on a steady basis. The contributing factors to this development include the rise of Asian economies, namely China, India, South Korea, and the smaller economies of Southeast Asia added to Japan all of which have registered a large and growing demand for energy. The Asia/Pacific region is the engine of growth for Asia whose core is East Asia housing certain large and growing economies with increasing energy requirements.

East Asia's four forming states, namely China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea, can be divided into two groups according to their economic strength and thus energy consumption. The first three states constitute its major economies with a large and growing demand for energy. In comparison, North Korea has a small and stagnating economy with small energy requirements. The recent efforts to revive its economy by implementing, at a small scale, the Chinese model of development (i.e., keeping the Communist leadership in place while promoting free enterprise economy) has had a limited degree of success. However, such economic improvement is not yet large enough to change the North Korean economic situation radically to be translated into a major increase in energy consumption.[1]

East Asia is the world's single largest energy-consuming region. The contributing factors include its large and growing economies with the exception of Japan whose economy (ranking it as the world's second largest) has faced low or negative growth rates since the burst of the "Bubble Economy" in the early 1990s. Another factor is East Asia's large and growing populations excluding that of Japan as its large population has been experiencing a negative growth rate. Despite their current differences, as apparent in the following Tables 1-4, all four East Asian countries of China, Japan and North and South Koreas will experience negative growth rate between 2025 and 2030 or shortly after to continue, predictably, for at least two decades should the contributing factors remain in place.

Table 1: China's Population

2009 population: 1,345,751,000[3]

Population(thousands) Medium variant 2005-2050		**Population growth rate (%) Medium variant 2005-2050**	
Year	**Population**	**Period**	**Population growth rate**
2005	1 312 253		
2010	1 354 146	2005-2010	0.63
2015	1 395 998	2010-2015	0.61
2020	1 431 155	2015-2020	0.50
2025	1 453 140	2020-2025	0.31
2030	1 462 468	2025-2030	0.13
2035	1 462 351	2030-2035	-0.00
2040	1 455 055	2035-2040	-0.10
2045	1 440 289	2040-2045	-0.20
2050	1 417 045	2045-2050	-0.33

Source: Table is created using data provided by Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision: Highlights. New York: United Nations, 2009, p. 36.

Table 2: Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Population

2009 population: 23,906,000[4]

Population(thousands) Medium variant 2005-2050		Population growth rate (%) Medium variant 2005-2050	
Year	Population	Period	Population growth rate
2005	23 529		
2010	23 991	2005-2010	0.39
2015	24 399	2010-2015	0.34
2020	24 802	2015-2020	0.33
2025	25 128	2020-2025	0.26
2030	25 301	2025-2030	0.14
2035	25 300	2030-2035	-0.00
2040	25 154	2035-2040	-0.12
2045	24 900	2040-2045	-0.20
2050	24 562	2045-2050	-0.27

Source: Table is created using data provided by Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision: Highlights. New York: United Nations, 2009, p. 37.

Table 3: Japan's Population

2009: 127,156,000[5]

Population(thousands) Medium variant 2005-2050		Population growth rate (%) Medium variant 2005-2050	
Year	Population	Period	Population growth rate
2005	127 449		
2010	126 995	2005-2010	-0.07
2015	125 791	2010-2015	-0.19
2020	123 664	2015-2020	-0.34
2025	120 793	2020-2025	-0.47
2030	117 424	2025-2030	-0.57
2035	113 733	2030-2035	-0.64
2040	109 804	2035-2040	-0.70
2045	105 740	2040-2045	-0.75
2050	101 659	2045-2050	-0.79

Source: Table is created using data provided by Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision: Highlights. New York: United Nations, 2009, p. 38.

Table 4: Republic of Korea's Population

2009 population: 48,333,000[6]

Population(thousands) Medium variant 2005-2050		Population growth rate (%) Medium variant 2005-2050	
Year	**Population**	**Period**	**Population growth rate**
2005	47 566		
2010	48 501	2005-2010	0.39
2015	49 153	2010-2015	0.27
2020	49 475	2015-2020	0.13
2025	49 484	2020-2025	0.00
2030	49 146	2025-2030	-0.14
2035	48 422	2030-2035	-0.30
2040	47 296	2035-2040	-0.47
2045	45 813	2040-2045	-0.64
2050	44 077	2045-2050	-0.77

Source: Table is created using data provided by Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision: Highlights. New York: United Nations, 2009, p. 39.

When it comes to energy, East Asia has limited energy resources. As evident in Table 5, South and North Korea has no oil and gas deposits. Japan has very insignificant oil and gas reserves incapable of meeting even its basic needs for these fuels. All three countries have small reservoirs of coal.

Table 5: Proven Reserves of Oil, Gas, Coal of Japan, South/North Koreas

	2008 Reserves		
	Oil (million barrels)[1]	**Gas (trillion cubic feet) [2]**	**Coal (million tones)[3]**
Japan	**44**	**0.738**	**355**
South Korea	**0**	**0**	**133**
North Korea	**0**	**0**	**600**

[1] Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Statistics, Washington, D.C.: EIA 2009. (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6; accessed on 18 December 2009), [2] Ibid., [3] BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009, London: BP, 2009, p. 32.

In a comparative sense, China has substantial fossil energy resources as reflected in Table 6. In terms of fossil energy, China was self-sufficient until the early 1990s when its domestic production proved unable to meet its growing consumption forcing it to start importing oil and gas. The country has enormous amount of coal enough to meet all its domestic needs for about four decades although bottlenecks in its production has over time forced the Chinese to import relatively small

amounts of coal to meet the gap between its supply and demand.

Table 6: Fossil Energy Reserves of China

China Energy Reserve (2008)		Share of World Total (%)
Oil	15.5 billion barrels	1.2
Gas	86.7 trillion cubic feet	1.3
Coal	114 billion tons	13.9

Source: Table is created based on the data provided by BP Statistical Review, June 2009

Despite differences between the East Asian countries in terms of fossil energy reserves, their resources are inadequate to meet their current and future needs. Of course, this inadequacy varies from one regional country to another given the differences in terms of availability of oil, gas and coal between and among the regional countries. Their inadequacy in this regard is evident in the current gap between their current production and consumption of oil, gas and coal as indicated in Table 7. This gap is very wide for energy-poor East Asia countries (Japan, South Korea and North Korea) with respect to all three types of fossil energy excluding North Korea's coal production, which is larger than its consumption. In the case of, relatively-speaking, energy-rich China, the gap is wide only regarding oil while insignificant for gas; there is no gap when it comes to coal thanks to China's larger than consumption coal production.

Table 7: Current Production and Consumption of Fossil Energy in East Asia

Petroleum (thousand barrels per day)				
	China	Japan	North Korea	South Korea
Production	3,790.18	6	0	0
Consumption	7,831	4,784.85	16	2,174.91
Natural Gas (billion cubic feet)				
	China	Japan	North Korea	South Korea
Production	2,446	132	0	14
Consumption	2,490	3,542	0	1,230
Coal (million short tons)				
	China	Japan	North Korea	South Korea
Production	2,795.462	0	41.345	3.181
Consumption	2,772.799	207.818	37.732	98.278

Source: Table is created based on the data provided by EIA Energy Profiles as follows: EIA, China Energy Profile, 19 November 2009. (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=CH; accessed on 26 December 2009); EIA, Japan Energy Profile, 19 November 2009. (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=JA; accessed on 26 December 2009);
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(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=KN; accessed on 26 December 2009)
EIA, Korea, South Energy Profile, 19 November 2009. (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=KS; accessed on 26 December 2009)
2008 figures for petroleum. 2007 figures for natural gas and coal.

Table 8: China's Current and Projected Energy Consumption

China	2007	2030	Shares (%) 2007	Shares (%) 2030
Total Demand (million tons of oil equivalent)	872	3827	100	100
Coal	534	2397	66	63
Oil	114	758	18	20
Gas	13	202	3	5
Nuclear	0	127	1	3
Hydro	11	90	2	2
Biomass and waste	200	205	10	5
Other Renewables	0	47	0	1

Source: Table is created based on the data provided by IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009. (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/index.asp; accessed on 18 December 2009)

Table 9: Japan's Current and Projected Energy Consumption

Japan	2007	2030	Shares (%) 2007	Shares (%) 2030
Total Demand (million tons of oil equivalent)	514	488	100	100
Coal	115	98	22	20
Oil	230	152	45	31
Gas	83	92	16	19
Nuclear	69	113	13	23
Hydro	6	8	1	2
Biomass and waste	7	14	1	3
Other Renewables	4	11	1	2

Source: Table is created based on the data provided by IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009. (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/index.asp; accessed on 18 December 2009)

Despite their efforts, Japan and South Korea will be unable to significantly change their domestic production of energy. This is partly because of the insignificance of their fossil energy resources as discussed above. It is also partly due to a prediction based on the current and planned programs that their non-fossil energy production will not be large enough to drastically decrease their need for fossil energy.

In a general sense, this regional pattern is also true for China. However, unlike other East Asian countries, China has relatively-speaking significant oil, gas and coal resources. Knowing its growing energy needs, China has sought to increase its production of both non-fossil and fossil energy. Despite its impressive achievement in renewables (mainly solar and wind), the renewables and, in general, non-fossil

energy will not be large enough to sharply decrease its needs for fossil energy. As evident in Table 10, they will account for 11 percent of its energy demand in 2030.

Table 10: China's Energy Mix in 2007 and 2030

	Energy Demand (mtoe)		Share (%)		Annual Growth (%)
	2007	2030	2007	2030	
Coal	1293	2397	66	63	2.7
Oil	358	758	18	20	3.3
Gas	61	202	3	5	5.3
Nuclear	16	127	1	3	9.4
Hydro	42	90	2	2	3.4
Biomass & Waste	195	205	10	5	0.2
Other Renewable	5	47	0	1	10.2
Total	1970	3826			2.9

Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009, p. 646. (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/index.asp; accessed on 18 December 2009)

Consequently, the Chinese economy will remain heavily dependent on fossil energy. However, the domestic production of fossil energy will not be sufficient to satisfy all its needs as a result of which it will remain dependent on large imports of fossil energy particularly oil and gas. This insufficiency is clearly indicated in Table 11.

Table 11: China's Current and Forecasted Production and Consumption

	Year	Production	Consumption
Oil	2008	3.8	7.7
(million barrels per day)	2030	3.2	16.3
Coal	2007	1875	1847
(million tons of coal equivalent)	2030	3336	3424
Gas	2007	69	73
(billion cubic meters)	2030	125	242

Source: Table is created based on the data provided by IEA, World Energy Outlook 2009 (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/index.asp; accessed on 18 December 2009)

To decrease such dependency to the extent possible, China's energy security policy puts heavy emphasis on maintaining coal as the major source of energy. The reason lies in the fact that the country has large coal reserves enough to meet its needs at least for about four decades at the current level of consumption. Thus, heavy consumption of domestically produced coal will continue. As evident in Table 11, China's coal production is currently more than its consumption and, in the foreseeable future (2030), will be close to its consumption requiring a relatively

small amount of coal imports. However, when it comes to oil and gas, the existing large gap between production and consumption will be even wider to force china to depend on heavy imports.

Thus, growing dependency on imported fossil energy will be a major characteristic of East Asia. This is clearly evident in the case of "energy-rich" China and surely is true in the case of "energy-poor" Japan and South Korea for two major reasons. These are the growing consumption of energy and the low production of non-fossil energy due to the overall underdevelopment of the sector in all East Asian countries even though each regional country has been successful to a degree in developing some type of non-fossil energy.

Unsurprisingly, growing energy demand is making energy security a major objective for China, Japan and South Korea. In fact, this objective has become a main factor shaping their foreign policies, a fact especially evident in the case of China especially concerned about the impact of inadequate energy supplies on its growing economy. Its major components for energy-poor countries are: efforts to increase the production of their non-fossil energy production while heavily depending on imported fossil energy especially oil and gas. For relatively energy-rich China, they are: increasing the production of non-fossil energy, maximizing the production of oil, gas and coal, focusing on coal for its abundance inside the country and importing large amounts of oil and gas.

In short, all the East Asian countries will remain heavily dependent on imported fossil energy despite their differences in terms of domestic oil, gas and coal reserves. Against this background, their pursuit of energy security is contributing to the emergence of rivalry between and among the three East Asian poles (China, Japan and South Korea) and the two Western ones (US-led North America and the EU). This is due to the fact that such objective requires long-term access to the major oil and gas producing regions. Being the regions of interest to the large fossil energy importers in the Western poles, this reality has given birth to an emerging rivalry between the two sides with political and economic implications for both sides.

The rivalry is not prominent currently in the case of Japan and South Korea because of the nature of their relations with especially the US, which include their heavy security dependency on Washington. However, it will become more evident in these two cases as their domestic and regional changes will reduce the importance of security in their bilateral relations with the US. This will especially be the case with respect to Japan, as even today disagreements between Japan and the US are gradually emerging. This development has particularly become evident since the election of the new Japanese prime minster in the late 2009 having the declared aim of revising Tokyo's ties with Washington to make Japan a "normal country".

The rivalry is currently more evident and will remain so in the case of China because of many factors. Added to its growing confidence as the world's third largest economy, a major factor has been its phenomenal and growing needs for especially imported oil and gas necessary for its continued economic growth, this is crucial for addressing its extensive underdevelopment especially in its rural areas. This necessity has made it look everywhere in search of oil and gas suppliers, from Africa to Latin America to include, of course, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, a fact apparent in its pattern of crude oil imports in 2008 and 2009 as provided below.



Source: EIA, Country Analysis Briefs: China, July 2009. (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html; Accessed on 18 December 2009)

Thus, China has expanded relations with many oil suppliers for their capabilities to meet its oil requirements without regard to their troubled relations with the mentioned Western poles. They include those suppliers, which the Western poles have been trying to isolate and weaken, i.e., Iran, Venezuela, Sudan and Myanmar. The last one will be a gas supplier and also a facilitator for importing oil from the Persia Gulf and Africa in 2013 when the under-construction oil and gas pipelines between Myanmar and China will go online. This ignoring of the Western policy in pursuit of energy security has also been evident to a lesser extent in the case of Japan and South Korea both of which have expanded relations with Iran for its importance as a rising pole and its significance for their energy security. Given Iran's position as a long-term supplier of both oil and gas thanks to its vast oil and gas resources grating it the second rank globally, both countries now import oil from Iran while have plans to import liquefied natural gas from that country as well.

In conclusion, the bilateral relations of China, Japan and South Korea as three East Asian poles with the two Western poles of US-led North America and the EU will be affected by various factors including their unhappiness with the status quo, i.e., their current dissatisfactory positions in the international system. Within this context, their pursuit of energy security will be an additional factor affecting

those relations. Hence, as a major factor shaping their foreign policies, their quest for energy security will likely be translated into tensions and conflicts in the mentioned relations in the rising and consolidating multipolar international system. This state of relations will be especially prominent in China's relations with the two Western poles.

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Endnotes

[1] Throughout this document, North Korea is excluded due to the scarcity of statistics on its energy consumption although references to the country are made when any relevant statistic is available.

[2] All projected population estimates and growth rates are medium variants. Derived from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, "World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision," UN-ESA Official Website (http://esa.un.org/unpp; accessed on 18 December 2009)

[3] Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United

Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision: Highlights.* New York: United Nations, 2009, p. 36.

[4] Ibid,, p. 37.

[5] Ibid., p. 38.

[6] Ibid., p. 39.

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES IN ASIA: SECURITIZING RESPONSE STRATEGIES

Catherine Lo Yuk Ping & Nicholas Thomas

Introduction

In the last 25 years a number of new infectious diseases have emerged to present a major threat to the security of the countries in the Asian region. HIV/AIDS is a threat. SARS is a threat. HPAI, H5N1 and H1N1 are threats. Other, older diseases – such as Polio, Japanese Encephalitis, Malaria and Dengue Fever – are also threats to the wellbeing of the region. But to what extent? While governments may label these diseases as major threats to the security and stability of their populations and economies, there are often gaps between political rhetoric and policy implementation. By drawing on both securitisation and governance theories, the responses to these threats can be mapped and the real threat levels of these diseases established.

The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that Asia is becoming an increasingly interconnected region. With this greater interconnectivity comes a compression of time and space that represents a fundamental challenge to those whose task it is to respond to infectious disease outbreaks. As Gable noted, 'As our world becomes increasingly interconnected, threats to global public health continue to proliferate. New and novel risks to health have emerged consistently over the past 30 years. Moreover our shrinking world now allows health threats to spread more quickly than ever before.' As such policies and practices towards infectious disease outbreaks in the countries of the region as well as those followed by regional/international organisations and institutions are an important topic for study.

However, while Asia is the fastest growing region in the world but it is an uneven growth. Nowhere else do the developing and developed worlds meet so intensively as in Asia. While a 2005 finding by the National Intelligence Council might label Asia as the global future, it is also a region of many problems – systemic and emerging. Asia has the starkest GDP per capita differential (from Macau [$37,821] to Nepal [$1,379]) , it has the highest population densities (8 of the 10 most densely population cities in the world are in Asia). This growth – especially among the larger populations in China, India and Indonesia – coupled with the unchecked urbanisation is already generating massive stress on the region's ecosystems, with an Asian Development Bank report showing significant environmental overshoot within the region – meaning the situation will get worse before (or if) it gets better.

In such an environment public health threats proliferate. While this has always been the case in Asia, the rapidity of development is creating new opportunities for infectious diseases to emerge or cross the species barrier. Moreover, the

transportation networks that serve to underpin much of Asia's growth also serve to tie the region into global developmental processes. This can be especially seen in regional tourism figures. Fuelled by increasing wealth and a proliferation of low-budget airlines, an ever increasing number of Asians are travelling within the region and to other parts of the world, at the same time as the rest of the world is coming to Asia in ever higher numbers. These human flows provide artificial assistance to infectious diseases, allowing them to move to new locales more rapidly than they could otherwise do so on their own.

Given this threat potential it is pertinent to review regional responses to emerging infectious diseases, to explore whether there is a developing awareness of the effectiveness of responses to date and the lessons that might be (or have been) derived from these actions and to consider how the region might respond to future EIDs. It is the intention of this paper to undertake a review of threat-based responses to infectious diseases in Asia. These responses will be based on a series of four cases studies encompassing the main infectious disease outbreaks that have threatened Asia in the last decade, namely: HIV/AIDS, SARS, H5N1 and H1N1. Although focused on the diseases, these cases will review state-level responses to the outbreaks. These responses will be through a combination of governance and securitisation. From this it should be possible to understand the priority securitising actors accord the threats posed by infectious diseases. From this understanding, it is hoped that this paper will be able to evaluate how committed Asian states are to countering infectious diseases outbreaks as well as to what extent other variables – such as political or economic considerations – alter the securitisation of infectious diseases.

Securitisation and Contagious Diseases

> *Pandemics, emerging diseases and bioterrorism are readily understood as direct threats to national and global security.*

Since the end of the Cold War, the theoretical space within which other, non-traditional threats to security can be considered has expanded. As Risse-Kappen (1995) stated, 'The end of the Cold War and the dissatisfaction with prevailing approaches to international relations…opened new spaces for theorizing about world politics'. This evolution in international relations led to search for a new security doctrine that could better explain the overlapping nature of nation-state's various interests; one that could reconcile the traditional challenges facing states with non-traditional threats such as international economic instability or global environmental degradation.

One of the new issues to be considered concerned the nature of the relationship between state sovereignty and security, in particular the ways in which threats could spread from the domestic realm to the international, and visa-versa. Such

interdependence suggested an overlapping of state needs with other states' policies and practices and/or with activities within the international realm. The mutual dependence that such threats created affected not only states but also their attendant markets and societies. The space where the international met the domestic was fluid, depending on the type of issue that was crossing the boundaries and the concomitant responses that were required. The fluidity of such issues is especially apparent when considering the different types of security threats that have gained prominence in the post-Cold War period.

In this period more attention has been paid to non-traditional security threats – in other words, threats that may emanate intentionally or otherwise from one nation-state to challenge the security of another nation-state. In 1994, the UNDP released its annual human development report entitled *New Dimensions of Human Security* (UNDP, 1994). Although developmentally-focused this report categorized a broad range of non-traditional security threats within seven interdependent groups, namely: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

However, the broad definitions used by the United Nations in the 1994 report created a problem for those seeking the theoretical clarity that had once been assumed during the Cold War era. It has have argued elsewhere that the transnational component of the human security concept offers a way of accruing greater analytical and policy value. To achieve this clarity requires acknowledgement of three factors, namely that (1) insecurity arises from 'inadequacies in internal state systems [that] make individuals and groups within [other] states more vulnerable'; (2) that affected states and individuals frequently cannot address these threats unilaterally; and (3) that due to this some form of international assistance or intervention is required (Thomas and Tow, 2002).

Thus, when evaluating an event as a human security threat it is necessary that the issue emerge from within a domestic setting before crossing national boundaries to negatively affect other states or associated groups or individuals. The nature of a human security threat is such that affected states do have the capacity to resolve them by themselves but need to rely, to varying extents, on other states, international organisations and/or individuals. This is especially the case when threats become non-linear – where causes and effects beyond the immediate area of the threat must be considered (Thomas and Tow, 2002).

However, a latent problem with the human security approach is that while it provides a good structure by which to classify non-traditional threats, it avoids clarifying the process by which threats are recognised. Even if the process described above eventuates how are researchers and policy officials able to clarify whether an event is truly threatening to the security and wellbeing of a nation-state? Into this gap steps securitisation theory. This theory, first proposed by

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) enunciates the steps whereby an issue is categorised as a threat. This process involves a declamation (speech act) by an actor (a private individual, a group or organisation, a government or international agency or a political leader) who is able to influence a target audience that a particular issue represents an existential threat to their security. A shift is then made from a normal mode of operation into an emergency mode, whereby resources (human, financial, policy) are reallocated to address the threat. Upon the successful resolution of the threat there is a return to the normal mode of operation and the issue is desecuritised. Hence, in combining both human security and securitisation approaches one is presented with both a structure and a process by which to evaluate non-traditional security threats. The strength of this theory lies in its utility for scholars and policy-makers alike, essentially asking securitising actors 'why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?' (Wæver, 1999).

The recognition that health issues are vitally important to the human security of individuals and the security interests of states is not new. The health-security linkage is not a novel concept. It was explicitly pronounced that 'the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security' in the constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) backed in 1946.[6] Yet, this linkage did not facilitate the development of health security concerns. It was only after the end of the Cold War and the publication of the 1994 UNDP Report on New Dimensions of Human Security that this weak link was strengthened. Among seven aspects of human security mentioned in the 1994 report, four aspects were directly related to human health: health security, food security, environmental security, and also personal security,[7] signifying the importance of health-related security over other concerns in the human security discourse. Thiesmeyer has suggested that fundamental idea of human security in any place in the world is health, as it is the determinant of the survival of human race.[8] Chen advanced this argument noting that human security and health is tightly linked because 'good health is "intrinsic" to human security, since human survival and good health are at the core of "security"; good health is also "instrumental" to human security as it enables the full range of human functioning'. [9]

Apart from the emergence of the conceptual framework of health security within human security; as well as the analytical framework in securitisation theory, there are other developments that escalated the health-security linkage. These include the destructive impact of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases[10] (ERIDs), bioterrorism threats as well as a rising awareness about the deepening vulnerabilities of populations in rich and poor countries caused by the global spread of diseases . In response to these current developments, various scholars and analysts started proposing the idea of securitizing health in order to tackle the problems efficiently and effectively[11].

Pirages and Runci (2000) commented that, 'Viruses, bacteria, and various kinds of plants and animals have never respected national borders....Now there is growing concern over the impact of increasing globalisation on the potential development and spread of new and resurgent diseases across increasingly porous borders.' Works by Garrett (1995) and Oldstone (1998) have also charted the various types of diseases to which Pirages and Runci refer; those that have crossed national borders in the past and present as well as the types of state-society responses that have accompanied each outbreak. In the virology and bio-medical fields there is a large and rich literature on these diseases and their impact. Indeed it is too large a field to address in a single proposal. Instead this paper will only engage with those medical works which have direct relevance to the social science discipline that underpins this research (such as: Vallat, 2004; Tumpey et al, 2002; Brown, 2001; Guan et al, 1996; Class et al, 1994 and Choi et al, 2005).

Narrowing the field of research down to security studies there are again a smaller number of publications that link the threat of infectious diseases with national or human security and wellbeing. In Altman's article on AIDS and Security (2003) the author demonstrates how political and social structures inhibit responses to the threat of HIV/AIDS. This conclusion is echoed in Whitman's edited collection on *The Politics of Emerging and Resurgent Infectious Diseases* (2000), where the contributing authors focus on the political factors that inhibit responses to infectious disease outbreaks clearly shows how the modern international political system – with its preoccupation on sovereignty – inhibits transnational responses to such outbreaks. Without a more flexible system, virulent pathogens will be able to transcend national boundaries far more easily then could be the case. In Asia, where many societies have cultural reservations to diseased persons and where most states are loath to relinquish or pool their sovereignty to achieve common policy objectives, these conclusions have particular resonance. One of the areas this project intends to focus on is the way in which regional/international organisations are allowing states to combine resources without necessarily infringing on their domestic norms or sovereign capacities.

McMurray and Smith (2001) sought to consider the impact globalisation had on the health and wellbeing of societies as they move up the economic development ladder and become more enmeshed in global processes of trade and human interaction. Drawing on three case studies the authors show how globalisation is eroding state borders and creating new transnational health challenges. Andrew Price-Smith's *The Health of Nations* (2002) is another key work in this area. Price-Smith's focus is on the impact infectious diseases have on nations' stability and prosperity. While Price Smith writes within an international relations/security studies context, the main focus of his study is on environmental change and development-related issues. Brower and Chalk (2003) extend the work on the threats of infectious diseases, with specific reference to HIV/AIDS and public policy responses by US government agencies. What all these studies show is the

need to develop rigorous analytical ties between sub-state, state and international processes when examining the link between infectious diseases, international relations and security issues.

When considering the link between securitisation responses and the threat of infectious diseases in Asia, Cabellero-Anthony (2006) explored the link between securitisation and public health goods in Asia. This research considered the case for a more 'inclusive public goods approach' in combating infectious disease outbreaks. Cabellero-Anthony suggested that by applying a securitisation approach to preventing infectious disease outbreaks, securitising actors would have a greater capacity both within and across countries to deal with pandemic consequences. Chalk (2005) analysed the links between disease and securitisation in the Asia-Pacific. In both of these two studies the authors take broad thematic approaches to the threats posed by infectious diseases.

The link between health and security has been most recently addressed by Chan, Støre and Kouchner (2008) who have readily concluded that 'Pandemics, emerging diseases and bioterrorism are readily understood as direct threats to national and global security.' Davies (2008) places these responses within the last two decades, noting that during the 1990s, 'awareness of the threat that infectious disease outbreaks could pose to their citizens' health and to their countries' economic and political stability encouraged western governments to develop responses in national security terms'. As a result, 'Health challenges now feature in national security strategies, appear regularly on the agenda of meetings of leading economic powers, affect the bilateral and regional political relationships between developed and developing countries...Although health has long been a foreign policy concern, such prominence is historically unprecedented' (Fidler and Drager, 2006). Hence, as Wilson, Tigerstom and McDougall (2008), state 'collective action to manage global health emergencies' is important if health security challenges are to be overcome. It is now necessary to consider the four cases studies of infectious disease outbreaks as examples of the types of existential challenges to health security in Asia; starting with HIV/AIDS.

HIV/AIDS in Asia

> *The scale and geographical scope of the HIV/AIDS pandemic has only two parallels in recorded history: the 1918 flu pandemic and the Black Death in the fourteenth century.*[12]

The first diagnosed HIV/AIDS case in human history surfaced in mid-1980s. [13] Since then HIV/AIDS has become a pandemic disease and remains one of the greatest global killers to date. The *2009 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic* released by UNAIDS shows that approximately 33.4 million people in the world have been found to be HIV-positive in 2008.[14] Within the 33.4 million people, 4.7 million

come from Asia.[15] With the exception of Thailand, every country in Asia has an adult HIV prevalence of less than 1 percent (see Table 1 below).[16] Amongst the Asian countries, China and India are home to the largest HIV/AIDS infected populations.

HIV/AIDS came to prominence in Asia about a decade later than in the West. The source of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Asia was deemed to originate in the United States. Unlike the situation in the US, in which the homosexual community constituted the majority group of HIV infections in the early stage of the epidemic, however, the majority of HIV/AIDS infections in Asian countries—especially the East Asia—were via the transfusion of contaminated and unscreened blood products. Prior to 1990, more than 80 percent in Japan and 82 percent in Taiwan of HIV/AIDS cases consisted of hemophiliac patients.[17] They had been infected by contaminated blood products the VIII and IX imported from the US, due to the ignorance of the national government and the pharmaceutical companies in undergoing blood monitoring at that time.[18]

Table 1: Past and Current Situation of HIV/AIDS in Asia

Countries	Year first HIV/AIDS case reported[19]	HIV-positive cases (2007)[20]	Adult (aged 15- 49) HIV/AIDS prevalence, 2007 (percent)[21]
Japan	1983	9,600	<0.1[22]
Taiwan	1984	18,233 (2009)[23]	<0.1[24] (2005 or latest year)
Thailand	1984	610,000	1.4
Korea	1985	13,000	<0.1
China	1985	700,000	0.1
Malaysia	1986	80,000	0.5
India	1986	2,400,000	0.3
Indonesia	1987	270,000	0.2
Pakistan	1987	96,000	0.1
Myanmar	1988	240,000	0.7
Nepal	1988	70,000	0.5
Bangladesh	1989	12,000	<0.1
Vietnam	1990	290,000	0.5
Lao PDR	1990	5,500	0.2
Cambodia	1991	75,000	0.8

Sporadic HIV/AIDS cases were also reported amongst the foreign tourists or local people who have previously stayed or traveled to the US. In 1984, Taiwan notified its first HIV/AIDS case was an American physician who had developed

symptoms in Thailand and then diagnosed as AIDS during the transit in Taiwan.[25] In 1985, Japan released the first official report on HIV/AIDS when they discovered HIV/AIDS in a homosexual man who had previously lived in the United States.[26] China also announced its first HIV/AIDS case in an Argentine tourist from the United States.[27] At the same time, Korea also reported the outbreak of HIV/AIDS amongst the American soldiers stationed in the country and the sex workers serving them.[28] Since HIV/AIDS infection in Asia were commonly found amongst foreigners or local individuals infected by the foreign sources, the governments only implemented isolation and containment policies to halt the entry and spread of the epidemic. Measures such as forcing the suspected HIV-positive individuals to take HIV test,[29] and banning on the entry of HIV-infected people and blood products were implemented.[30] Yet the rising figures of HIV/AIDS infection in these countries proved the ineffectiveness of these strategies in dealing with this novel pandemic in Asia.

Regionally, HIV/AIDS next emerged in South Asia. Unlike during the earlier episodes in some East Asian countries, the main source of this HIV virus was Myanmar, one of the members of the 'Golden Triangle' region that is infamous for its heroin production and exportation.[31] Together with Myanmar heroin and opium, HIV/AIDS also spread along the nacro-trafficking routes across mainly southern part of Asia. Meanwhile, widespread of heroin and HIV/AIDS from Myanmar along the drug trafficking routes also resulted in the resurgence of HIV/AIDS outbreaks amongst the injecting drug users (IDUs) in countries such as China, India and Thailand between 1988 and 1989.[32] Subsequently, injecting drug use became and remained to be one of the primary transmission modes in many countries such as Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.[33] For instance, HIV/AIDS prevalence amongst IDUs was 34.65 percent in Taiwan;[34] while over 40 percent in Jakarta, Indonesia.[35] During the 1990s, heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDS primarily from female sex workers (FSWs) became the second major modes of HIV/AIDS transmission in Asia. High HIV/AIDS prevalence was observed amongst FSWs in Cambodia, southern part of India and Thailand.

In general, HIV/AIDS infection in Asia has been associated with the high risk groups such as IDUs and sex workers.3[6] However, the virus has found is now well established in general populations of many regional countries; due to an increase in the transmission along the (1) sex between MSM and their male/female partners and (2) sex between FSWs and their clients vectors, which have become the dominant transmission route in these countries. In 2007, for example, 38 percent of the HIV/AIDS infected cases in China were attributed to heterosexual contacts compared with only 11 percent in 2005.[37] HIV/AIDS prevalence amongst MSM was also increased from 0.4 percent in 2005 to 3.3 percent.[38] In Thailand, there were increases in HIV/AIDS prevalence from 17 to 28 percent among MSM in Bangkok between 2003 and 2005.[39]

SARS in Asia

The first known SARS case was detected in mid-November 2002 in Foshan city, Guangdong province, China. However, the WHO only received a report from the Chinese authorities on 11 February 2003 stating that there had been an outbreak of atypical pneumonia in the province that had affected 305 persons and resulted in 5 deaths.[40] The WHO was officially made aware of the existence of a severe form of atypical pneumonia with no known cause on 28 February 2003 when Dr Carlo Urbani, alerted the WHO regional offices following the review of an American patient in the French Hospital who had contracted the virus.[41]

The main SARS inflection left mainland China via 65-year old Dr Liu Jianlun from Guangdong province, who came to Hong Kong after treating SARS patients. He checked in to a room on the 9th floor of the Metropole Hotel, and subsequently infected other people staying on the floor. In returning to their home countries this group became the new index cases, spreading the disease to Singapore, Canada and Vietnam, as well as other parts of Hong Kong. Further outbreaks of the SARS virus occurred in Southeast Asia, in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand; though no local transmission of the disease was ever confirmed in Thailand.

On 12 March 2003, after the WHO had assessed the situation in Asia a global health alert was issued regarding "cases of severe atypical pneumonia with unknown etiology that appeared to place health workers at high risk".[42] This was raised on 15 March 2003 to a rare emergency advisory. As the situation worsened, the WHO recommended that all non-essential travel to Hong Kong and Guangdong province be postponed.

Meanwhile, the virus spread outside the region, to Europe and the United States, by infected air travellers. Following the WHO's global alert, countries started to take a range of precautions against the further spread of SARS. These measures included the temporarily banning flights from "hot zones" (those areas most infected); temporarily stopping the issuance of visas to persons from these zones; health and temperature checks; and quarantining persons from infected countries for 10 days.

On 20 April China finally admitted to the spread of SARS from Guangdong to Beijing, with hundreds of cases as yet unreported. Although the Chinese Health Minister, Zhang Wenkang, and the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, were both sacked for their lapse, this move was seen proverbially as "scaring the chickens to catch the monkey"; a Chinese idiom meaning 'to create a fuss to deflect blame from those more senior in power'. This action came two-and-half weeks after WHO officials were allowed access to the main infectious sites in southern China (3 April), and nearly a month after the WHO made the preliminary identification of the index case coming from Foshan city in Guangdong province (28 March). China's silence as to its knowledge of SARS can be seen as the major causes of its rapid spread and deadly effect.

On 28 April 2003, Vietnam became the first country to be declared SARS-free. By mid-2003 all countries had either been declared free of the SARS virus or were finalising their quarantine period. An isolated infection occurred in Singapore in September 2003, arising from a breach of laboratory safety protocols. Although limited to a single individual, who later recovered, of most concern was that this infection did not exhibit all the SARS symptoms. Should the virus reoccur, its mutable nature could possibly make detection more problematic.

H5N1 in Asia

Influenza has been present in different avian species for a very long time and in most of its variations it does not present a threat to humans. However, over the past 100 years, different strains of the avian influenza virus have crossed the species barrier causing millions of deaths around the world. The Spanish, Asian and Hong Kong Flus were all caused by avian flu strains – H1N1, H2N2 and H3N2 respectively. Furthermore, the intermingling of human and avian genes is suspected have played a role in the development of the latter two strains.[44]

The strain of the current outbreak – HPAI H5N1 – that is affecting a large number of East Asian countries first came to prominence in 1997 in Hong Kong. During that outbreak 18 people were infected and six died as a result of contracting the virus. To prevent the virus from spreading further the entire chicken population – approximately 1.4 million chickens – in Hong Kong was slaughtered.

> *In late 2000, the virus changed genetically, incorporating new genes from other influenza viruses. These genes were believed to be from influenza viruses derived from other aquatic birds. "Further, viruses isolated from a goose and a duck in December 2000 have acquired NS, PA, M, and PB2 genes from the aquatic avian influenza gene pool through reassortment. For pandemic preparedness, it is important to monitor whether these reassortant viruses have the capacity for interspecies transmission to terrestrial poultry or mammals."*[45]

The virus re-emerged in Hong Kong in 2001 but without any human casualties. As before the entire local stock of chickens older than 75 days as well as related fowls (ducks, geese, pigeons and quail) were culled. At the same time, the importation of live stock from mainland China was also banned, although no evidence of the virus was ever revealed by the mainland authorities.[46] However, at the same time, the strain was again found in duck meat that had been imported to South Korea from China,[47] lending credence to the notion that there was an uncontained (and unreported) outbreak in China. The most recent Hong Kong-centred emergence (in terms of human infections) occurred in February 2003 when a limited outbreak of HPAI H5N1 infected two people (a father and son), killing one of them.[48] While it is known that the two Hong Kong residents had travelled to Fujian immediately prior to becoming ill, no cases of the virus were reported by either the Fujianese or Guangdong authorities.[49] Hence, the source of this outbreak was never confirmed.[50]

Regionally, HPAI H5N1 next emerged in South Korea in mid-December 2003.[51] Unlike the earlier episodes in Hong Kong, the main carrier of the South Korean virus was ducks not chickens, although both were heavily culled across a number of provinces as a precautionary measure. Interestingly, the South Korean virus was identified as being genetically different from the other, more lethal strains of HPAI H5N1, which is indicative of a second reservoir of the disease and may also account for why no people died.[52] One month after the South Korean outbreak, the disease was detected on a farm in Ato, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan. This was the first outbreak of the disease since 1925.[53] The Japanese episode was limited when compared with outbreaks in other countries and quickly contained.[54] Since these initial outbreaks both countries have experienced repeat episodes, particularly in wild fowl species.

At the same time as the South Korean and Japanese episodes were occurring, Southeast Asian countries were also experiencing outbreaks of HPAI H5N1. Between November 2003 and January 2004, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam all reported instances of the virus. Over the next 12 months it spread to a further four Asian countries. In a significant departure from protocols developed during the SARS outbreak, few countries in Southeast Asia immediately alerted either their regional neighbors or the relevant international organisations. It was only when the situation worsened (or was revealed by whistle-blowing officials), exceeding the capacities of the state that the initial contact countries called for international assistance.

Table 2: Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1)

Country	2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		Total	
	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths	cases	deaths
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	5
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Cambodia	0	0	0	0	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	9	7
China	1	1	0	0	8	5	13	8	5	3	4	4	7	4	38	25
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	10	25	9	8	4	39	4	90	27
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	20	13	55	45	42	37	24	20	20	19	161	134
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2
Lao	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	2
Myanmar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	3	1
Thailand	0	0	17	12	5	2	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	17
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	4
Viet Nam	3	3	29	20	61	19	0	0	8	5	6	5	5	5	112	57
Total	**4**	**4**	**46**	**32**	**98**	**43**	**115**	**79**	**88**	**59**	**44**	**33**	**72**	**32**	**467**	**282**

Source: *'Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO (30Dec 2009)'*,<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2009_12_30/en/index.htm>.

In the six years since the initial outbreak H5N1 has spread around the world – moving between wild fowl to domesticated fowl populations and into humans and other species, with the death total standing at 282 persons and a mortality rate

in excess of sixty percent (see Table 2).

Throughout this period, none of the regional governments have been able to entirely eliminate the prevalence of the virus. The concern is now being expressed by international organisations that these countries could be becoming reservoirs for a more lethal strain of the virus, one that can be passed by human-to-human contact or that one of the H5N1 strains could mix with the current pandemic strain of H1N1 to become even more lethal.

H1N1 in Asia

Swine influenza – of various strains (H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2) – has been in circulation for over 75 years. Van Reeth notes that in Europe H1N1 (first identified in 1931) mixed genetically with avian influenza in the late 1970s, while in the Americas it has remained a 'more classical' strain. In early 2009, a new form of the H1N1 strain[55] was identified; one which demonstrated an ability to jump from human-to-human. What made this strain different was that it had started in the Americas, whereas the last two major epidemics were Asian in origin. It also possessed a high transmissibility; a key factor in the WHO's decision to upgrade the threat posed by this outbreak to Phase 6 (pandemic) in June 2009.

The first cohort of infections for the 2009 variant stemmed from the Mexican town of La Gloria in March. Initially it was believed that the virus was H3N2; however subsequent tests showed H1N1 was responsible. By April, the virus had spread in North America and across to Europe, leading to countries around the world instituting travel bans against people going to or coming from the infected zones and testing of persons travelling were widespread. Despite these numerous efforts, they had little effect (see Chart 1). By early May the virus had reached Asia, with South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan and China all confirming cases.[56] South and Southeast Asian infections began to be identified soon thereafter in mid-late May.[57]

In contrast to the last two infectious diseases outbreaks, H1N1 had a markedly lower impact. Although the initial fear of a new viral outbreak was that its rapid spread would be accompanied by a mortality rate similar to SARS or H5N1 this proved not to be the case. With estimates varying by country H1N1 had a mortality rate of 0.9 percent; although this figure is unclear given the misrepresentation of H1N1 and H3N2 symptoms. It also appeared to be more deadly in the developing world (especially Brazil and India) where the mortality rates ran in excess of 2 percent of cases.[58] However, with most deaths occurring in the Western Hemisphere Asia was spared a re-experience of a high rate of infectious disease deaths.

There are several possible reasons for this difference. First, the time lag between the initial outbreak being publically identified by Mexico and the US as well as the WHO response and the disease arriving in Asia, gave regional governments more time

to implement emergency responses: from screening of passengers to quarantining and deporting suspected carriers. Second, the public nature of the outbreaks in the Western Hemisphere meant that the outbreaks were public knowledge before they emerged in Asia. This helped encourage regional governments to act in a more public manner to deal with the threat. As is noted above with the other case studies and below, effective engagement with civil society is key to addressing an infectious disease outbreak. Third, the ongoing H5N1 threat meant that much of the public health infrastructure was already in place at border control points and in hospitals. This also meant that the pharmaceutical responses for H5N1 could be implemented for H1N1.

By the end of the year the H1N1 virus appeared to be in decline around the world. In East Asia, most countries were recording lower levels of infections and deaths (with the exception of Mongolia). This was different to the case of South Asia where infections – particularly in the northern regions of India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) – continued to 'be intense'.[59] However, the capacity of the virus to mutate and – possibly – to recombine with other viruses means that this threat bears continuous vigilance.

Chart 1: Confirmed H1N1 cases



Source: 'Laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 as officially reported to WHO by States Parties to the IHR (2005) as of 20 December 2009', <http://gamapserver.who.int/h1n1/ cases-deaths/h1n1_casesdeaths.html>.

Issues Arising

However, the question remains as to how best to address health challenges as security threats? As the case studies in this paper identify, the securitization model put forward by the Copenhagen school is a good starting tool but its applicability

outside of a European context remains unclear. As the cases suggest, there are contextual problems in applying securitization to issues of health insecurities in Asia and in international organizations. These findings revolve around a set of concerns: the identification of a health security threat, the governance of the response to the health threat and the desecuritization of the health threat. Each of these will now be explored in more detail.

Identifying a Health Threat

The first two steps in the securitization process require (1) an actor to identify an existential threat to their existence and (2) a target audience to be convinced of the immediacy of the threat, so that a shift into an emergency mode to reallocate resources to successfully address the threat can be undertaken. These first two steps are inherently liberal-democratic in nature. As Buzan et al noted, a securitizing actor could be any 'political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups' (Buzan et al, 1998:40). The problem that then emerges is what happens when the socio-political system is not liberal-democratic or when the securitization is initiated and/or carried out by an international body, itself the subject of capture by multiple (and possibly competing) state agendas.

Most of Asia is characterized by an absence of liberal-democratic systems with the types of plural authority structures identified by Buzan et al. Instead, most countries have authoritarian systems of governance with clear strictures on basic political freedoms (such as speech or assembly). Even where plural democratic political systems do exist, they are generally far weaker than their counterparts in Europe and can be distorted by powerful political figures (as was seen in Thailand and Indonesia with with H5N1). Such authoritarian systems or political figures may prevent or corrupt the securitization process, subverting its urgency for their own political agendas. The Chinese government frequently avoids securitizing threats as the need to move into emergency mode presents a legitimacy challenge to the government.

In the case of international organizations, the influence of state members can act to prevent or discourage the initial stages of the securitization process. As the case of the initial H5N1 outbreak in 2003 illustrated, member states will not necessarily share critical information where it is perceived to be against their national interest (Thomas, 2006). Furthermore, states will react against the actions by international organisations where either their own national interests are jeopardized or where the organisation is perceived as having exceeded its mandate and infringed on members' sovereign rights – as the outcry over the WHO's travel advisory for H5N1 on 23 April exemplified. Within Asia, ASEAN is a regional organisation that does not act beyond its member states interests. The ability of such an organisation to initiate a securitization process over a health threat is minimal at best. The fact that the target audience for such organisations are the member states whose

interests are being infringed upon only further complicates the 'acceptance' stage of securitization.

Hence, applying securitization to non-liberal democratic countries – such as that found in most Asian countries – or to international organizations – who are heavily influenced by member states' interests – is problematic. This is a finding that has been noted elsewhere (Caballero-Anthony, 2006; Emmers, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007; Vuori, 2008) and was alluded to by Wæver who stated that 'the current quite absolutist concept of "securitised or not", might be differentiated through empirical studies of mixed and partial situations' (Wæver, 2003: 26). However, it can be said that most countries in studied in this paper did securitize their responses to the health threats insofar as they identified an issue that required supra-normal efforts to address. In some instances, there is a clear use of securitizing language once the situation became serious enough to potentially create a legitimacy challenge or once international pressure become strong enough (or a combination of both). In other cases, the health threat was addressed through the supra-normal provision of policies and resources from 'public good and social order' perspectives. This disaggregation of securitization's initial phases argues for less emphasis to be placed on the actual speech act and acceptance and more on the response phase and the roles of its different stakeholders than is currently the case.

Governing a Health Threat

To shift into emergency mode requires an array of stakeholders beyond the state. Business groups, civil society organizations and individuals all need to be mobilized to deal with health threats. The omission of any one cohort or the failure of any one cohort to reallocate resources and implement the emergency-mode policies jeopardizes the effective securitization of the health threat. As observed in all four infectious disease case studies, effective partnership with market actors and civil society is essential if an outbreak is to be prevented, minimised or eradicated. States simply do not have the capacity to act unilaterally.

In Asia, the illiberal socio-political systems combined with strong state-market ties, challenges the emergency mode phase of securitization by restricting information flows, actors and resources. Moreover, the centralized nature of these states' systems means that a more restrictive hierarchical is utilised rather than a more responsive heterarchical structure. Furthermore, the nature of the state systems politicises the bureaucracy; subordinating it to the will of the ruling party and preventing it from delivering impartial advice. Beyond the iron triangle of the state-market-bureaucracy, lies the civil society and its individual members. But, state-civil society relations in many Asian countries remains rudimentary – with the many regimes still wary of mobilizing their own populations; a problem of mistrust that flows in both directions. Yet as the Lancet noted: 'Transparency and continued communication between WHO, governments, health officials, the

public, and the media' is critical in a health crisis (The Lancet, 2009: 1495). How to overcome these systemic constraints will be a key developmental response challenge for these states as new health threats emerge.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that certain authoritarian regimes in Asia are beginning to change their practices in the face of the threat posed by health insecurities. The expansion of Chinese efforts to counter H5N1 and H1N1 by engaging the public led to greater benefits than the more societal-exclusionary practices followed under SARS, while the revisions to the International Health Regulations dramatically expanded the range of non-governmental actors involved in disease surveillance in Asia and across the world.

With such changes comes a question of power and authority. If there is even a partial fragmentation in the regional power structures does this mean that there are now new centres of authority in Asian states that are declare a health security threat? As the cases of Thailand and China show speech acts regarding the threat posed by disease outbreaks – made by commercial groups, civil society organisations and individuals – did have a securitizing impact on state responses. The role of international organisations is also very important. The WHO, the Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and ASEAN have all played an important role in expanding the will and capacity of states to meet the social and health challenges generated by infectious disease outbreaks, while bodies such as the World Bank and ADB help states plan for the economic impact of health crises.

What this suggests is that even though Asia is a very different operational environment for the securitization of health threats, the social and political transformations witnessed in the region in the past thirty years may be creating sufficiently similar power and authority structures to enable securitization to be actualized in a mainstream, Copenhagen-style way. However, these findings also suggest that such commonalities are unevenly distributed across the region. Given the fluid nature of Asian state systems it cannot yet be concluded in which direction – towards or away from convergence – the region will move in the future.

De-securitising a Health Threat

The ultimate purpose in securitizing a threat is to mobilize the necessary resources to address the insecurity before de-securitizing back to a normal mode of socio-political behaviour and resource allocation. This theoretical objective assumes two factors. First, that the rational response to an existential threat is to securitize it. Second, that the purpose of securitizing the issue is to address an existential threat. Both of these assumptions can be challenged when exploring the securitization of health in Asia.

As the cases of Vietnam and China illustrate, there was a rational, political

decision not to securitize existential health threats: in China in the case of SARS and in Vietnam in the case of H5N1. In both countries a decision was made that either for reasons of socio-political stability (China) or economic-political costs (Vietnam) it was preferable not to securitize a health threat. Overriding both countries strategies was a concern that securitizing a health threat was tantamount to acknowledging an inability to safeguard the wellbeing of their respective peoples. Such an acknowledgement could only call into question the legitimacy of the state in systems where there are no avenues for such questions to be raised. The internal tensions that such a contradiction would generate were considered a greater challenge than that posed by the health threat. This political rationale in illiberal regimes modifies the utility of securitization theory, requiring a greater understanding of the culture and norms of a country before applying a securitization yardstick.

Given this possible reticence, the issue of why a health threat is securitized must also be addressed. Fidler has argued that it is possible to identify a post-Cold War shift towards a post-Westphalian health order. This new order is characterised by the dissolution of the traditional domestic and international categories that was, in turn, an outcome of the clear policy recognition (led by the US) that not only do the spread of infectious diseases not respect national boundaries but that their spread represents a clear challenge to all countries (Fidler, 2004:43-44). Under such a system there is a moral imperative towards human security irrespective of state borders that supersedes national interest.

This 'de-Westphalianisation' of health reached a peak between 2005 and 2007 with the revision and subsequent implementation of the new WHO International Health Regulations. Under the new regime that ability of states to block information transfer was lessened, while the WHO was given greater scope to utilise non-state information in developing its official position. Member states are now also required to respond to the WHO's request for verification of information, irrespective of its source or origins' (CMAJ, 2007:448). This allows civil society groups and private sector organisations to pass information to the WHO, which it can then act upon – instead of waiting for states to provide formal notification. As a result, WHO members have far less scope for independent action than was previously the case; although many still return to expressing sovereign rights when it suits them to do so.

In Asia, however, it remains questionable as to what extent the de-Westphalianization of global health is adhered to by states. Numerous studies have shown that an abiding characteristic of the regional order is the retention of sovereignty – both as an intrinsic operating principle of a state's foreign policy as well as a reactive domestic policy against territorial incursions. Hence, even when a state is pre-disposed towards a de-Westphalian system – and even when it may engage at the global level in such processes – the realities of the regional order

means that a largely Westphalian orientation prevails domestically and in Asia. One good example of this can be seen in Indonesia, where Health Minister Supari placed national sovereignty over the sharing of virus samples. Thailand also put its sovereign economic interests ahead of its international health obligations in choosing not to initially reveal its outbreak of H5N1. Nonetheless, even in the case of Indonesia, there is a degree of cooperation proceeding – if not on a multilateral basis then on a bilateral basis. Thus, in considering why a state chooses to securitize health threats, it is necessary to balance its domestic constraints against its international obligations. When domestic costs clearly outweigh international benefits then a Westphalian response can be expected. When the potential costs and benefits are more mixed there is more scope for de-Westphalian actions as suggested by Fidler.

Conclusion

Even though HIV/AIDS has been spreading through the region since the early 1980s, it was only with the SARS crisis of 2003 that East Asian states began to appreciate how fast infectious diseases can now spread; within Asia and from the region to the wider world. The SARS experience showed that only by dealing with disease outbreaks in an open and timely manner could the disease be stopped. To do otherwise not only jeopardised the safety of the infected state's citizens but also populations outside its borders. A moral as well as political responsibility. These were lessons that were quickly forgotten with H5N1 and have only been partially re-remembered with H1N1. The delay in state-level responses meant that regional organisations were slow to react to the crisis, ensuring that states – often with insufficient domestic capacity – with some support from international organisations dealt with the virus in a primarily unilateral mode.

The conclusion that can therefore be reached is that – despite the pressure to the contrary – East Asian states are yet to effectively securitize their approaches to public health threats. As with crises in other sectors, the failure of East Asian states to address these threats in a timely and collective manner only means that they will cause more damage over a longer period of time than should have otherwise been the case. It is also worth noting that the social, environmental and husbandry pressures that allowed SARS and H5N1 to emerge were still present with H1N1, which raises the question as to how far regional states are willing and able to undertake strategies necessary to prevent infectious diseases outbreaks before they happen.

Finally, it is worth recalling that to-date H5N1 has infected 467 people resulting in 282 deaths. This has happened over a seven year period. H1N1 infected hundreds of thousands of people but only resulted in 12200 deaths. In mid-2005 over a two month period (July-August) there was a Japanese Encephalitis outbreak in India.

1145 cases were confirmed in the province of Uttar Pradesh, 296 people died. In other words, Asia is overdue for a pandemic – one with both a high transmission rate and a high mortality rate – but we should not assume that it will come from a prevailing threat or from something new.

Endnotes

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