



5TH EAST ASIA SECURITY OUTLOOK

SEMINAR MONOGRAPH • 21 January 2013

SULTAN HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH
INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
(SHHBIDSS)

EAST ASIA SECURITY OUTLOOK 2013

Edited by:

Research Division, SHHBIDSS



**Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Brunei Darussalam**

Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS) was formally formed in April 2007 as the Brunei Darussalam Ministry of Defence's Policy Research Institute. SHHBIDSS mission is to study, discuss and disseminate defence, security and strategic issues relevant to Brunei Darussalam and its surrounding environment.

SHHBIDSS invites internationally renowned academicians and practitioners to present and write on the different issues surrounding the East Asia Security Outlook. This publication is based on presentations delivered by SHHBIDSS's invited speakers on the 29 January 2013.

© Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2009.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise, without prior permission from SHHBIDSS.

First published: 2017
ISBN: 978-9991736679

Printed and bound by in Brunei Darussalam by:
Brunei Press Sdn Bhd

All correspondence should be addressed to:

Library and Publication Section
Support Services Division
Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Ministry of Defence
Bolkiah Garrison
Bandar Seri Begawan BB3510
Negara Brunei Darussalam

Tel: +673 2386693
Fax: +673 2381424
Email: library.shhbidss@mindef.gov.bn

Contents

Preface	i
List of Acronyms	ii
1. Challenges to Defence and Security Cooperation in East Asia: Southeast Asian Perspective <i>Dr Johan Saravanamuttu</i>	1
2. Territorial Disputes and its Implications to Regional Security <i>Professor Seok-soo Lee</i>	23
3. The Putative 'Arms Race' in East Asia <i>Dr Mark Rolls</i>	36
4. The Emergence of China as a Military Power <i>Dr Ron Huiskens</i>	46
5. Challenges and Responses in Maritime Security: Sea Power and Regional Order in the East and South China Seas <i>Dr Alessio Patalano</i>	64
Contributors	81

Preface

This publication is the outcome of the East Asia Security Outlook (EASO) seminar conducted on the 29 January 2013 by Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS).

The main objective of EASO seminars is to share views, perspectives and outlooks on the current security environment of East Asia. The contributors in this publication have covered a wide range of topics that are significant to the stability and security of the region including the defence and security cooperation in the region, emergence of China as a major power, and challenges faced in terms of arms race and in the maritime domain. These topics serve as an update to the vast challenges faced by the East Asian region.

SHHBIDSS would like to thank the contributors, its staff and all others who are involved in making our EASO this year a success.

Muhammad Shahrul Nizzam Umar

Director

Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

List of Acronyms

US	United States
A2/AD	anti-access/area denial
AAD	area air defence
ADMM-Plus	ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASBM	anti-ship ballistic missile
ASCM	anti-ship cruise missile
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian States
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
CCP	China Communist Party
CNP	comprehensive national power
CS	continental shelves
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DOC	Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
EEZ	exclusive economic zones
ESCS	East and South China Seas
EW	Electronic warfare
FLEC	Fisheries Law Enforcement Command
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Forces
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ISR	Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance
JDA	Joint Development Areas
MAC	massive and ancient civilisation
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
NSA	Negative security assurance
NWFZs	Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapon States
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
QDR	Quadrennial Defence Review

R&D	Research and Development
SCS	South China Sea
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asian Treaty for Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSBN	nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TEUs	twenty-foot equivalent units
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

CHALLENGES TO DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA: A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

Johan Saravanamuttu

Introduction

The paper looks at defence cooperation from a discursive perspective of Southeast Asian states addressing and managing major tensions and conflict in the East Asian or Asia Pacific region. It contextualises defence cooperation, such as there is, within the so-called 'new geopolitics' largely premised on the economic and political rise of China. This Chinese rise is usually cast in the backdrop of a declining United States (US) presence and role in the region. However, of late, US rebalancing under the Obama Administration indicate that the superpower wants to maintain a role as a "pivot" in Asia. Most Southeast Asian governments have welcomed this new posture of the US but continue to hedge between a rising China and the primacy of the US as a strategic partner in areas of defence and security collaboration. It is not always entirely clear what these Southeast Asian states are 'defending' themselves against as in terms of their core values and immediate national interests, there have been no major 'existential threats'¹ since the end of the Cold War. Much has been made of the emerging and surfacing tensions and conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS) which are over economic resources and territorial claims rather than absolute core interests. This paper will probe these issues and show why maintaining a central role for the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) in defence and security cooperation in the region remains paramount for its ten members. The institutional character of these collaborative arrangements remains inchoate albeit flexible. However, given the current fluidity of geopolitics in the region maintaining flexibility and a basic nonalignment in relations with major powers still promises to be the best option for the Southeast Asian states.

China's Rise and the US Pivot

In this section, we will discuss the notion of a new geopolitics premised on the rise of China as the discursive terrain on which much discussion, strategies, practices and policies about defence and security are embedded, explicitly or implicitly. What are the major elements of the new geopolitics of Asia? Apparently, China's putative rise has been coupled with a supposed US decline and this defines the broad parameters of changing discourse on regional geopolitics. Let us examine some of the facts. Like most astute observers of the changing geopolitics, Munir Majid has observed that since the US departure from Indochina two decades

ago, there has been an unmistakable rise in “the depth and breadth” of China’s influence in Southeast Asia (Majid 2012, p.21). The relative economic decline of the US has been concomitant on the deepening of economic relationships of China with the Southeast Asian states all of which have normalised relations with China, beginning with Malaysia in 1974. Majid suggests that Obama’s rebalancing posture, also known as the US Asian ‘pivot’ strategy, is due to these deepening relationships of China with the region:

China’s economic rise and success not only won the admiration of Southeast Asian countries, but also helped Beijing establish strong trade and financial ties with them. China is now the second largest economy in the world with economic growth of 9-10 per cent per annum since the late 1970s, even as American share of global GDP declined in 1999. The size of the Chinese economy is expected to surpass that of the US by 2030. (Majid 2012: 22)

The new pivoting policy of the US was signalled by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in July 2009, when she said: “The United States is back in South East Asia. President Obama and I believe that this region is vital to global process, peace and prosperity and we are fully engaged with our ASEAN partners on the wide range of challenges confronting us”.² By the end of 2011, a series of announcements by the Obama Administration gave clear indications of the US policy of rebalancing in the Asia Pacific, with Southeast Asia more or less as the fulcrum of the US’s Asian pivot.³

Much popular and academic writing revolves around the idea of China as the future dominant and global power (Jacques 2012) and the supposed shift of global balance of power to Asia (Mahbubani 2008). However, the current realities are that the US remains the most important strategic partner to most Southeast Asian countries and the discourse of Chinese power tends to overrate existential threats to the region emanating from China. Indeed, American power in Asia has continued to be present in terms of its actual reality and in the perception of Southeast Asian political elites and actors (Hamilton-Hart 2013). Since the end of the Cold War, states in the region have managed relations with major powers through ASEAN deploying policies which have maintained core and sovereign interests among each other while largely keeping non-aligned policies vis-à-vis major powers, varying in degree from state to state. Historical defence and security collaboration with Commonwealth allies has also naturally continued for states such Malaysia and Singapore. So too has the Philippines continued to preserve strong ties with the US despite having discarded its formal military alliance with the superpower. In a sense, while much has changed in the region, much has also remained stable in terms relationships. In a workshop held at the end of 2011, Southeast Asian specialists came to the following observations about the character of the new geopolitics in the region and their implications for Southeast Asia:

- 1) China's increasing military capability and economic strength has created a structural change in the region which has also witnessed the relative decline of US economic and political presence in recent years.
- 2) The underlying thrust of the Southeast Asian approach is to maintain good relations and cooperation with China while enhancing security collaboration with the US. The US remains as the major strategic partner of most Southeast Asian states with variations of commitment and engagement. The increasing economic engagement with China is not matched by any security or military arrangements except for ad hoc military exercises such as with Thailand.
- 3) In spite of domestic economic problems, the US will remain committed to key allies in the region. The US alliances with Japan and Australia will act as an overall anchor for the Asia Pacific region.
- 4) US-China rivalry is increasing as manifested in the SCS and by China's drive for East Asian economic integration as against the US drive for Asia-Pacific regional integration.
- 5) Russia and India are not considered to be major players in the current shifting geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific.
- 6) The SCS has become a source of increasing tension. Southeast Asian countries which have overlapping claims with China have relied on both ASEAN-based multilateral forums as well as bilateral initiatives.
- 7) ASEAN-based soft security forums tend to be flexible and can be used as balancing and hedging instruments vis-à-vis major powers. However, over time, ASEAN's 'centrality' will be increasingly challenged by the quest for equal decision-making power of ASEAN outside partners.
- 8) Track II diplomacy remains of value because it can generate new ideas and approaches to address changing situations. Track II diplomacy such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP are part and parcel of the 'constructivist' value of ASEAN.⁴

These observations and assumptions about regional politics will provide the basis the arguments offered in this paper for the sort of flexible defence and security cooperation necessary for Southeast Asian states.

Gyrations in the South China Sea

Before we actually address the question of defence and security cooperation, we need to briefly examine the most serious tensions and conflicts that have surfaced in the recent times in the East Asia region. Clearly some of the most difficult issues concern developments with respect to the SCS. Two sets of players are involved in these dynamics: the claimants to its territories, islands and features; and the outside powers and states which have an interest in maintaining sea lines of communications and freedom of navigation.

Along with China, major claimants in the SCS are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. ASEAN as a group has attempted to engage with China through the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which underscores universally recognised norms of international law based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Not much progress has been made in resolving issues between the ASEAN nations and China despite the setting up of a Joint Working Group that has held several meetings to date.⁵ The matter is further compounded by the vagueness of China's claims and the US insistence, although not as a claimant, to freedom of navigation in the SCS, on which China has remained silent. The annual value of US trade passing through the SCS is said to exceed \$1trillion and political analysts suggest that the US is increasingly concerned about China's recent assertiveness in the region. China's strong stance in the SCS is to be expected, given that it is, after all, the major littoral state to these waters. However China's claims are rather extravagant, premised on its controversial U-shaped map drawn in 1947 extending to territories claimed by Malaysia and Brunei at its southern-most end. What is particularly worrisome is the character of its claims, which remain vague, given that the nine dashed lines of its map at the southern extremity has never been explained in the lexicon of international law.

The US pivot to Asia has put China on the defensive with respect to the SCS and perhaps emboldened other claimant states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. The Aquino's government stronger stance on its claims in the Spratly group was sparked by the April 2012 stand-off near Scarborough Shoal between Philippines and Chinese vessels. As for Vietnam, past incidents and skirmishes with China in the Paracels and Spratlys long predate the US pivot. However, Vietnam's newly initiated 2012 collaboration with India in oil and gas exploration in the Paracels has earned the ire of Beijing. In June 2012, China raised the status of Shansa City in to that of a prefecture to manage the islands of Xisha, Zhongsha and

Nansha and their surrounding areas. China's SCS actions have opened the door for greater balancing by the US and to Southeast Asian support for the US. It has interestingly also led to some level of bilateral cooperation among ASEAN states.

In May 2009, Malaysia-Vietnamese cooperation took the form of a submission to UNCLOS notifying the two countries' extended continental shelf claims in the SCS. The area covered was within the 200 nautical mile limit of the two countries and included part of the Spratly Islands and its adjacent waters. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak said both countries had "more or less" sorted out the portions each country owned. China filed a note with the UN Secretary-General objecting that the area claimed was under Chinese sovereignty. Malaysia responded with a note asserting its legal right to claim the area and stating that it recognised the overlapping claims by various countries over the same territory. During his state visit to China in June, Razak intimated that China and Malaysia had reached an understanding and agreed to continue negotiations over all territorial disputes. It is obvious, however, that the Malaysia-Vietnam joint submission would be problematic simply because of the multiple claimants to the SCS entities and, in particular, China's expansive U-shaped claim.

The Philippines may have recently clarified matters for themselves by resorting strictly to an islands regime approach. The overall problem of multiple claimants also explains why the Joint Development Areas (JDAs) have been slow to take shape. Malaysia now has one major JDA with Brunei, which was agreed in 2009. According to Wisma Putra, Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the talks leading to the signing of the agreement represented the culmination of 20 years of tough negotiations. The two sides agreed to 'unsuspendable rights of maritime access', which guaranteed the right of movement by Malaysian vessels through Brunei territorial waters, provided Brunei's laws and regulations are observed.

Challenges to Defence and Security Collaboration

Needless to say there have been great historical divergences insecurity and defence postures and policies among the Southeast Asia states. One of the legacies of defence collaboration concerns Malaysia and Singapore, the two Commonwealth states which are party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Having just celebrated its 40th Anniversary, the FPDA remains well in place.⁶ I have argued that it is an ongoing confidence building measure for defence collaboration and beyond for the two countries and particularly for Malaysia the FPDA represented a shift from the stricter terrain of 'defence' to the broader terrain of 'security', while allowing it to maintain its historical links with Commonwealth allies, namely, Britain, Australia and New Zealand (Saravanamuttu 2011, p.43-48). The annual military exercises conducted under the FPDA has conferred it a flexibility that is strategically important for the region. Thayer writes in sanguine tones about these

arrangements, viz:

The FPDA could become a model for how regional states can cooperate with middle powers in maintaining regional security. Four of the five members of the FPDA are also part of the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) process (Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore). Crucially, Australia and Malaysia are co-chairs of the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security. There appears to be scope – over fullness of time – for the modalities and operational experiences of the FPDA to be studied, shared, and adapted by other ADMM-Plus states. (Thayer 2011, p. 64)

To date, Brunei, a Commonwealth country, remains outside the FPDA. Another issue concerns how the FPDA should eventually relate to the ASEAN group of states of which Malaysia and Singapore are members. Indonesia had once called for a trilateral defence arrangement among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Thayer is perhaps hinting that in the long term all the ASEAN could set up some similar to the FPDA except this still begs the questions of which outside powers would also be party to such an arrangement.

For now, it would appear that the FPDA should be perceived as supplementary and complimentary to what Desmond Ball has termed a “Southeast Asian Defence Model” (Ball 2012). I will draw on some of the points made in Ball’s comprehensive paper and add some observations of my own consonant with our earlier discussion about the new geopolitics of East Asia.

The principal elements of what Ball has sketched out as Southeast Asian Defence Model hinges around various ASEAN institutions and structures, namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), formed in 1995, its various stages of implementation of programmes and outcomes particularly within what Ball calls the ARF’s “defence track” (Ball. Pp. 13-15). One of the spinoffs of this defence track would be the ADMM-Plus process. Prior to this, the Shangri-La Dialogue held annually in Singapore by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) served as the forum for defence ministers in the East Asian region. Without engaging in all the details of Ball’s paper, we will draw on his broad suggestions about what he considers to be main challenges to creating a credible defence architecture for the region:⁷

In this region, with its immense diversity and security concerns, progress with construction of new security architecture is invariably slow, gradual and iterative, and conditional on consensus...The challenge for the ASEAN-led processes will be to move faster, to increase the rate of their evolution and to be more adventurous with respect to the ‘Asian way’, in order to meet emerging security issues of perhaps unprecedented scale, complexity and

consequence such as managing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), undertaking humanitarian intervention in accordance with the 'the responsibility to protect', responding to large scale natural disasters and environmental security issues, and ensuring cyber security (Ball 2012, p. 22).

The list is long and daunting but one could hardly disagree with the thrust of these suggestions. In the changing geopolitics, it would imperative to emphasis two broad but highly important dimensions of architecture which would need to become more robust in the future, namely, the peaceful settlement of conflicts symbolised by ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and a non-nuclear weapons stance symbolised by the Southeast Asian Treaty for Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ).

SEANWFZ and Geopolitics

In this section I will examine ASEAN security cooperation and challenges with respect to the movement towards creating SEANWFZ guaranteed by the regional nuclear powers in the context of the new geopolitics. In my view, setting up a nuclear-free zone represents a specific type of defence and security collaboration which engages major nuclear powers on eliminating the ultimate existential threat to the Southeast Asian states.

The idea of a SEANWFZ was first raised at the Jakarta Foreign Ministers' meeting of July 1984 (Muthiah, 1987: 1). It was not surprising, therefore, that Indonesia's elder statesman, the late Adam Malik, made a similar call for the SEANWFZ at about the same time. By June 1986, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Manila, much press was given to the idea which was under study by the ASEAN Working Group on ZOPFAN. At the same time, the US made it clear that it was against any type of "exclusionary zones" in Southeast Asia. Then Secretary of State, George Shultz went to Manila specially to make this point. However, the strongest point in favour of the possible full participation of the Southeast Asian states and thereby the largest possible geographical scope of the SEANWFZ treaty, was that all Southeast states, except for Myanmar, were already signatories of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). ASEAN senior officials evidently worked steadily on the project and on the eve of the extension of the NPT in early 1996, already had the treaty in place for the ASEAN Summit of December 1995, where it was signed by the ASEAN heads of Government, including that of Vietnam. The Treaty only required seven ratifications and came into force on 28 March 1997. This allowed the Philippines to sit in on SEANWFZ meetings until it became party to it in 2001 (Chesterman, 2010: 26).

However, the rather problematic implementation of NWFZs and the inevitability of loopholes without the compliance of major nuclear powers, coupled with

the fact that the Cold War's end had taken the thunder out of such proposals, all combined to make SEANWFZ yet another ASEAN treaty without much bite in terms of keeping the region truly free of nuclear weapons. To date the major nuclear powers have not been prepared to sign the protocols.⁸ The treaty ensures a moratorium on developing, manufacturing, possessing and transiting, and testing and using nuclear weapons and a commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy among the ASEAN states (vide articles 3 and 4). More recent developments seem hopeful of expanding the scope and areas of nuclear free zones. At the 40th ASEAN Ministerial meeting, a Plan of Action (2007-2012) was approved for actions related to IAEA safeguards, and ratifications of protocols. At the 8th NPT review, US Secretary State Hilary Clinton indicated a willingness to consult the SEANWFZ parties to arrive at an agreement on protocols. This followed the holding of the April 2010 Nuclear Summit in New York and a conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone for Mongolia. This stance of the Obama Administration is a clear departure from that of previous US administrations. However, in spite of much fanfare that the five nuclear powers, US, Russia, China, France and UK, would be signing the protocols in 2012, this never came about. This signing was scheduled for the ASEAN Summit of July in Phnom Penh.

Termsak Chalermpanupap, a former senior official⁹ of the ASEAN Secretariat, now Visiting Senior Research Fellow at ISEAS, provides important insights into the significance of SEANWFZ as a commitment to keep ASEAN free of all nuclear weapons and all forms of WMD, a factor which has complicated the original treaty.¹⁰ While China had indicated that it would sign the protocols, the SEANWFZ Commission had decided against asking China to go ahead because the other four nuclear powers (P4) still have reservations to the protocol text. At the point of writing, the much heralded signing of the revised protocols by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) was scheduled for July 2012 at the Phnom Penh Summit but has now been postponed indefinitely.¹¹ According Chalermpanupap, in his earlier 2011 paper, the main pending issues of the P4 were the following:

Transit Rights and Port Visits

By July 2012 the States Parties (ASEAN states) had agreed largely that Article 3 and Article 7¹² of the SEANWFZ Treaty could be reconciled. The P4 seem to want to hold firm to their rights and freedom of navigation and thus would notify littoral states of any movement of their navy ships or military aircraft outside the territorial waters of littoral states. Port and airfield visits constitute another problem; whether allowing frequent visits of foreign navy ships, aircraft carriers, submarines and military aircraft that are known to be capable of serving as platforms for nuclear weapons violates Article 3 and goes against the spirit of the Treaty.

Zone of Application

One of the difficult issues concern P4 objection to the wide coverage of SEANFWZ,

which includes the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves (CS) of the States Parties. The P4 have contended that the EEZ and CS are not suitable for defining nuclear weapon-free zones because of unclear demarcation and disputable overlapping claims. As things stand now, the States Parties are unlikely to curtail the zone of application of SEANWFZ, chiefly because they need maximum protection against dumping of radioactive material or disposal of other dangerous wastes in the seas surrounding Southeast Asia. This extra protection is vital especially to the safety of Indonesia and the Philippines, as both are vast archipelagic states near major busy international sea lanes. The 1971 Seabed Treaty which prohibits emplacing nuclear weapons and other WMD on the seabed, the ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof outside the 12-mile territorial waters is inadequate, because it does not cover dumping of radioactive material and disposal of other dangerous wastes. In recent negotiations, the NWS have indicated that they would respect environmental protection efforts of the States Parties and agree not to dump radioactive wastes in the high seas and seabed.¹³

First-Use and Sanctuary Issue

Article 2 in the Protocol to the Treaty on SEANWFZ reads: “Each State Party [each of the P5] undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.”

China has long adhered to the no first-use policy of threatening or attacking any non-nuclear-weapon state. Similarly, each of the P4 has unilateral undertakings not to threaten or attack any state party to the NPT that has satisfactory safeguards agreement with the IAEA.¹⁴ All the NWS, therefore, have no difficulty with the first part of Article 2 of the Protocol to not threaten or attack any State Party to the Treaty.

In recent negotiations, the P4 have agreed to extend negative security assurance (NSA) to the States Parties’ territories, territorial seas and the airspace above but not to the EEZs of continental shelves.¹⁵ A problem that was hitherto a concern of the NWS was that parties may use SEANWFZ as a sanctuary for its nuclear weapon platforms and this can then pose a serious security threat to others. Thus they had wanted to delete the second sentence in Article 2 of the Protocol.

Sovereignty and the high seas

Another concern of the P4 is what they consider as the unlawful exercise of sovereignty of the States Parties over the SEANWFZ zone, which could restrict freedom on the high seas. Although Article 2, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty guarantees “freedom of the high seas, rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of ships and aircraft, and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations”, the P4 had sought clarification on this. China has also sought assurance

that SEANWFZ would not affect in any way any party's claims over disputed areas and islands in the SCS.

According to Chalermphalanupap, although the revised protocols were due to be signed in July 2012, one week before the signing, France came up with new written reservations and interpretation of its undertakings and in the next day, Russia and the UK followed suit with their own written reservations. An urgent meeting was held to discuss these matters brought no resolution.¹⁶

From the foregoing, it is evident that the full implementation of the SEANWFZ has some distance to go. In my view, the challenges to SEANWFZ represent some of the major constraints to defence and security cooperation in East Asia, which are crucial to the establishing of security architecture necessary for an ASEAN Political-Security Community. In particular, the obstacles to SEANWFZ's effective implementation show the kind of constraints imposed on defence and security collaboration by the major powers. By the same token, the fact that negotiations have reached this point indicates the high level of ASEAN confidence building in relations with major powers.

Concluding Remarks

This paper has tried to show the prospects and limits to defence and security cooperation in the region from a Southeast Asian perspective. ASEAN norms of peaceful engagement, conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the implementation of peace zones and nuclear-free zones continue to provide the underlying spirit for such defence and security collaboration. The creation of concepts and structures such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum, a Southeast Asian NWFZ, ADMM-Plus and related institutions are clear indications of how Southeast Asian states have created arrangements and set the norms necessary for such collaboration. However, the current institutions and arrangements remain weak and far from robust, not least of all because regional cooperation is ultimately dependent on big-power convergence on crucial matters for success. However, ASEAN centrality and flexibility in norms setting and institutional building remains fundamental despite flaws.

Appendix

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

The States Parties to this Treaty:

DESIRING to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

DETERMINED to take concrete action which will contribute to the progress towards general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, and to the promotion of international peace and security;

REAFFIRMING the desire of the Southeast Asian States to maintain peace and stability in the region in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding and cooperation as enunciated in various communiques, declarations and other legal instruments;

RECALLING the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971 and the Programme of Action on ZOPFAN adopted at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 1993;

CONVINCED that the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, as an essential component of the ZOPFAN, will contribute towards strengthening the security of States within the Zone and towards enhancing international peace and security as a whole;

REAFFIRMING the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing towards international peace and security;

RECALLING Article VII of the NPT which recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assume the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

RECALLING the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly which encourages the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones;

RECALLING the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, that the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is important for the maximum effectiveness of this nuclear weapon-free zone treaty and its relevant protocols.

DETERMINED to protect the region from environmental pollution and the hazards posed by radioactive wastes and other radioactive material;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article 1

USE OF TERMS

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocol:

- (a) “Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”, hereinafter referred to as the “Zone”, means the area comprising the territories of all States in Southeast Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ);
- (b) “territory” means the land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, the seabed and the sub-soil thereof and the airspace above them;
- (c) “nuclear weapon” means any explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such device if separable from and not an indivisible part thereof;
- (d) “station” means to deploy, emplace, implant, install, stockpile or store;
- (e) “radioactive material” means material that contains radionuclides above clearance or exemption levels recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- (f) “radioactive wastes” means material that contains or is contaminated with radionuclides at concentrations or activities greater than clearance levels recommended by the IAEA and for which no use is foreseen; and
- (g) “dumping” means
 - (i) any deliberate disposal at sea, including seabed and subsoil insertion, of radioactive wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, and
 - (ii) any deliberate disposal at sea, including seabed and subsoil insertion, of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, containing radioactive material, but does not include the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures.

Article 2

APPLICATION OF THE TREATY

1. This Treaty and its Protocol shall apply to the territories, continental shelves, and EEZ of the States Parties within the Zone in which the Treaty is in force.
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the rights or the exercise of these rights by any State under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, in particular with regard to freedom of the high seas,

rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of ships and aircraft, and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 3

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

1. Each State Party undertakes not to, anywhere inside or outside the Zone:
 - (a) develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons;
 - (b) station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; or
 - (c) test or use nuclear weapons.
2. Each State Party also undertakes not to allow, in its territory, any other State to:
 - (a) develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons;
 - (b) station nuclear weapons; or
 - (c) test or use nuclear weapons.
3. Each State Party also undertake not to:
 - (a) dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the Zone any radioactive material or wastes;
 - (b) dispose radioactive material or wastes on land in the territory of or under the jurisdiction of other States except as stipulated in Paragraph 2 (e) of Article 4; or
 - (c) allow, within its territory, any other State to dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere any radioactive material or wastes.
4. Each State Party undertakes not to :
 - (a) seek or receive any assistance in the Commission of any act in violation of the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article; or
 - (b) take any action to assist or encourage the Commission of any act in violation of the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.

Article 4

USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the right of the States Parties to use nuclear energy, in particular for their economic development and social progress.
2. Each State Party therefore undertakes:
 - (a) to use exclusively for peaceful purposes nuclear material and facilities which are within its territory and areas under its jurisdiction and control;
 - (b) prior to embarking on its peaceful nuclear energy programme, to subject its programme to rigorous nuclear safety assessment conforming to guidelines and standards recommended by the IAEA

for the protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property in accordance with Paragraph 6 of Article III of the Statute of the IAEA;

- (c) upon request, to make available to another State Party the assessment except information relating to personal data, information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality, and information relating to national security;
- (d) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA safeguard system; and
- (e) to dispose radioactive wastes and other radioactive material in accordance with IAEA standards and procedures on land within its territory or on land within the territory of another State which has consented to such disposal.

3. Each State Party further undertakes not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to :

- (a) any non-nuclear-weapon State except under conditions subject to the safeguards required by Paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT; or
- (b) any nuclear-weapon State except in conformity with applicable safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Article 5

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Each State Party which has not done so shall conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of full scope safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities not later than eighteen months after the entry into force for that State Party of the Treaty.

Article 6

EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

Each State Party which has not acceded to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident shall endeavour to do so.

Article 7

FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

Each State Party, on being notified, may decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships through its territorial sea or archipelagic waters and overflight of foreign aircraft above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes

passage or transit passage.

Article 8

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE

1. There is hereby established a Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”.
2. All States Parties are ipso facto members of the Commission. Each State Party shall be represented by its Foreign Minister or his representative accompanied by alternates and advisers.
3. The function of the Commission shall be to oversee the implementation of this Treaty and ensure compliance with its provisions.
4. The Commission shall meet as and when necessary in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty including upon the request of any State Party. As far as possible, the Commission shall meet in conjunction with the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.
5. At the beginning of each meeting, the Commission shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next meeting.
6. Unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, two-thirds of the members of the Commission shall be present to constitute a quorum.
7. Each member of the Commission shall have one vote.
8. Except as provided for in this Treaty, decisions of the Commission shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.
9. The Commission shall, by consensus, agree upon and adopt rules of procedure for itself as well as financial rules governing its funding and that of its subsidiary organs.

Article 9

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

1. There is hereby established, as a subsidiary organ of the Commission, the Executive Committee.
2. The Executive Committee shall be composed of all States Parties to this Treaty. Each State Party shall be represented by one senior official as its representative, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
3. The functions of the Executive Committee shall be to:
 - (a) ensure the proper operation of verification measures in accordance with the provisions on the control system as stipulated in Article 10;
 - (b) consider and decide on requests for clarification and for a fact-finding mission;
 - (c) set up a fact-finding mission in accordance with the Annex of this

Treaty;

- (d) consider and decide on the findings of a fact-finding mission and report to the Commission;
 - (e) request the Commission to convene a meeting when appropriate and necessary;
 - (f) conclude such agreements with the IAEA or other international organizations as referred to in Article 18 on behalf of the Commission after being duly authorized to do so by the Commission; and
 - (g) carry out such other tasks as may, from time to time, be assigned by the Commission.
4. The Executive Committee shall meet as and when necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions. As far as possible, the Executive Committee shall meet in conjunction with the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting.
 5. The Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be the representative of the Chairman of the Commission. Any submission or communication made by a State Party to the Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be disseminated to the other members of the Executive Committee.
 6. Two-thirds of the members of the Executive Committee shall be present to constitute a quorum.
 7. Each member of the Executive Committee shall have one vote.
 8. Decisions of the Executive Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

Article 10

CONTROL SYSTEM

1. There is hereby established a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations of the States Parties under this Treaty.
2. The Control System shall comprise:
 - (a) the IAEA safeguards system as provided for in Article 5;
 - (b) report and exchange of information as provided for in Article 11;
 - (c) request for clarification as provided for in Article 12; and
 - (d) request and procedures for a fact-finding mission as provided for in Article 13.

Article 11

REPORT AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

1. Each State Party shall submit reports to the Executive Committee on any significant event within its territory and areas under its jurisdiction and control affecting the implementation of this Treaty.
2. The States Parties may exchange information on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty.

Article 12

REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION

1. Each State Party shall have the right to request another State Party for clarification concerning any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about the compliance of that State Party with this Treaty. It shall inform the Executive Committee of such a request. The requested State Party shall duly respond by providing without delay the necessary information and inform the Executive Committee of its reply to the requesting State Party.
2. Each State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Committee to seek clarification for another State Party concerning any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about compliance of that State Party with this Treaty. Upon receipt of such a request, the Executive Committee shall consult the State Party from which clarification is sought for the purpose of obtaining the clarification requested.

Article 13

REQUEST FOR A FACT-FINDING MISSION

A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Committee to send a fact-finding mission to another State Party in order to clarify and resolve a situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with the procedure contained in the Annex to this Treaty.

Article 14

REMEDIAL MEASURES

1. In case the Executive Committee decide in accordance with the Annex that there is a breach of this Treaty by a State Party, that State Party shall, within a reasonable time, take all steps necessary to bring itself in full compliance with this Treaty and shall promptly inform the Executive Committee of the action taken or proposed to be taken by it.
2. Where a State Party fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article, the Executive Committee shall request the Commission to convene a meeting in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 3(e) of Article 9.
3. At the meeting convened pursuant to Paragraph 2 of this Article, the Commission shall consider the emergent situation and shall decide on any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation, including the submission of the matter to the IAEA and, where the situation might endanger international peace and security, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

4. In the event of breach of the Protocol attached to this Treaty by a State Party to the Protocol, the Executive Committee shall convene a special meeting of the Commission to decide on appropriate measures to be taken.

Article 15

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCESSION, DEPOSIT AND REGISTRATION

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedure of the signatory states. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand which is hereby designated as the Depositary State.
3. This Treaty shall be open for accession. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Depositary State.
4. The Depositary State shall inform the other States Parties to this Treaty on the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary State shall register this Treaty and its Protocol pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 16

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification and/or accession.
2. For States which ratify or accede to this Treaty after the date of the seventh instrument of ratification or accession, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 17

RESERVATIONS

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 18

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Commission may conclude such agreements with the IAEA or other international organizations as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by this Treaty.

Article 19

AMENDMENTS

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and its Protocol and shall submit its proposals to the Executive Committee, which shall

transmit them to all the other States Parties. The Executive Committee shall immediately request the Commission to convene a meeting to examine the proposed amendments. The quorum required for such a meeting shall be all the members of the Commission. Any amendment shall be adopted by a consensus decision of the Commission.

2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force 30 days after the receipt by the Depositary State of the seventh instrument of acceptance from the States Parties.

Article 20

REVIEW

Ten years after this Treaty enters into force, a meeting of the Commission shall be convened for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. A meeting of the Commission for the same purpose may also be convened at anytime thereafter if there is consensus among all its members.

Article 21

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute arising from the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled by peaceful means as may be agreed upon by the States Parties to the dispute. If within one month, the parties to the dispute are unable to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute by negotiation, mediation, enquiry or conciliation, any of the parties concerned shall, with the prior consent of the other parties concerned, refer the dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice.

Article 22

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.
 2. In the event of a breach by any State Party of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty, every other State Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.
 3. Withdrawal under Paragraph 2 of Article 22, shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the members of the Commission.
- IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed this Treaty.
DONE at Bangkok, this fifteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five, in one original in the English language.

References

- Ball, Desmond 2012. "Reflection of Defence Security in Southeast Asia", RSIS Working Paper No. 237, 27 April 2012.
- Chalermpananupap, Termask, 2011. "SEANWFZ and Other Nuclear Challenges in Southeast Asia," paper presented at the Workshop on Nuclear Challenges in Southeast Asia, organized at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 15-17 February 2011.
- CRS Report for Congress, 2012. "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's 'Rebalancing' Toward Asia," Congressional Research Service, 7-5700. [www.crs.gov R42448](http://www.crs.gov/R42448).
- Chesterman, Simon, 2010. "Does ASEAN Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations as an International Legal Person." In *ASEAN: Life after the Charter*, edited by S. Tiwari, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Freeman, Jan, 2007. "Existentially Speaking" *The Boston Globe*, 4 February, 2007. http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/02/04/existentially_speaking/ (accessed 2/1/13)
- Jacques, Martin, 2012. *When China Rules the World*, London: Penguin Books
- Majid, Munir, 2012. "Southeast Asia between China and the United States." In *The New Geopolitics of Southeast Asia*, edited by Nicholas Kitchen, LSE IDEAS Special Report SR015 November 2012, pp. 21-35.
- Mahbubani, Kishore, 2008. *The New Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*, New York: Public Affairs.
- Muthiah Alagappa, 1987, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Southeast Asia" ISIS Research Note, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur.
- Oren, Michael B, 2009. "Seven Existential Threats", *Commentary*, May 2009. <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/seven-existential-threats/> (accessed 2/1/13)
- Singh, Daljit and Johan Saravanamuttu, 2011. "Workshop Report on Impact of Asian Geopolitical Shifts in Southeast Asia" Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
- Saravanamuttu, Johan, 2011. "Malaysian Foreign Policy and the Five Power Defence Arrangements." In *Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty*, edited by Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers and Daljit Singh, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011, pp.36-50.
- Storey, Ian, Ralf Emmers and Daljit Singh, 2011. *Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Thayer, Carlyle A, 2011. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises, 2004-10." In *Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty*, edited by Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers and Daljit Singh, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011, pp. 51-67.

Endnotes

¹ We borrow this interesting and useful terminology from American and Israeli foreign policy discourse. Thus the global war on terror was pursued because of a so-called 'existential threat' to the US homeland and Arab opposition to the Jewish state is thought to continue to be an existential threat to Israel. The obverse view of the existential threat Palestine is often ignored. See Freeman (2007) and Oren (2009). For our purposes here in this paper the term refers to a threat to the existence of any Southeast Asian state.

² The statement was made when Clinton attended the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phuket, Thailand.

³ See CRS Report for Congress, 2012.

⁴ See Singh and Saravanamuttu (2011, pp. 1-2)

⁵ On the ASEAN side of things, after the July 2012 deadlock over a joint communiqué on the South China Sea at the Phnom Penh ASEAN meeting, no further progress was made at the November Summit, due largely to the Philippine's spat with China over Scarborough Shoal.

⁶ See the edited volume by Storey, Emmers and Singh (2011).

⁷ Ball also talks about Track II processes, non-traditional security issues, disaster relief and arms control which I have left out in this discussion.

⁸ The ASEAN Foreign Ministers' joint communiqué of July 2010 made a specific reference to SEANWFZ and nuclear disarmament.

⁹ ChalermPALANUPAP was the Director of the Political-Security Directorate, Department of ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Secretariat.

¹⁰ See ChalermPALANUPAP (2011). I draw from ChalermPALANUPAP's intimate information about these matters as found in his paper and in personal communications with him. I would like to acknowledge his invaluable help in this section of the paper, with the caveat that any errors are mine alone.

¹¹ Personal communication from ChalermPALANUPAP. The ASEAN leaders in November 2012 called for revised protocols to be signed but several reservation among the P4 remained unresolved.

¹² Article 3 of the Treaty and Article 7 appear to be contradictory. On the one hand, Article 3 requires each State Party, among other things, "*not to allow, in its territory, any other State to : (a) develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; (b) station nuclear weapons; or (c) test or use nuclear weapons. ...*", Article 7 leaves open the possibility that "Each State Party, on being notified, may decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships through its territorial sea or archipelagic waters and overflight of foreign aircraft above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage." (See Appendix for the full text of these articles).

¹³ Personal communication from ChalermPALANUPAP.

¹⁴ All the States Parties to the SEANWFZ Treaty are in the NPT, and all of them have initial safeguard agreements with the IAEA, but only Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore

have additional protocols to their safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Brunei Darussalam and Lao PDR have not yet joined the IAEA.

¹⁵ Personal communication from Chalermphanupap.

¹⁶ Personal communication from Chalermphanupap.

TERRITORIAL DISPUTE IN EAST ASIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Seok-soo Lee

I. Introduction

Growing attention is directed to East Asia for two reasons. Foremost is the economic vitality of the region. While global economy falters, it shows better economic performance than other parts of the world. China and Japan are the second and third largest economy in the world. Amid global financial crisis, South Korea and other Southeastern countries also recorded steady economic growth. The three Northeast Asian countries share 20 percent of the global economy in terms of GDP with a population of 1.6 billion.¹

Meanwhile, the region confronts such hard security issues as Sino-US competition for regional influence, regional rivalry between Japan and China, North Korea's nuclear and missile development program, and maritime territorial disputes. Regional strategic dynamics undergo a dramatic transition due to China's rise, Japan's uncertainty, and US' relative decline. China's growth significantly contributed to shaping new regional strategic landscape in general and accelerating maritime disputes in specific. Recent maritime rows are attributed to the confluence of China's assertiveness and Japan and the US' efforts reactions.

Amid shifting strategic context in East Asia, simmering maritime territorial disputes heighten tension in the region. Rows in waters include Dokdo, Senkaku/Diaoyu, and the SCS. Most pronounced is a contestation between Japan and China in the East China Sea. China, Japan, South Korea, and some countries in Southeast Asia are embroiled in maritime spats, hampering multilateral regional cooperation for security and prosperity.

This paper is an attempt to assess ongoing maritime disputes in East Asia in terms of manifestation, determinants, challenges, implications, and solutions. In doing so, focus is placed on three cases: Dokdo, Senkaku/Diaoyu, and SCS dispute. The first part, therefore, devotes to examining the row over Dokdo between South Korea and Japan. The second one looks into dispute in Senkaku/Diaoyu between Japan and China. The third one concerns investigation of spat in the SCS. The fourth part is related to overall assessment of three cases of maritime disputes. Lastly, implications and conflict management are drawn.

II. Dokdo

1. Recent Development of the Dispute

Seoul and Tokyo have experienced sporadic spats because of distorted Japanese history textbook, Japan's wartime sex slavery of Korean women, cabinet member's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and Dokdo dispute. Friction between the two neighbors culminated in President Lee Myung Bak's landing on Dokdo in August, 2012. The unexpected visit was made, following Japan's claim to sovereignty over the disputed territory of Dokdo in newly released *Defense White Paper* in July. In fact, President Lee's visit is a reaction to Japan's territorial claim over Dokdo.

Soaring tension between Seoul and Tokyo exacerbated unfriendly feeling of the public to each other. South Korean legislators and a growing number of South Koreans made a trip to the islets. During presidential campaign, candidates maintained rigid stance on the issue of territorial dispute with Japan regardless of affiliation to political party. South Korean political leaders continued to reiterate that Dokdo is the part of South Korean territory historically, geographically, and under international law. The islets in East Sea are not a matter of compromise and negotiation. President-elect Park Guen-hye stressed this before and after the election.

In the wake of President Lee's landing on the islets, Japan recalled its ambassador from Seoul to demonstrate its discontent with the visit. Some of its cabinet members' visit to Yasukuni Shrine worsened friction between the two neighboring countries. Japan's parliament took resolutions demanding apology from South Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko contended that the territorial dispute should be settled at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while assertively claiming its sovereignty over the islets.

Both countries reached the agreement that the amount of a foreign exchange swap was expanded from \$13 billion dollars to \$70 billion on one year base in 2011.² Last October, Japan's finance minister Koriki Jojima stated that increased portion of the deal was not necessary but temporary and Japan let the deal expire. At last, South Korea and Japan agreed to allow expansion of currency swap deal terminate at the end of October, 2002. The expiration means that the swap deal decreases to \$13 billion from 70 billion. While Tokyo stressed that the agreement had nothing to do with the recent spat over the islets, it appears that the deal is fallout of the friction.

South Korea prefers what it calls 'a calm approach' to resolving the row with Japan in the waters. Its basic position of the islands involves maintaining effective occupation, denying the existence of dispute, and rejecting negotiation. South Korea's president-elect clearly announced during campaigning that "Dokdo is not

a subject for negotiation and urged Japan to 'squarely face' the matter for their two countries' future".³ It is very rare for Seoul to trigger feud with Japan. Mostly, Japan stimulated South Korean people with regard to history under the Japanese colonial occupation.

Relations between Seoul and Japan are not likely to improve anytime soon. New leaders feel pressure for improvement of relations but cannot move forward because of their political bases of supports. For a while, rapid compromise on Dokdo issue cannot be expected. While Japanese Prime Minister attended the last two presidential inauguration ceremonies, new Prime Minister will not participate in the ceremony coming February. Even if new governments in Seoul and Tokyo seem not to want further escalation of tension between the two, they cannot help taking firm stances on the territorial dispute. Both governments, however, wants the confrontation remain under control.

2. Sources and Challenges of the Dispute

1) Sources⁴

Various factors were taken into consideration in explaining the emergence and development of the row between South Korea and Japan on Dokdo. Determinants of the outbreak and maintenance of the dispute can be categorized into the two clusters: root causes and catalysts. Most frequently mentioned as an origin is history and nationalism. South Koreans cannot forget the Japanese colonial rule from which Koreans suffered too much. Koreans have bitter memory of Japanese occupation era. South Koreans considered Japanese claim to sovereignty over Dokdo as a byproduct of Japanese colonial rule. For South Koreans, giving up the territory seems to be the legitimization of Japanese colonial occupation. There has been little room for compromise with Japan over the islets. In this historical context, nationalistic sentiment plays a critical role in heightening the tension over Dokdo issue. South Korean government and people retain a firm position that Dokdo is Korean and no dispute exists in Dokdo.

In contrast, Japan continues to assert that Dokdo what it calls Takeshima is an integral part of its territory. Its stance is closely connected with misunderstanding of its history. Japan sporadically infuriated South Koreans by including distorted historical facts in textbooks for its purposes⁵ Furthermore, some Japanese shamefully denied government's role concerning what State Secretary called enforced 'enforced sex slaves' of Korean women during the wartime. For South Koreans' eyes, Japan never genuinely demonstrated its deep remorse on its atrocities. Clash between Korean and Japanese nationalisms led to the confrontation over Dokdo. Nationalism affected understanding of history, identity and national pride which constitute a root cause of the maritime territorial dispute.

Secondly, domestic politics matters. The hibernating conflict was activated by President Lee's sudden visit to Dokdo and immediate harsh response from Japanese political leaders and the people. The escalation of the dispute is attributed to the decline of President Lee's popularity and a fragmented politics in Japan. For Japanese political leaders, ratcheting up the tension was urgent to win the election of the lower house of the parliament on December 16 while President Lee felt less political pressure as a one term President stipulated in the constitution. In this vein, Political leaders in Japan such as the former Prime Minister Noda and incumbent Prime Minister Abe were lured into nationalistic sentiment shared by majority of Japanese. Other factors like changing security environment and economic interests entail little impact on augmenting the row on Dokdo.

2) Challenges

The two countries could confront challenges across sectors by the dispute. First of all, the bilateral diplomatic relations have been under deterioration, while nationalism in both countries has risen. Second, the tension between the US allies weakened collaborative efforts in dealing with threats imposed by North Korea to Seoul and Japan. As a result, chasm between the two countries destabilized Northeast Asia. Third, the ascending tension also prevented regional countries from cooperating. Last but not least, the confrontation led to a surge of nationalism in the region, exacerbating negative attitudes toward each other. All in all, maritime dispute in Dokdo devastated relations between Seoul and Tokyo across sectors, intimidating peace and security in the region and impeding bilateral and regional economic cooperation.

III. Senkaku/Diaoyu Case

1. *Recent Development of the Dispute*

The friction in Senkaku/Diaoyu has been fluctuating between being dormant and apparent over time. The dispute surfaced since the 1970s. The tension between Tokyo and Beijing increased since 2012 when Japan purchased 3 islands in Senkaku/Diaoyu from Japanese private owners. This infuriated Chinese government and people. The bilateral relations was seriously strained and in deadlock. The escalating tension in the islands prevents both countries from cooperating with each other for mutual interests of peace and prosperity. Recent soaring feud has been driven by Chinese 'assertiveness' and Japanese 'nervousness.' Japan contends that the islands are integral part of Japanese territory on the basis of history and international law. This is the reason why it is not ready to admit the dispute in the waters in Senkaku/Diaoyu. While claiming sovereignty to the islands, Japan has made effort to retain its *de facto* control over the islands. Japanese civilian and military capacities have been mobilized to block access of Chinese activists and

Chinese ships and aircrafts to its airspaces and waters within its territory defined by Japan. In order to avoid armed clash, Japan has relied on coast guard in waters.

Amid escalating tension in the area, both Japan and China were recently involved in what we called a vicious cycle of 'action-reaction' typically demonstrated in a crisis escalation. Since spring, 2012, Tokyo mayor Ishihara frequently revealed his intention to buy the islands in Senkaku/Diaoyu. Those statements incited Chinese government and people. In this context, attempt to land on the islands were made several times by Chinese. For instance, 14 activists in Hong Kong landed on the islands and they were arrested by Japanese authorities on August 14.

According to Japanese Coast Guard report, Chinese ships from China Marine Surveillance (CMS) agency and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command ships entered Japan's contiguous zone 19 times since September 11 when Japan purchased the islands in Senkaku/Diaoyu.⁶ It is proved that China began to ratchet up its activities around waters of the islands. These ships for surveillance, patrol, and research are not from People's Liberation Army (PLA).

On January 10, China sent civilian surveillance plane to fly over the islands which are under dispute. As a quick response to the appearance of Chinese flight, Japan scrambled F-15 to watch out Chinese plane. China sent two J-10 fighters to the East China Sea after a Y-8 aircraft was closely followed by two Japanese F-15 fighters.⁷ This was the first time that military fighters confronted with each other over the sky of the islands since the feud in the waters erupted last year.⁸ Even if crisis situation of armed clash was not created by fighters, the frictions between Japan and China expanded from the sea to the sky. Intensifying conflict could lead to armed clashes in the disputed waters and skies.

As the tension grows, the two actors brace for expected military contingency by boosting military preparedness and readiness. Japan conducted military exercise to prepare for attacks on Japan's remote islands. Moreover, Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) and US marines carried out an exercise designed to strengthen GSDF capabilities to defend remote islands. Forward deployment plan of fighters is under consideration by Japan. With the frictions intensified, it is released that Japan increased, if not much, defense spending of 2013.

According to China's announcement, PLA navy continues to patrol and exercise in the East China Sea for the purpose of protecting Chinese fishing and natural gas development activities. In addition, China conducted military exercise in the East China Sea by dispatching naval vessels, aircrafts, and helicopters. A plan to build surveillance capabilities is completed to construct 36 modern and high-tech surveillance vessels by 2015.

After the island friction broke out in August, Japan's economic relations with China began to be deteriorated because Chinese protesters disrupted Japanese factories in China and boycotted Japanese products. According to World Bank data, its' exports to China fell 17 percent between June and November last year.⁹ China also damaged Japanese economy by prohibiting the export of rare-earth minerals to Japan.

2. Sources and Challenges of the Dispute

1) Sources

Various factors have to do with the emergence and development of the row between Japan and China on Senkaku/Diaoyu. Contributing factors to the outbreak and maintenance of the dispute can be categorized into the two clusters: root causes and catalysts. History and nationalism is a source of the friction. Chinese have unpleasant memories of Japanese atrocities under colonial rule. Chinese government asserts that the disputed islands have been Chinese territory since 1895 and the issue should be brought to the ICJ for resolution. Nationalistic sentiment plays a critical role in coping with Japanese claims to sovereignty over the islands in disputed area. Chinese think that imperialist Japan stole the islands by force.

In contrast, Japan continues to retain effective control over the islands. Nationalists never thought that Japan gave up a part of its territory like Senkaku/Diaoyu to China. They keep asking Japanese government to take a robust and harsh policy toward China in the disputed islands. Recently, Japanese nationalistic sentiment has been deepened by sensitivity to China's growing economic and political power. As Japan became very nervous to China's rise, Japanese nationalism made Japan more hawkish. While uncertainty led to soaring nationalism in Japan, economic growth made nationalism dominant in China. Mounting nationalism in the two countries exacerbated the friction in islands of the East China.

Domestic politics and transitional security environment catalyzed the tension between China and Japan in the East China Sea. As discussed earlier, Japanese politics has been so unstable that leadership change frequently took place. It is this unstable political situation that makes political leaders remained very cautious about popularity. By taking a tough stance toward rising China, they could bolster supports by the people. Domestic politics is one of reasons to worsen the tension. On the other hand, China also needed nationalistic mobilization which is favorable to maintaining a communist one party political system in China. Confrontation between Tokyo and China equipped with nationalism made the dispute worse.

While making difference with Seoul-Tokyo feud in Dokdo, the tension in East

China is in part attributed to strategic context in Northeast Asia. The emerging strategic rivalry between the two strong countries aggravated the maritime territorial dispute in the East China Sea. Facilitating compromise and negotiation was disrupted by the tight contestation between the two strong powers in Northeast Asia. Even though economic calculation affected the quarrel in the dispute area, it did not play a determining role in shaping the current development of the clashes. Given historical memory and nationalism, the confrontation was intensified by emerging security environment and domestic politics.

2) Challenges

Mounting tension in the East China Sea is a roadblock in facilitating stability and prosperity in East Asia in general and Northeast Asia in specific. Split between Japan and China prevented cooperation across sectors involving diplomacy, security, economy, and society. Regional peace and stability could be seriously at risk by the conflict between the two big powers. Military competition between the two will put pressure on regional countries in East Asia. Regional countries will carry out military build-up, redeployment of armed forces for the dispute, and military exercises. Against this backdrop, military tension in the region will rise.

The dispute spilled over into diplomatic, economic, societal arena. Japan and China is economically interdependent.¹⁰ The Japanese and Chinese economies constitute 18.8 percent of GDP with trade volume exceeding \$340 billion. Furthermore, Japan is the second source of foreign investment with 23,000 Japanese companies in China and total \$190 billion investment. China also provides huge market to Japan. As independence between the two countries increased, the spillover effect of the territorial dispute into economy could lead to economic calamity in Tokyo and Beijing simultaneously. The row in the East China Sea could pose risk and threat to both regional and global economy. In addition to economic difficulties, diplomatic relations were aggravated with growing negative attitudes toward the opposite.

IV. South China Sea Case

1. *Recent Development of the Dispute*

Before 2010 when ARF was convened in Hanoi, the SCS was relatively calm without eruption of serious frictions among concerned countries. Competition for territory and resource characterized the spats in the area. After 2010, strategic element affected the confrontation because the SCS became a focal point of China-US strategic rivalry in Asia-Pacific. China felt uncomfortable with the US intervention in the region. Against this backdrop, there is an escalating tension between China and the concerned countries such as Vietnam and Philippines in terms of territory

and maritime resources.

With economic and military power on the rise, China began to flex its muscle to neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. China grew assertive in claiming to the dispute area in the SCS, while hoping to exercise effective control over the waters in the dispute by coercion and intimidation rather than negotiation and compromise over last two years. For instance, China has prevented Filipino fishermen from using their traditional fishing ground by keeping patrol boats in the waters around disputed area.

Filipino official position is that China has interfered with the lawful exercise by the Philippines of its rights within its legitimate maritime zones and China's claim too much of the SCS is unlawful.¹¹ In addition to China and the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam also make claims to islands in the Sea, creating tension among them.¹²

Recently, China is determined to retain existing gains and further strengthen its claims to sovereign over the islands in the SCS by employing such measures as maritime security and fishing fleets, oil exploration plans, extra-legal trade sanctions, and diplomatic threats. In order to maintain a tight control over the disputed islands, China announced a plan to boost maritime surveillance capabilities to 16 aircrafts and 350 vessels by 2015.¹³ In response, other claimants to the disputed area also upgrade their navies and coast guards.

As strategic elements intervene in the spat in the Southeast Asia, the dispute forges a new dynamics in terms of actor, intensity, implication, and solution. Before 2010 when State Secretary Clinton made remarks on the dispute that the area is in US interest, the US kept distance from the issue. Since 2010, the US emerged as a major player in the dispute, relatively reducing ASEAN's role and influence. China's strategic rivalry intensified the friction in the SCS rather than taming it so far.

It has yet to be proved whether the US involvement play a positive role in mitigating and terminating confrontation in a peaceful manner. Long-term role of the US could play a positive role in managing the clash of competing interests of claimants.

2. Sources and Challenges of the Dispute

1) Sources

Various factors should be examined to explain the advent and fluctuated manifestation of the spat between China and some countries of ASEAN in the SCS. Causes of the dispute can be categorized into the two clusters: root causes and

catalysts. With regard to the maritime dispute in the SCS, competing economic interests are root causes of the friction and changing security environment facilitated the confrontation.

As well known, natural resources are abundant in the disputed waters. There are oil and gas reserves and the fishing and ocean resources. Competing for natural resources in the waters is the main source of conflict in the area. Energy is treated as a strategic resource required for economic growth. China is very in need of energy for enduring economic development. For Vietnam, the SCS is a primary source of gas, oil, and fishery. Even if exclusive monopolization of resources is not possible, China would like to control to access of neighboring countries to the Sea by employing such measures as arbitrary ban of activities in order to maximize Chinese interests and minimize neighboring countries' ones.

Given competing economic interests, rising strategic significance made the friction more complicated and even worse, adding the US as an actor to the rift. The disputed Sea became a flashpoint in the context of Sino-US strategic rivalry in the region. The US proclaimed that the Sea is in its interests. Its involvement in the dispute grew in an incremental manner. The rivalry between Washington and Beijing could determine the future path of the conflict in the Sea. The spat is in part influenced by history, nationalism, and domestic politics. While strategic factors gains importance, economic calculation is dominant factor to determine behaviors and attitudes of Vietnam, the Philippines and other concerned countries.

2) Challenges

Due to China's economic development, China got assertive in control over the islets in the SCS. China's assertiveness begot the elevation of the tension in the Sea, restraining neighboring countries' activities like exploring oil reserve and fishing in the water. Racing for more accessibility to the waters could create destabilization of the disputed areas. In addition, overlapping claims to the islets among ASEAN countries and the Sino-US rivalry could disintegrate the unity of ASEAN countries. Southeast Asian countries could face economic difficulties stemming from fragmentation of Southeast Asia and constraints on activities in the disputed waters.

Meanwhile, the dispute could fuel military competition by building military capabilities, increasing military exercises, and reinforcing alliance and partnership. Effort for naval expansion could be a trend among countries involved in the maritime dispute. While China bolster power projection capabilities, the US want to maintain naval superiority in the region. The US announced a new defense strategy in Asia-Pacific characterized by 'rebalancing.' Defense Secretary stated that by 2020 the navy will reposture its forces from today's 50/50 percent split

between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those oceans.¹⁴

V. Comparative assessment of three maritime territorial disputes

	Actors	Features	Sources	Intensity	Solutions
Dokdo	S. Korea/ Japan	Political/ diplomatic/ economic	Domestic politics/ Nationalism	Middle	S. Korea: effective occupation/ Japan: ICJ
Senkaku/ Diaoyu	Japan/ China/US	Political/ military /economic	Domestic politics/ Nationalism/ Strategic	High	Japan: effective occupation/ China: ICJ
South China Sea	China/ Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia/ US	Economic	Economic/ Strategic	Low	China: history, first discovery Southeast Countries: UNCLOS/ US: UNCLOS, land features, freedom of navigation, diplomacy

VI. Concluding Remarks: Implications and measures

Comparative analysis of three cases offers some policy implications to regional security as follows:

- ✓ Dokdo Dispute
 - Impeding collaboration/cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo
 - Providing obstacles in facilitating a trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington,
 - weakening combined capabilities to cope with threat posed by North Korea
 - Creating Instability in Northeast Asia
- ✓ Senkaku/Diaoyu
 - Intensifying regional rivalry between Japan and China
 - Destabilizing East Asia as a whole including Southeast Asia
 - Rising military tensions
 - Facilitating naval arms race between the two strong powers

- Promoting a block confrontation between pro-China block and pro-Japan block in Southeast Asia
- ✓ The South China Sea
 - Ratcheting up strategic rivalry between the two global powers in Asia-Pacific
 - Creating a block confrontation between pro-China block and pro-US block in Southeast Asia

Comparative analysis of three cases offers some policy implications to conflict management as follows.

- ✓ Three cases demonstrated similarities and differences in terms of actor, feature, source, intensity, and solutions. Therefore, combining common approaches and separate ones should be demanded for conflict management of avoidance, prevention, settlement, and resolution.
- ✓ The effect of maritime territorial disputes spilled over into economy, security, and nationalism. For peace and prosperity, minimizing spillover effect into economic and military sector is required
- ✓ While root causes shows little variance over time, escalation of the disputes were driven by contextual variables such as domestic politics and security environment.

To mitigate or terminate frictions, the negative influence of domestic politics and strategic context should be constrained.

- ✓ It is difficult for actors of disputes to share territory, natural resources, and power in dispute which are exclusive in nature. Step by step approach is needed to manage the dispute.
- ✓ South Korea, Japan, and China are involved in more than 2 cases of dispute. A country is arbitrary without principles in solving disputes. For example, Japan adopted 'effective occupation' principle for claim to the islands in East China Sea, whereas it suggested bringing the dispute of Dokdo to ICJ. Principles should be unanimously agreed by concerned countries with disputes.

Various measures for effective conflict management should be devised to solve disputes. Case by case approach is required by combining what follows.

- ✓ Approach
 - Unilateral
 - Bilateral
 - Multilateral
- ✓ Format
 - Track 1
 - Track 1.5
 - Track 2
- ✓ Level
 - High-ranking
 - Working level
- ✓ Consequence of cooperation
 - From hard security to soft security
 - From soft security to hard security
- ✓ Measures

Endnotes

¹"Northeast Asia in turbulence: Incoming 3 leaders share responsibility for peace," *Korea Times*, December 25, 2012. <http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/common/printpreview.asp?> Accessed January 10, 2013.

²Mayumi Otsuma, "Japan-S. Korea Currency-Swap Deal Put a Risk by Island Squabble," *Businessweek*, August 17, 2012. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-17>. Accessed January 20.

³"Tension between Korea, Japan to continue under new government: experts," *Korea Times*, December 24, 2012. <http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/common/printpreview.asp?>. Accessed January 20.

⁴For an excellent discussion on causes of maritime territorial disputes, see Andy Yee, "Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the South China Sea and the East China Sea," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 40. 2. (2011), pp. 165-193.

⁵Ralph Cossa's response is very good on this point. *PacNet*, No. 56R (September 18, 2012)

⁶James J. Przystup and et. als. "Japan-China Relations: 40th Anniversary: "Fuggetaboutit!" *Comparative Connections* (January 2013).

⁷China's Ministry of National Defense confirmed. See "China sends fighters to counter Japanese aircraft," *China's Global Time*, January 11, 2013. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/desktopmodules/DnnForge%20NewsArticles>, Accessed January 20.

⁸Jane Perlez, "Tiny islands part of larger standoff in East Asia," *International Herald Tribune*, January 19-20 (Seoul edition).

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Dong Wang, "China-Japan Relations-Now What?" *PacNet*, No. 6 (January 17, 2013)

¹¹Jane Perlez, "Japanese visit to Beijing aims to cool island dispute," *International Herald Tribune*, January 23, 2013 (Seoul edition)

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Leszek Buszynski, "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2012), p. 144

¹⁴Leon Panetta, "The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific," Shangri-La Dialogue 2012. <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/>, Accessed on 20 January, 2013. He also mentioned that navy will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines.

THE PUTATIVE 'ARMS RACE' IN EAST ASIA

Mark G. Rolls

The perception that an arms race may be occurring in East Asia, or the sub regions of Southeast and Northeast Asia, is not a new one. It was discussed in relation to arms procurement in the 1980s and the 1990s prior to the impact of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, although neither of these periods warranted the term.¹ The term 'arms race' is now being applied and discussed because something significant appears to have changed from what went on before: the current situation appears to be unusual and perhaps even abnormal.²

Certainly the label 'arms race' is applied and used (or one might say misused) frequently now. This is readily apparent in the media where, as is its wont with most issues, the coverage is sensationalised and often 'breathless' (to borrow Geoffrey Till's term)³. Examples of some of the titles of reports include: "Asia's arms race puts everyone on edge"; "The coming arms race in Asia and the Pacific"; "Asia's mad arms race"; "Arms race explodes as neighbours try to counter China"; and "An Asian arms race?".⁴ The last one at least asks the question as to whether or not one is occurring and attempts to define what such a race would actually consist of.

Reference to the idea that something is happening and that this could have significant security implications is also found, of course, in government statements. Closer to home (mine, that is), the New Zealand government's 2010 defence white paper observed that: "New technologies are emerging, capable of narrowing some aspects of the military advantage enjoyed by New Zealand's traditional partners."⁵ If the race analogy is an apt one, then New Zealand would hope that its partners would remain a lap ahead! Among the technologies listed are new generation anti-ship missiles. "The spiraling cost of modern military capabilities is a related trend. Only wealthy countries or those which put a high premium on military spending will be able to field the latest technologies, with implications for the ability of the like-minded countries to remain interoperable."⁶

When the term 'arms race' is employed, it is usually used in relation to increases in defence spending and/or the number and types of weapons platforms and systems which regional states are acquiring. There is certainly evidence of both of these things occurring.

In terms of increases in defence expenditure, *The Military Balance* for 2012 notes a real increase in spending of 3.58 percent occurred in East Asia in 2011 with "strong expenditure growth of 4.85% in Southeast Asia".⁷ A study by the

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on defence spending from 2000-11 by the five Asian states with the largest defence budgets (China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan) found that they “collectively spent an approximate \$224 billion (in constant 2011 US dollars)” in 2011.⁸ This combined total was almost twice that spent in 2000. Japan had the largest budget until 2005 when it was replaced by China, whose share of combined expenditure went from 19.9 percent in 2000 to 40.2 percent in 2011.⁹

Even such large increases in defence spending do not necessarily mean that an arms race is occurring: a caution which some of the authors of the CSIS study have drawn attention to and which is apparent in the study’s findings. The increase in spending which “occurred [was] primarily in the personnel accounts – spending on payroll and benefits – and was less rapid in the investment accounts, namely, research, development and acquisition of goods and services.”¹⁰ Unhelpfully, there is no percentage figure for increases in expenditure we can select which automatically means there is an arms race.

With regard to equipment, much has been made of the quantity and quality of that which the region’s states have acquired, are planning to acquire, or are developing, especially in terms of air and naval capabilities: lists of these feature prominently in relevant books, articles and conference papers. Examples of those from *The Military Balance 2012* include the following:

- China’s launch of its first aircraft carrier; the first flight of a J-20 next-generation combat aircraft; and the operationalisation of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile;
- Japan’s commissioning of two *Hyuga*-class helicopter carriers; the planned increase in the Maritime Self-Defence Force’s submarine fleet to 22 vessels by 2013; and the upgrading of the Air Self-Defence Force’s F-15s;
- South Korea’s replenishment of its air force with F-15Ks;
- Taiwan’s upgrading of its F-16A/Bs;
- Indonesia’s order in 2012 for three South Korean submarines;
- Malaysia and Singapore’s deployment of two submarines each (respectively *Scorpene* and *Archer*-class boats); and
- Thailand’s planned acquisition of up to six submarines and Vietnam’s acquisition of six *Kilo*-class submarines between 2014 and 2017.¹¹

Till, in his recent *Adelphi* paper analysing the naval expansion of China, India, Japan and the US, also draws attention to China’s submarine development. This, he observes, “has focused on procuring quieter, longer-range endurance boats capable of evading US and Japanese ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] capabilities,

in particular through the 12 *Kilo*-class vessels purchased from Russia in the 2000s and the *Yuan*-class boats currently being built domestically.”¹² The various states’ focus on maritime capabilities is not surprising. As one retired US Navy admiral has noted, the majority of security issues in the Asia-Pacific are in the maritime domain and thus the “military capabilities competition will be largely maritime as well”.¹³ In particular, China is seeking to acquire capabilities which will force the “US and its allies [to] operate further from its home waters.”¹⁴

One of our earlier presenters, Professor Ball, has noted in respect of naval competition in North-east Asia that it includes modern surface capabilities; large ‘amphibious transport ships’, helicopter carriers, or ‘sea control ships’; submarines and ASW capabilities; sea-based air and missile defence capabilities; and naval EW (electronic warfare) systems.¹⁵

Although they have not featured prominently in such lists of equipment, it is worth drawing attention to UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles). It has been reported that countries in the Asia-Pacific as a whole are the number two buyers of UAVs after the US and that it has been forecast that spending on them will increase from US\$500 million in 2011 to US\$2.0 billion in 2016. Most of these are for ISR (Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance), but in future they could be used against both “conventional military targets and non-state actors”. Drones have a number of advantages including that they have a greater range and can remain in the air longer than manned aircraft and are considerably cheaper too (a ‘Reaper’ costs US\$37 million whereas an F-35 Joint Strike Fighter comes in at US\$181 million).¹⁶

It is worth noting, of course, that equipment does not equal capability and therefore that all this “new equipment does not automatically translate into better military capabilities” for the region’s states.¹⁷ Indeed, this aspect is often overlooked even by the states concerned who often “remain focused on the platforms almost as an end in themselves”.¹⁸ As Davies also recognises, to keep the platforms operating requires appropriate logistics and maintenance, plus the development of requisite tactics and effective training and exercises to make them operationally effective.¹⁹ There is invariably a lengthy time period between orders being placed and weapons being delivered and becoming operational. In the case of Thailand, for example, it signed an agreement with Sweden in 2007 for twelve JAS-39C/D *Gripen* combat aircraft and two *Erieye* airborne early warning aircraft. Phase 1 of the operational capability of the first six *Gripens* and the *Erieyes* was only reached in July 2011, however, and Phase 2 (when the next six *Gripens* will be in service) will only be completed this year.²⁰

Overall, however, and arguably lying at the centre of concerns about all this actual and planned procurement, is the belief that it “potentially provide[s] armed forces

in the region with the capacity to locate and destroy targets at longer ranges and with greater accuracy.” Additionally, the region’s states are “expanding their capacities to deploy more substantial forces over greater distances.”²¹

Do all these actual and planned acquisitions equate to an ‘arms race’ though? How do we tell whether or not one is occurring?

In discussing arms acquisitions in the region and the idea of whether or not they constitute an arms race, various analysts have employed such words as ‘rapidity’, ‘competition’, ‘superiority’, and ‘action-reaction’ to describe what is occurring. They are all apposite ones, but they do not constitute a full definition which enables the label ‘arms race’ to be ascribed to what is happening.

The classic definition of an arms race is the one put forward by Colin Gray. For him, the “minimal condition” for one to exist is “that there should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a *rapid* rate and structuring their respective military postures with a *general* attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties.”²² He then breaks this down into four “basic conditions” that “must [all] be present for there to be any valid assertion that a particular relationship is an arms race.”

1. “There must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism”;
2. they must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race participants”;
3. “they must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment)”;
4. “there must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality.”²³

This check-list approach has been employed by others too. Buzan and Herring, for example, cite Grant Hammond’s eight criteria although they support Gray’s critique of it.²⁴ Whilst some of these may indeed be difficult to gauge, numbers three and four (that there is “military and diplomatic planning based directly on the capabilities and intent of the other” and “a high degree of public animosity or antagonism between the parties involved”)²⁵ have some utility in that they support the creation of a climate in which some form of military competition is highly likely even if doesn’t actually equate to an arms race.

Most recently, Geoffrey Till has written that studies on the Anglo-German naval arms race of 1909-14 (one of the ‘classic’ arms races) have shown that arms races

have seven common features. "They are:

- driven by international rather than domestic imperatives;
- usually bilateral;
- intense in terms of effort, rapidity and expression;
- associated with high levels of political tension;
- operationally specific;
- indicative of high strategic stakes; and
- regarded as such."²⁶

Whilst he contends that it is not hard to find evidence of some of the seven dynamics at work in the naval modernisation of China, India, Japan and the US, it is still hard to reach a definitive answer as to whether or not this constitutes an arms race. Ultimately, he concludes that: "The evidence that naval modernisation in the Asia-Pacific approximates to a naval arms race, then, seems mixed. There are certainly elements of arms racing at play in the developing relationship of the American, Japanese, Indian and Chinese navies, particularly the first and the last. ... But there is also a great deal of evidence against the proposition, not least in the region's high levels of sea-based economic inter-dependence and declaratory and operational stress on naval cooperation against common threats such as natural disasters, piracy, terrorism and other forms of maritime crime".²⁷ Such hesitancy in attaching the label 'arms race' to what is occurring in East Asia is not uncommon in the more rigorous academic analyses.

This is perhaps not surprising given the sort of very specific definition and essential conditions put forward by those such as Colin Gray and the complexity of the action-reaction process in arms procurement. An action-reaction process involves the variables of magnitude, timing and awareness in arms acquisitions and is about more than just weapons. An action-reaction process can be influenced by political and economic factors too. For example, "changes in foreign policy may increase feelings of hostility, as may the use of force by an opponent." *Political* actions may cause military *reactions*.²⁸ Moreover, an action-reaction process does not just operate in terms of arms racing; it can operate in terms of the normal behaviour of maintaining the military status quo.

Particular complexity is generated by the operation of the technological imperative model which can make it much harder to decide whether what is happening is normal or unusual. The technological imperative can make states behave in a way which is similar to racing even when the main motive is "keeping up with the leading edge of technological standards."²⁹ In situations where there are high

levels of 'technological innovation', the boundary between 'maintenance' and 'racing' may be less than clear.³⁰ In view of the tendency of many states to acquire off-the-shelf military equipment so as to gain "credible capabilities" more rapidly than would be possible through the development of "indigenous designs", they are effectively importing high-technology military competition and adding to the boundary definition problems.³¹

Where high-level competition is occurring among great powers then the rate of technological advance will increase and the effects of this will be felt everywhere. In addition to which, such powers will be more likely to provide advanced weapons and upgrade packages to friends and allies. Sino-US competition may have this sort of impact on East Asia and there is some evidence that this competition is likely to increase. China has made it clear in its 2011 defence white paper that it will be a 'peer competitor' of the US by 2050 and the US has stated that its newest weapons systems will be deployed to the Pacific theatre first.³²

As it can be seen, determining whether or not there is an arms race in East Asia is a difficult undertaking and it is perhaps not surprising that there is certain reluctance among academics to reach any hard and fast conclusion. The author of the Asia section in the IISS's *Military Balance* for 2012 is not so circumspect, however, stating clearly that: 'Contemporary military developments in Asia do not closely resemble classic arms races'.³³

It has been contended that whether or not we label something to be an 'arms race' may not matter as arms races are not necessarily dangerous. Charles Glaser notes that one traditional view of the correlation between arms races and war is that "arms races are driven by revisionist adversaries, explained by the deterrence model, and increase security."³⁴ For Glaser, the question to ask is whether or not an arms build-up is the best option for a state. The answer to this will be influenced by the state's security environment.

In some cases it may well be better to arm than to engage in "restraint and cooperation". "If a state's security environment necessitates an arms build-up, then arming, as well as the competition that ensues if its adversary responds, is rational and the state's best policy option. Even if arms races correlate with war, they do not cause it. Instead, the state's security environment causes the arms race and in turn war."³⁵

Buzan and Herring, in reference to the spectrum of patterns of behaviour, argue that it is "the direction of change [which] may be a more appropriate guide to events than any attempt to locate a given cause on one side or the other of some strict but arbitrary dividing line."³⁶ The direction of change

in East Asia appears to be away from the maintenance of the military status quo end of the spectrum and towards the arms racing one, although whether it has yet reached the point of military competition is itself difficult to determine.

The idea of movement along the spectrum can be linked to the process of 'hedging', about which there is, rightly, some concern. "What makes contemporary Asian military modernisation programmes potentially dangerous is that they often reflect unspoken efforts to hedge against the assumed ulterior motives of other regional players. This risks destabilising interaction between defence strategies, doctrines and capability development programmes."³⁷

If we are moving towards a more competitive pattern of arms acquisition, and hedging is a real source of concern, then what can be done to ameliorate the situation? Can military cooperation have a role to play?

One obvious suggestion is to try to introduce some form of arms control, the absence of which in the contemporary East Asian security environment has been drawn attention to.³⁸ Indeed, it has been recognised that now would be an opportune moment "to creatively think about how to develop and implement arms control measures".³⁹

That there is a need for some form of arms control in the Asia-Pacific region is not, of course, a new one: its desirability has been argued before.⁴⁰ Although it has been noted that "arms control of any type is looked on with heavy skepticism" by the regional states, previous attempts have occurred. These have been on the demand side and have been centred on efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures:⁴¹ for example, the ARF has encouraged member states to submit reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. They have certainly not gone as far discussing or implementing limits and haven't touched on the 'supply' side at all.⁴²

We now seem to be in a situation where the mere reporting by East Asian states to the UN Register of Conventional Arms is not by itself generating much confidence. Arms acquisitions, and even arms control, needs to come on to the security agenda of some of the bodies comprising the regional security architecture. One of the Shangri-La Dialogue's plenary sessions would seem to be an appropriate forum (military modernisation in general and certain capabilities in particular have been discussed in the closed, break-out sessions). So too would the ARF's Inter-Sessional Meetings and Inter-Sessional Support Groups on Confidence Building Measures and

Preventive Diplomacy.

The heightened risk of “misunderstandings and accidents” that may occur as inexperienced regional states acquire new capabilities, and which could have conflict potential, can certainly be lessened through military cooperation. Observing and/or participating in exercises and the promotion of military to military contacts could all play a useful role.⁴³

It is very much to be hoped that such limited measures, plus the various aspects of co-operation already considered, prove to be effective. The possession of many of the weapons platforms and systems discussed, however we choose to label what is occurring, may increase the potential for conflict and the destructive effect of any which eventuates.

Endnotes

¹ I use the term “accelerated maintenance” to describe the South-East Asian experience in the 1980s. Mark G. Rolls, *The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in South-East Asia During the Second Cold War* (Aldershot/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), p.147. Des Ball refers to the period from the late-80s to the mid-90s as Round 1 arguing that this period displayed little action-reaction and can “best be explained in terms of ‘modernisation’, or the requirements for enhanced self-reliance”. Des Ball, “Asia’s Naval Arms Race: Myth or Reality?” Paper presented at the 25th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 30 May – 1 June 2011, p.2. Buzan and Herring contend that some have seen the situation in East Asia in the mid-90s as being akin to an arms buildup, which “generally requires geographical isolation or a very low starting point.” Barry Buzan & Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Boulder/London: Lynne Reiner, 1998), p.81.

² Here we need to think of a spectrum with normal and abnormal situations at the two ends. The former Buzan describes as the ‘maintenance of the military status quo’ and the latter as ‘arms racing’. See Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations* (London: Macmillan/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p.72. At a mid-point on this spectrum comes ‘arms competition’. This is “something rather less than an arms race, but rather more than the maintenance of the military status quo”. Buzan and Herring, op. cit., p.80.

³ Geoffrey Till, *Asia’s Naval Expansion: An arms race in the making?* (Abingdon: Routledge/IISS, 2012), p.239.

⁴ See, respectively, *The Nation*, 20 April, 2012, <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Asias-arms-race-puts-everyone-on-edge-30180297.html> (accessed 4 January, 2013); *The Asahi Shimbun*, 19 May, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201205190012 (accessed 4 January, 2013); *Huff Post World*, 29 May, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/conn-hallinan/asias-mad-arms-race_b_1546059.html?v...

(accessed 4 January, 2013); *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 November, 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=3805222>; (accessed 4 January, 2013); and *The Diplomat*, 28 March, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/03/28/an-asian-arms-race/?print=yes> (accessed 8 January, 2013).

⁵ *Defence White Paper 2010* (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, November 2010), p.23

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.25.

⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2012* (London: Routledge/IISS, 2012), p.210.

⁸ Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Herman & Sneha Raghavan, *Asian Defense Spending, 2000-2011* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), p.vi.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.1.

¹⁰ Joachim Hofbauer & Guy Ben-Ari, "Not an Arms Race: Parsing Asia's Defense Spending", *World Politics Review*, 7 November, 2012, <http://worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/print/12482>, (accessed 8 January, 2013).

¹¹ See *The Military Balance 2012*, pp.212, 222 and 224, 205, 206 and 207.

¹² Till, *op. cit.*, p.36.

¹³ Michael McDevitt cited in "China's 'Security Dilemma' Risks Arms Race in Asia", *TIME.com*, 16 May, 2012, <http://nation.time.com/2012/05/16/chinas-security-dilemma-risks-arms-race-in-asia/print/> (accessed 4 January, 2013).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Ball, *op. cit.*, p.5. In addition to major naval capabilities, he also sees action-reaction dynamics at work in the areas of long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, and missile defence systems; electronic warfare systems; and information warfare and cyber capabilities. *Ibid.*, p.4.

¹⁶ *The coming arms race in Asia and the Pacific*. China has given some importance to UAVs and is aware of a gap with the US in this area. For the US, UAVs have great benefits. The US Navy hopes to be able to deploy them on aircraft carriers by 2018 which will mean their carriers can remain out of range of so-called 'carrier killer' missiles, plus launching UAVs from Australia or Guam - rather than Japan or South Korea - "will protect U.S. assets from China's anti-access weapons." *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *The Military Balance 2012*, p.205.

¹⁸ Andrew Davies, "Asian military trends and their implications for Australia", *ASPI Strategic Insights*, 42, July 2008, p.8

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ See Tim Huxley, "Defence Procurement in Southeast Asia". Paper presented to the 5th workshop of the Inter-Parliamentary Forum on Security Sector Governance (IPF-SSG) in Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh, 12-13 October 2008, p.12, and *The Military Balance 2012*, p.207.

²¹ *The Military Balance 2012*, p.205.

²² Colin Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon", *World Politics*, XXIV, 1971, p.40. Gray, Buzan and Herring note, has subsequently argued that the whole concept of arms races should be abandoned. Buzan & Herring, *op. cit.*, p.79

²³ Gray, *op. cit.*, p.41.

²⁴ Grant Hammond, *Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races and International Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993) cited Buzan & Herring, *op. cit.*, pp.78-9.

- ²⁵ Hammond, *op.cit.*, p.31 cited Buzan & Herring, *op. cit.*, pp.78.
- ²⁶ Till, *op. cit.*, p.19.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.238-39.
- ²⁸ Rolls, *op. cit.*, p.4.
- ²⁹ Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, p.109 cited *Ibid.*, p.5
- ³⁰ Rolls, *op. cit.*, pp.5-6.
- ³¹ Davies, *op. cit.*, p.8.
- ³² See *The Military Balance 2012*, p.211 and "US to deploy high-tech weapons to Asia-Pacific", *Channel News Asia*, 20 December, 2012, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/print/1243645/1/1.html (accessed 4 January, 2013).
- ³³ *The Military Balance 2012*, p.208.
- ³⁴ Charles L. Glaser, "When Are Arms races Dangerous?", *International Security*, Vol.28, No.4, Spring 2004, p.44.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.45.
- ³⁶ Buzan & Herring, *op. cit.*, p.80.
- ³⁷ *The Military Balance 2012*, p.208.
- ³⁸ See, for example, Ball, *op. cit.*, p.15.
- ³⁹ Tim Huxley, "Multiple Competitions, Suspicions Breed Instability", *Defense News*, 30 May, 2011, <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2011/may-2011/contr...> (accessed 11 January, 2013).
- ⁴⁰ See Tamar Gabelnick, "Conventional Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Case for a Supply-Side Regime Based on International Law". Paper presented at the Conference on Conventional Arms Rivalry in the Asia Pacific Region, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 25 October, 2001 <http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/code/APCSS.htm> (accessed 11 January, 2013).
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.* In the context of ASEAN and arms control in South-East Asia, Amitav Acharya has also noted a reluctance to pursue traditional, conventional arms control measures with their being a greater acceptance of the transparency and confidence-building approach. Amitav Acharya, "An Arms Race In Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control", *Pacific Strategic Papers*, 8, 1994, pp.41-43.
- ⁴² Gabelnick, *op. cit.*.
- ⁴³ Davies, *op. cit.*, pp.17-19.

THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA AS A MILITARY POWER

Ron Huisken

Introduction

In the case of China, we need, first of all, to be more specific as to which emergence as a military power we propose to look into. For all of recorded history, and certainly for the past 2500 years, China has been the dominant strategic entity in East Asia, decisively larger in terms of population, territory and wealth than any other tribe or community in this neighbourhood. Equally, military power has played a decisive role in China's history for all of this time. In times of particularly strong national coherence, as in the Han, Tang and Ming/Qing dynasties, imperial armies pushed the boundaries of the empire out quite dramatically. The more consistent targets of these expansionary impulses have been modern Vietnam, Korea, Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. The scale of China's asymmetric strategic weight is reflected in the fact that, on the two occasions that foreign entities succeeded in conquering China – the Mongols in the 13th century and the Manchu's in the 17th century – it took the invaders 30-40 years to complete the task.

This is not the place to probe too deeply into China's fascinating and spectacular past. Our primary interest, rather clearly, is to consider how China's armed forces have travelled in the modern era of 'reform and opening up' and what this might suggest for the decades immediately ahead. There are, however, two considerations that can be extracted from this extraordinary story that have continuing relevance today.

First, historically, China's strategic preoccupation (and its military tradition) has essentially been that of a continental or land power. China's current security focus on its maritime approaches is essentially without precedent. This matters because China's continental orientation remains as an irreducible reality; those extensive land borders will always be there as a potential archilles heel to qualify whatever requirements or aspirations it may have for maritime power.

Second, China's leaders in the past incurred prodigious costs in blood and treasure to acquire and regain surrounding territories. The most recent slide in China's 'comprehensive national power' began in the first half of the 19th century, saw the collapse of the imperial system in 1911 and continued on through the era of the Republic of China and the early part of the era of the People's Republic of China. But post-imperial China, despite being weakened by a century of relative decline,

secured sovereignty over nearly the full extent of the former imperial territories at zero cost. To cut a long story short, it was a gift of the international system in the opening decades of the 20th century (when the US was rising rapidly), reaffirmed in 1945 (when the US was the dominant power). This broke a pattern that started with the Han dynasty two millennia ago. It also means that regaining former territories is not part of the PLA's tradition.

The Modern PLA

In 1949, the PLA was a formidable guerrilla army but not remotely a modern military force. Moreover, having missed the industrial revolution and China was essentially devoid of the technological and industrial capacities needed to transform the PLA into such a force. Convinced of American determination to reverse his revolution, Mao reluctantly but determinedly sought a security pact with the USSR and developed the concept of 'people's war' as an external security posture for China. People's War played to China's two strengths: lots of people and depth of territory. The defining threat was a full-scale assault by a superpower, including the use of nuclear weapons, to which China would respond through trading people and space but eventually creating opportunities to smother the invader in a PLA-led people's war of attrition. This posture had the additional virtue of requiring dispersed deployment of the PLA and facilitating the performance of its internal security role. Rapid industrialisation with extensive Soviet technical assistance included the emergence of large PLA-managed enterprises producing older-generation Soviet equipment in great numbers: light armour, coastal submarines and combat aircraft (regarded by the PLA leadership as long-range artillery). These circumstances, coupled with the PLA being repeatedly drawn into the maelstrom of CCP politics, had the almost inevitable result: a PLA that was bloated (close to 5 million personnel in the 1970s), inefficient, and moving ever further away from being a modern military force. It was also very costly with official US estimates suggesting that it absorbed upwards of a debilitating 15 percent of GDP in the 1970s [see Chart 1].

We understand that Deng Xiaoping was a trenchant critic of the PLA even when Mao was still alive. His reservations were confirmed when, as the new paramount leader, he ordered an incursion into Vietnam in 1979 to 'teach it a lesson' for invading Cambodia the previous year. Although presented as a sharp, limited intervention to send a political message, the PLA very nearly suffered an undisguisable defeat. By this time, however, Deng had succeeded in engineering the decisive re-orientation of China's aspirations under the catch-phrase 'reform and opening up' (which, roughly translated, meant 'it's the economy, stupid'). Deng's determination to give absolute priority to economic development included scrapping Socialist prescriptions for the creation and distribution of wealth in favour of free markets and sacrificing China's ageless preference for autonomy in

favour of interdependence with the global economy.

As a heavy consumer of China's limited resources and a critical asset in ensuring the CCP's grip on power, the PLA was necessarily a key factor in Deng's strategic re-orientation. He had to sell the proposition that China confronted a strategic window of opportunity, an indefinite period of comparative tranquillity on the security front defined by a reliable stalemate in the superpower confrontation, with China usefully positioned between them and able to pivot one way or the other to sustain that stalemate. The available evidence supports the contention that Deng entered into a compact with the PLA under which the PLA would accept a diminishing share of GDP in the short to medium term on the understanding that it would later have an appropriate share of a much larger and faster growing GDP. Accordingly, the PLA was among the four priorities areas for reform and modernisation that Deng identified but ranked last behind agriculture, industry and science & technology.

Even Deng could not trifle casually with Mao's legacy but the simple innovation in the early 1980s to characterise the PLA's mission as 'people's war under modern conditions' was sufficient to license China's security community to begin to debate where the PLA should go. By the mid-1980s, Deng was confident enough to declare that the threat that had defined PLA thinking for more than three decades, the full scale strike by a superpower, should be scrapped in favour of roles and missions more responsive to China's contemporary and emerging security challenges. At about the same time, the PLA decided to downsize, initially demobilising 1 million personnel, with later decisions cutting a further 700,000, resulting in the current establishment of some 2.3 million. More than one-third of the manpower cut from the PLA appears to have been diverted to China's several paramilitary organisations, notably the People's Armed Police so the reduction in capacities to ensure internal stability was less drastic.

Operation Desert Storm in 1991, characterised by the limited but still graphically effective application of precision guided munitions and network-centric warfare, sharpened the debate in China in two main ways. First, it underscored how remote the PLA was from the cutting edge of contemporary warfare. Second, it highlighted that decisively important objectives could be won (or lost) with extent forces in timeframes that precluded mobilisation and even the massing of extent forces from surrounding theatres. In 1993, the PLA proclaimed the aspirational objective of 'winning limited/local wars under hi-tech conditions', further refined a decade later as 'winning limited/local wars under conditions of informationisation' and adding some indicative interim milestones: achieving the foundations for a modernised military by 2010; significant progress toward the objective by 2020; and achieving the objective itself by 2050.

These brief observations are intended to support three initial observations about the trajectory of China's military power.

First, China is engaged in the patient and methodical development of its armed forces to capability levels appropriate to its determination to regain the status of a first-rank global power. Motivated by defence imperatives, power and influence, prestige and symbolism, China has aspired from the outset to acquire military and related capabilities that match in every way those of the other advanced states, above all, the US.

Second, to help reconcile this aspiration with China's overall economic weakness and patchy skills in R&D and advanced industrial capacities, the PLA was persuaded to accept a declining share of the nation's resources and to, as far as possible, direct the resources it did receive to improving the quality of its personnel and developing, whether indigenously or through other means, the R&D/industrial support base needed to underpin a modern and competitive military force. Most particularly, the PLA was encouraged (directed?) to preference these objectives over the 'normal' practise of re-equipping its forces with successive generations of new systems that, although improved, would still be inferior to those employed by others.

Third, we should not lose sight of the fact that all of this involved a transformative change in China's security paradigm from a continental to a maritime focus. At another level, it involved transforming a military establishment that had become more political than professional. At yet another level, it involved transforming a force utterly dominated by the Army to one in which the Navy, in particular, but also the Air Force commanded increasing power, influence and budgets.

These propositions are consistent with several of the more conspicuous characteristics of China's military program.¹ The quantitative development of Chinese forces, for example, has been comparatively modest to date with production runs for indigenous combat aircraft and naval surface platforms, in particular, staying relatively short, suggesting that the platforms in question are still regarded as stepping stones to capabilities deemed cost-effective for major investment. Table 1 broadly confirms these observations in respect of naval forces. At the other extreme, so to speak, there are capabilities that China deemed at various points in the past to be so-central to its political-military aspirations that they could not be deferred until they emerged naturally from the nation's wealth and technological competence. The outstanding examples include (1) nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems and (2) a capacity to exploit the military and commercial potential of space and to counter the offensive potential of foreign space assets. China is re-enacting the milestones of the manned space programs carried out by the US and the USSR. Equally, it is putting in place the

full suite of commercial and military space assets pioneered by the superpowers. China's demonstration, in 2007, of an anti-satellite capability and of a hit-to-kill ballistic missile defence capability in 2009 reflect many years of heavy investment in the component technologies. A third and more recent example might be the J-20, a twin-engined stealth combat aircraft unveiled in January 2011. Seen alongside China's other recent indigenous combat aircraft programs - the J-11, a rough match for the American F-16 of the 1970s, and the J-11B and J-15 (both somewhat controversial 'adaptations' of the Russian Su-27 and Su-33 respectively) - the J-20 appears to be a bold attempt to jump to more contemporary combat aircraft technologies. Finally, in respect of cyber warfare, a novel arena resulting from the information revolution (which roughly coincided with China's 'reform and opening up' program), China is widely considered to be at the cutting edge, in practise as well as theory.

Finally, the case of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) highlights the point that even some capabilities deemed critical remained out of reach for some time. The SSBN is a package of technologies that emerged during the Cold War as the centrepiece of a secure nuclear deterrent, far less likely to be found and destroyed than bombers or land-based missiles. All of the original nuclear weapon states except China developed and deployed this system. China completed its first SSBN, the Xia class, in 1983 but it appears to have been a major disappointment. Only one boat was built and there is no evidence that it conducted a single operational patrol. Nearly 25 years passed before China began construction of a follow-on SSBN, the Jin class, and had sufficient confidence in the package to produce a small fleet of them: 3 have either been launched or are under construction and the expert speculation is that a total of 5-6 will be built.²

A similar inference could be drawn from the high-profile weapon systems acquired from Russia since the end of the Cold War, that is, capability gaps that were perceived to be urgent but out of reach of China's technological and industrial capacities. The key examples are 4 large Sovremenny-class destroyers (8000 tons) armed with an advanced anti-ship missile (the SS-N-22 Sunburn); 12 Kilo-class conventional submarines, relatively quiet, suited to shallow seas and armed with SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship missiles; and several variants of the Su-27/30 twin-engined multi-role combat aircraft. All of these systems compromise Soviet/Russian technologies from the 1980s but they were developed to cope with the USN and USAF. It could also be noted that China still relies on Russian or Ukrainian sources for gas turbines (major surface warships) and high-performance jet engines (combat aircraft).

Anti-Access / Area Denial

As is well known, the RAND corporation conducted a major study, published in

2007, which endeavoured to infer China's strategic objectives and intentions from the observable capabilities the PLA was putting place.³ The study concluded that the anti-access/area denial (often shortened to A2/AD) objective coupled with a focus on asymmetric means of countering enemy capabilities both made sense from a Chinese perspective and seemed to 'explain' much of what the PLA was actually doing. Under the A2/AD concept, China has only to significantly delay the ability of the US to bring its military capacities to bear to secure an objective close to China and transform the issue (adversely, from the US standpoint) from deterring or defeating a Chinese attack to ousting an occupying Chinese force. The optimal outcome for China would be to deter the US from intervening at all by convincing Washington that the costs would be prohibitively or, at least, disproportionately high.

The focus of this thinking, of course, is Taiwan. Whatever the merits of our thesis that, from the early 1980s, the PLA was encouraged to think in terms of a patient and methodical (i.e. long-term) process of acquiring a comprehensive suite of competitive military capabilities, the Taiwan crisis of 1995-96 does appear to have injected some disruptive urgency and focus. Beijing was sufficiently alarmed by the political mood in Taiwan in favour of independence to engage in a crudely blatant program of military coercion only to decide that it had to desist in the face of a plausible US threat to inject 2 carrier task forces into the arena. Beijing concluded, it would appear, that the gap between its political rhetoric on Taiwan and its military capacity to back up that rhetoric was unacceptably large and had to be narrowed urgently. There were two dimensions to this challenge. One was to negate Taiwanese capabilities to sink an invasion force. The other was to prevent or at least sufficiently delay any US endeavour to come to Taiwan's assistance. The responses to the first challenge included deploying a formidable force of accurate short-range ballistic missiles on the mainland adjacent to Taiwan, (these currently number around 1200 and are thought to have the primary mission of destroying or grounding Taiwan's air force) and acquiring advanced long-range (or area defence) surface-to-air missile systems to secure air superiority over the Taiwan Straits.

The second challenge was more demanding and attracted a more diversified response, which the Chinese refer to as counter-intervention. Both Chinese and US analysts seem to agree that the most critical force-multiplying capabilities on the US side are its aircraft carriers, its space assets that perform communication, intelligence and targeting functions, and its information distribution nodes in the region. China has worked energetically over the past 15 years to acquire the offensive firepower, the airborne and space-based ISR capacities to direct this firepower, and to develop Navy and Air Force capacities to conduct joint operations that, collectively, would require Washington to think much more carefully about committing its forces to a Taiwan contingency. The firepower

consists predominantly of an array of anti-ship missiles launched from submarines, aircraft and surface ships. A long-range, ground launched cruise missile capability is also imminent. Perhaps the most innovative system – a world first, in fact – is an anti-ship variant of the DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (range ca 2000km). This system has a warhead (which could be high-explosive, generate a localised electromagnetic pulse to disable a ship's electronic systems, or nuclear) that can manoeuvre in its terminal stage to compensate for changes in the position of the target during its flight time, perhaps 15 minutes. The Pentagon has detected test flights of this missile and considered, in 2011, that it was approaching operational status.

In the background to these capability developments, China's security community debated strategy and doctrine. In its Defence White Papers and elsewhere, China has highlighted its concept of active defence, a position intended to signal that, once China is attacked, it will, as necessary, take offensive initiatives to defeat the enemy. Some participants in China's internal debates have contended that active defence should be interpreted to include pre-emption. The 2007 edition of *The Military Power of the PRC*, a Congressionally-mandated Pentagon assessment of military developments in China, took the view that China did consider pre-emption to be legitimate option within the concept of active defence. If taken seriously, this position compounds American difficulties. Forward bases, notably Guam but perhaps also Okinawa, could be struck in the first indication that hostilities were underway. Similarly, politico-military manoeuvring of forces as part of an effort to manage and defuse the crisis could trigger a pre-emptive strike.

Clearly, geography, technology, and capability differentials have inclined China toward a posture for a Taiwan contingency that is difficult to characterise as prosecuting a limited or local war and which could prove to be correspondingly more prone to further escalation. The same impulses can be seen at work on the US side. To defeat China's A2/AD posture, America's still ill-defined Air-Sea Battle concept looks in the first instance at the key capabilities on the Chinese mainland that enable and support this posture.⁴ Again, notions of a limited, local conflict become hard to sustain when the homeland of one of the protagonists comes under attack.

All of this invites a question not often asked. As the foregoing commentary makes clear, there has been a tendency to view the past 10-15 years as a particularly energetic and fruitful period for the development of PLA capabilities but an effort that has been significantly skewed toward a Taiwan contingency. But to what extent should the PLA's capability gains over this period be regarded as specialised for a Taiwan contingency and thus a diversion from whatever broader aspirations the PLA may have developed before 1996? The answer, it seems to this author, is not that much. Apart from the specialised units needed to transport a large number of

troops across the straits, a capability that China has not expanded significantly, the rest is either generic or applicable to all the spaces that are comparably proximate to China.

Aircraft Carriers

China's first aircraft carrier– the Liaoning – was commissioned and began sea trials in September 2012. It had no aircraft embarked but a J-15, a Chinese adaption of the SU-33, made the first landing on the vessel in December 2012. The Liaoning was under construction in the former Soviet Union as the Varyag, sister ship to the Knuznetsov-class 'heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser', a 65,000 ton vessel with a pronounced 'ski-jump' bow rather than steam catapults to launch its aircraft. Construction was suspended when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 and the vessel was later stripped of its armaments, electronics and engines. Chinese interests acquired the hull in the early 1990s, allegedly with the intention of converting it into a floating hotel for casino patrons in Macau, only to conclude that the water at the proposed location was not deep enough. In 1998, the vessel was acquired by the PLAN.

Since the 1980's, snippets of intelligence have leaked into the media suggesting exploratory PLAN interest in acquiring carriers: for example, satellite photography of carrier decks painted onto the runway at military airfields and of a raised platform constructed in a lake to simulate a carrier deck. Admiral Liu Huaqing, PLAN Commander 1982-88 and a Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 was a carrier devotee. He is associated with a 1982 plan proposing that the naval dimension of the nation's active defence strategy comprise a three-stage carrier-dependent endeavour to end US military dominance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In stage one (2000-2010), China would establish sea control within the first island (Okinawa-Taiwan-Philippines), move on to the second chain (Ogasawara-Guam-Indonesia) in 2010-2020 and then consolidate its primacy in the entire western Pacific and Indian Oceans over the period 2020-2040.

China approached this pivotal decision cautiously, although one could reasonably infer from the official justifications offered in recent times that it was understood in the internal debate that it was a question of when and how rather than whether China should acquire a carrier force.⁵ In the 1980s, it is likely that costs and technological limitations drove deferral of the program. These considerations would have remained strong into the 1990s, supplemented, perhaps, by (1) the urgency attached to acquiring Taiwan-focussed counter-intervention capabilities and the low relevance of carriers to this contingency, and (2) the prominence that the CCP elected to give over the decade 1995-2005 to declaratory positions on foreign and security policy intended to reassure neighbours in Asia. An aircraft carrier, the quintessential military instrument for power projection, would have cut across

this declaratory message. Hu Jintao, however, President from 2002, appears to have been persuaded of the centrality of the PLAN to China's security needs and aspirations. He delivered a speech in 2004 that spoke of (and thereby legitimised) the notion of 'far seas defence', that is, China's emerging global interests and responsibilities. The US Office of Naval Intelligence reported that senior Chinese officials appear to have been authorised in early 2006 to begin making public statements anticipating the introduction of an aircraft carrier, suggesting that the decision to refurbish and commission the Varyag/Liaoning was made in 2005.⁶ The Pentagon anticipates that China will proceed to construct additional carriers and some commentary refers to intelligence that one such indigenous carrier is currently under construction.⁷

As noted above, China's re-emergence over the past 30 years is characterised by a patient and methodical determination to rebuild China's power in a comprehensive and balanced manner, minimising the nation's vulnerabilities. The commitment to the Liaoning is most unlikely to be an exploratory move or a token gesture. China has taken at least 25 years to test and confirm the hypothesis that it needs aircraft carriers to achieve its security aspirations and the Liaoning almost certainly represents a commitment to a carrier-based navy. With three fleets, this could mean at least 4-5 carriers if each fleet is to have an operational carrier at all times.

China's Military Expenditure

Chinese governments have never been, and are not now, attracted to transparency. Indeed, secrecy is a deep-seated and powerful tradition, one directed equally at internal and external audiences. And as in all states, this tradition is practised most zealously in the military sphere. Over the two decades up to 1980, China did not divulge so much as a single figure on its military expenditure. It is no surprise, therefore, that China's military expenditure is a bone of contention. China now publishes its defence budget each year, and insists that this budget covers all the categories of expenditure that other states include in their military expenditures. Unfortunately, China has no visible processes of internal review. The budget is not justified to or approved by any independent agency. Nor is there sufficiently detailed information either on China's central government expenditures or its national accounts to allow economists to confirm the probable broad magnitudes accounted for by the military effort. Many states and analysts contest the view that China reports all its military expenditure, and adopt varying techniques to estimate the missing expenditures. Together with the options available to adjust for inflation and to convert expenditures to a common currency, this produces a wide range of estimates that can be hazardous for analysts to compare. Published estimates of China's military expenditure range from 2X to 10X the figures published by China's government.⁸ This credibility gap is regrettable. Comparisons of the level and rate of change of military expenditure seem like a convenient surrogate for

the complexities of evaluating military capabilities and, for this reason, are very influential in shaping broad judgements about whether another state is taking reasonable and prudent steps to provide for its security or is aspiring to disruptive changes in the existing order.

The levels and trends in Chart 1 support the explanation offered above on how costly the PLA had been in the 1960s and 1970s and how it fared in the different phases of the modern reform era. These data are valuable because they were generated by a single source – the US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency – which had access to intelligence information and which took the trouble to ensure overlap whenever it adjusted its methodology. Chart 2 highlights the extent of the ‘credibility gap’, with official US estimates (likely to have been prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency) of China’s military expenditure in recent years running at more than double the official figures provided by the Chinese government.⁹

Between 1970 and 1990, China’s defence expenditure, adjusted for inflation, was essentially static.¹⁰ Since that time, however, China’s military expenditure has grown steadily at about 10% per year (in real terms) for a period that already exceeds two decades. This combination of speed and duration, although submerged in the growth of China’s GDP, constitutes a military build-up without precedent among the major powers in modern times.

US Images of China

Among the more obvious techniques for assessing the trajectory of a country’s military capability is to look at what other countries say about them. Since 1949, China-US relations have occupied just about every location on the spectrum between partner and enemy. Following the establishment of the PRC, the negotiation of security alliance with the USSR and the rapid transformation of North Korea’s invasion of the South into a US-China war, the US depicted the Sino-Soviet bloc as a single entity for purposes of deterrence and war planning. The enmity was kept sharp by crises over Taiwan in 1954-55 and 1958 and China’s ideologically-driven endeavours to spark revolutions, particularly among the emerging states of Southeast Asia, which contributed to the concerns encapsulated in the Domino Theory and America’s slide into Vietnam in the early 1960s. By the mid-1960s the US was satisfied that the Sino-Soviet split was deep and genuine and within a few years the notion of testing the scope to recalibrate US-China relations was being spoken of publicly in Washington. There is some evidence that, when Sino-Soviet tensions erupted into major border clashes in 1969, Washington privately warned the Soviet Union not to consider widening the conflict, particularly in the direction of attacking China’s still narrowly based nuclear weapons capability. The nuanced and guarded rapprochement engineered by Nixon/Kissinger and

Mao/Zhou in 1971-72 proved to be a strategic coup within the primary US-USSR confrontation. The shocks of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989 and the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 proved too great, it seems, and the two states have not since succeeded in removing the doubts and ambiguities that plague their relations.

China appeared to take some comfort from the markedly modest posture initially proposed for the post-Cold War world by President Bush Snr. The notion central to China's grand strategy, that of a window of strategic opportunity during which China could focus its energies on economic renewal, seemed to remain valid with the US expected to be a benign hegemon during a transition to more multi-polar arrangements for global governance that was widely projected to be relatively quick. A noteworthy development occurred when a group of neo-conservative officials in the Pentagon were given the opportunity by then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in 1991-92 to develop a vision for what the US should do with unipolarity. In rather sharp contrast to the thinking in the White House and the National Security Council, these officials advocated a determined effort to develop and protect this status indefinitely with Washington being prepared to more clearly present itself as the global leader. China appears to have had no visibility to this group. To the contrary, to the extent they detected challenges to unipolarity, they emanated primarily from Japan and Germany. This report was leaked to the media, disowned by the President amidst a fierce backlash, and essentially disappeared for a decade.

China's economic fortunes continued to flourish during the 1990s. There was scope to begin funding the PLA more lavishly (on average, 10 percent real growth per year since the end of the Cold War) without defence spending accounting for a rising share of GDP. America also enjoyed a prolonged boom, a condition that probably contributed to a fateful propensity to act as though China was just another export-led tiger economy that the US could take in its stride, an attitude that progressively de-stabilised the US economy and increased its vulnerability to later shocks. China's leader's faced challenges to the window-of-opportunity thesis in the form of the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis and the 1999 Kosovo crisis (because the US and its NATO allies skirted certain Chinese and Russian vetoes in the Security Council to penalise and stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo plus, of course, the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) but persisted with the concept into the early years of the new century.

Speaking to the Australian Parliament shortly after winning a second term in November 1996, Bill Clinton foreshadowed an intensified focus on Asia and China, saying that "...how China defines its greatness will help determine whether the 21st century will be one of cooperation or conflict." Events frustrated that intention, although Clinton and Jiang Zemin did end up characterising their relationship as

a 'strategic partnership'. As is well known, this label was contested by George Bush in the 2000 Presidential elections, with Bush contending that China was in fact a strategic competitor. Less well known now is that the Bush administration followed up with a Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) that constituted a decisive pivot toward Asia, reversing America's traditional ranking of strategic priorities. In the QDR 2001, the familiar priority order of Europe, Near East, and Asia became Asia, Near East, and Europe, with China referred to elliptically in terms of "...the potential for a regional military power to harness its own and regional resources and emerge as a peer competitor." The reason this is now forgotten is that QDR 2001 was released 20 days after 911 and the declaration of the Global War on Terror. Asia and China slipped off American radar screens until Bush's second term, and then returned only intermittently, keeping open China's 'window of opportunity' and leading to a drastic weakening in America's economic fundamentals.

The Bush administration's second QDR, appearing in 2006, was no longer elliptical about China. Specifically¹¹:

China has the greatest potential to compete with the US...and offset traditional US advantages absent US countermeasures. (p.29);

PRC capabilities, the vast distances of the Asian theatre, China's continental depth, and the challenge of en-route and in-theatre US basing place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas. (p.30)

By this time, however, the horse had truly bolted. The cumulative impact of over 25 years of spectacular growth had transformed the political landscape of Asia in that China was now the decisively important economic actor. The global financial crisis of 2008 telescoped into an instant what would probably have been a more gradual process of getting used to the fact that China was, once again, this hugely asymmetric strategic weight in greater Asia. China, too, seems to have been unsettled at how these massive shocks have accelerated the development of its relative 'comprehensive national power', finding it difficult to resist trying to capture the strategic gains that seemed, prematurely, to be within reach. In very broad terms, this was the context for the most recent development in this saga, the Obama Administration's commitment in 2011-12 to rebalance America's political, economic and military energies and capacities toward Asia.

Neither China's instincts to keep a low profile and prolong the window of opportunity nor American reluctance to acknowledge that China had joined it as a state with disproportionate power and influence is surprising. But that phase is past. China has never measured itself against anybody other than the US but can no longer pretend that this is not the case because only the US is left. The US, similarly, has stopped playing mind games and seems fully cognisant that China

is a thoroughly traditional Realist power and a real contender for many of the titles that the US has carried for more than half a century. An interactive process of capability acquisition has taken root and efforts to manage and contain this trend through dialogue have had limited success.

Assessment

What conclusions might be drawn from these various strands of analysis? I believe that the following propositions can be advanced with some confidence.

First, China is engaged in a methodical and determined program to field military capabilities fully commensurate with its status as one of a small number of leading states and, potentially, the first among equals in this elite group. This endeavour is informed by an expanding set of perceived security challenges and aspirations but appearances, that is, considerations of status and prestige, appear to also be important factors.

Second, China set out to achieve this strategic objective around 1980 from a very low base in terms of general scientific, technological and industrial competencies. China has made rapid progress in filling key gaps and raising its general level of competence but still has much to do before it can confidently expect to match other major powers in this arena and field fully competitive indigenous military capabilities. That said, China will lack neither the will nor the resources to continue to close the remaining gaps in its capacities. China will certainly overtake the US as the largest economy in the world during the 2020s, and go on to become substantially larger, albeit at a slowing pace. For all the uncertainty about the true economic dimensions of China's military effort, this effort is not unsustainably large and could readily be expanded/accelerated if China's government so decided.¹² Clearly, this latent potential is itself a formidable source of 'sausive' power.

Third, in the context just of the states of East Asia, China's consolidation of a pronounced quantitative edge in military capability over the next two decades or so seems essentially inevitable. Whether China intends to go on and, in some fashion, match or exceed the capabilities that the US deploys, or could deploy, in the Western Pacific is not known. It could be that a general expectation to this effect is already in place. Alternatively, this may be viewed as a decision point that is still decades away. China will not seek to replicate America's global military posture. Indeed, it will avoid doing so. But China is, I believe, determined to be recognised and accepted as America's comprehensive peer, able to ensure that Washington has no easy options when it comes to diverting Beijing from pursuing its core security interests. We do need to bear in mind, however, that the PLA is undergoing a cultural transformation away from an Army-dominated continental

power and has limited practical experience (certainly no combat experience) with both the maritime domain and the advanced technologies it is seeking to master and to make routine within the PLA. Moreover, that continental perspective, together with the PLA's role in preserving regime security, will always be there as significant determinants of how the PLA is structured and deployed.

There are some other important considerations that further temper this prognosis. There is little prospect that China will ever experience the degree of global strategic preponderance that the US possessed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Even with an economy that is statistically No.2, the US will remain a decisively important power with qualitative strengths that will offset China's quantitative edge for a long time. Japan certainly faces relative diminution but will remain a substantial, wealthy and technologically-advanced power for many decades. The European Union, Russia and Brazil are, or are relatively likely to become, additional poles of significant economic power. Further, China is not unique as a massive and ancient civilisation (MAC) reclaiming a prominent position in the global hierarchy on the basis of a major economic revival. India is the other MAC, also located in Asia and also learning to make fast economic growth a routine, and with aspirations no less grand than those of China.

China's military modernisation seems still, for the most part, to be characterised by restraint and discipline, focussed on developing its research, development and industrial capacities and the avoidance of major investment in platforms or capabilities likely to be deemed sub-standard. That said, it remains the case that the ultimate shape of the PLA will be influenced strongly by the political aspirations of the CCP and its views on the role of military power in realising these aspirations. It seems beyond doubt that Deng Xiaoping and his successors took very seriously the contention that failure to control the military or being compelled by external developments to make a disproportionately large investment in military power constituted a major risk to the sustained revival of the Chinese state. The collapse of the Soviet Union, in large part because it aspired to outdo the West in military power with an economy that was never larger than about 40 percent that of the US alone, provided powerful reinforcement of this basic judgement. On the other hand, there is little sign that Beijing discounts the importance or utility of military power. The concept of 'comprehensive national power'(CNP), an analytical device favoured by Socialist states and one that still has some currency in China, emphasises the importance of balance. A low score on a single major parameter essentially erases all relative strengths. Japan, therefore, always fared poorly in international comparisons of CNP, even back in the 1970s and 1980s, because it lacked nuclear weapons, had deliberately constrained its conventional military strength and had accepted strict limits on its capacity to manipulate its military power for political and strategic gain.

These are critical questions for the East Asian community, not least because they play so directly into the outlook for stable coexistence between China and the US. In practical terms, these questions come down to what sort of maritime environment in the Western Pacific China both desires and considers achievable. Even more specifically, these questions subsume the issue of the first and second island chain and distil down to China's attitude toward America's alliance relationships in East Asia.

We know that China's security community shared the widespread view in academic and policy circles immediately after the Cold War that alliances could be expected to 'naturally' lose their appeal and eventually wither away. By and large, this does not appear to have happened although it is certainly the case that managing alliance relationships through the fallout from this geo-political watershed required a great deal of statesmanship and diplomatic creativity. We also know that China, as part of its standard rhetoric, characterises these alliances as anachronistic Cold War relics. This is still very different, however, from a determination that these alliances are incompatible with China's aspirations and having the policy intent to unravel them.

We do not, of course, have a clear answer to these questions but an assessment of the indicators yields a mixed prognosis that many, including this author, would regard as worrying. We have stressed the view that modern China, the China of the era or 'reform and opening up' has single-mindedly focussed on the US as its benchmark. The patience and methodical development of its 'comprehensive national power' and the energetic endeavours to avoid the limelight, bide its time and keep open the strategic window of opportunity to skew its energies toward economic development was relatively conspicuous until around 2005. By that time, China was reaping the natural rewards of influence and respect that flow from being everyone's primary trading partner and was confident of soon displacing Japan as the world's second largest economy even if the US still seemed in every respect to be a distant aspirational benchmark.

China is not waiting until the military component of its 'comprehensive national power' is fully in place. China has both a cultural propensity, traceable to Sun Tzu, to prefer deploying power well below the threshold of military force to shift the parameters of an issue in its favour or, in other words, to gradually erode overt resistance to its preferences. Moreover, Beijing is beginning to appreciate that its system of governance affords it a strong comparative advantage in deploying power in this fashion. China can assemble packages of pressure (with political, diplomatic, trade, investment, tourism and paramilitary elements), and change the mix, far more adroitly than other governments. It has done so with particular vividness in respect of Japan and selected ASEAN states with claims in the SCS, notably, the Philippines and Vietnam.

In 2010, China floated the idea that the SCS was a 'core interest', a posture that informed other states that contesting China position could attract a determined response up to and including the full scale use of military force. The idea was allowed to lapse but every Foreign and Defence ministry in the region was left with the message that this was an option for China, and one that had been considered at the highest levels. This message was re-iterated in late 2012 when the Minister for Defence asserted, ostensibly to offer reassurance, that China had not *formally* declared the SCS to be a 'core interest'.

In sum, it seems to this author that the only sensible working hypothesis is that China will inevitably acquire military capabilities commensurate with its status as the world's largest economy. China displays little sign, however, of imbuing its posture with that invaluable quality which will incline its neighbours to even accept gracefully, let alone welcome, this inevitable filling out of its power. Already, the slogans of new security concept, peaceful rise/development and harmony, so forcefully prominent over the period 1995-2005, have fallen off to a whisper. Perhaps the sequence of the 911 attacks, Washington's ill-fated Iraqi venture, and the Global Financial Crisis created the sense of a strategic opening to achieve gains formerly considered to be possible decades into the future, if at all, proved irresistible and overwhelmed the caution of China's leaders. As things stand, the task of maintaining stability and peace during a prolonged transitory phase in the geopolitics of East Asia remains as daunting a challenge today as it did when it was first exposed by the end of the Cold War.

Endnotes

¹ For a fuller exposition of the points to follow see, Ron Huisken, *Introducing China: The World's Oldest Great Power Charts its Next Comeback*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No.176, ANU E-Press 2010.

² Each of China's SSBNs carries 12 single-warhead JL-2 missiles and a fleet of 5 boats would support 1-2 on operational patrol at all times. In addition, since around 2007, China has been deploying new solid-fuel, road mobile ICBMs, notably the DF-31A. Taken together, these new programs probably mean that China has more than doubled its capacity to threaten targets in the US with nuclear weapons compared to its modest force of 20 liquid-fuelled DF-5 ICBMs dating from the 1980s and 1990s.

³ Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, Kevin L. Pollpeter, *Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States*, RAND Corporation, 2007.

⁴ See, for example, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, *Sea Change*, Foreign Policy, 2012 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/14/sea_change) and Andrew Davies & Benjamin Schreer,

Whither US Forces? US Military Presence in the Asia Pacific and the Implications for Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Analysis, 8 September 2011, and US Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), 17 January 2012.

⁵ See Nan Li & Christopher Weuve, *China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update*, Naval War College Review, Winter 2010, Vol.63, No.1.

⁶ Cited in Ronald O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernisation: Implications for US Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, 23 March 2012, p.17.

⁷ Op. cit, *China Naval Modernisation*, p.19.

⁸ The key sources include the Yearbooks published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Military Balance* prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and estimates prepared by US intelligence agencies (see Chart 2).

⁹ US Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*, 2010, Annual Report to the Congress, Washington DC, 2010.

¹⁰ *World Armaments and Disarmament*, SIPRI Yearbook 1991, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden, p.157.

¹¹ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington DC, 2006.

¹¹ Readers wishing to explore this issue in greater depth could start with Larry M. Wortzel, *China's Military Potential*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2 October 1998; Paul H.B. Godwin, *China's Defence Modernisation: Aspirations and Capabilities*, [available at <http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0003godwin.htm>]; David Shambaugh, *China's Military Modernisation: Making Steady and Surprising Progress*, Strategic Asia 2005-06; *Chinese Military Power*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2003; and Tai Ming Cheung, *Dragon on the Horizon: China's Defence Industrial Renaissance*, The Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2009, pp.29-66.





Chart 2: Official U.S. Estimates of Chinese Military Spending



China's Annual Real GDP and Military Budget Growth, 2000 - 2009

Table 1: Numbers of PLA Navy Ships and Aircraft Provided by Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009	Projection for 2015	Projection for 2020
Ships							
Ballistic missile submarines	1	1	1	2	3	4 or 5?	4 or 5?
Attack submarines (SSNs and SSs)	80	82	65	58	59	~70	~72
SSNs	5	5	5	6	6	n/a	n/a
SSs	75	77	60	52	53	n/a	n/a
Aircraft carriers	0	0	0	0	0	1?	2?
Destroyers	14	18	21	25	26	~26	~26
Frigates	35	35	37	42	48	~45	~42
Subtotal above ships	130	136	124	127	136	~146 or ~147?	~146 or ~147?
Missile-armed attack craft	200	165	100	75	80+	n/a	n/a
Amphibious ships	65	70	60	56	58	n/a	n/a
Large ships (LPDs/LHDs)	0	0	0	0	1	~6?	~6?
Smaller ships	65	70	60	56	57	n/a	n/a
Mine warfare ships	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	40	n/a	n/a
Major auxiliary ships	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	50	n/a	n/a
Minor auxiliary ships and support craft	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	250+	n/a	n/a
Aircraft							
Land-based maritime strike aircraft	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	~145	~255	~258
Carrier-based fighters	0	0	0	0	0	~60	~90
Helicopters	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	~34	~153	~157
Subtotal above aircraft	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	~179	~468	~505

Source: Prepared by CRS. Source for 2009, 2015, and 2020: 2009 ONI report, page 18 (text and table), page 21 (text), and (for figures not available on pages 18 or 21), page 45 (CRS estimates based on visual inspection of ONI graph entitled "Estimated PLA[N] Force Levels"). Source for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005: Navy data provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 9, 2010.

Notes: n/a is not available. The use of question marks for the projected figures for ballistic missile submarines, aircraft, carriers, and major amphibious ships (LPDs and LHDs) for 2015 and 2020 reflects the difficulty of resolving these numbers visually from the graph on page 45 of the ONI report. The graph shows more major amphibious ships than ballistic missile submarines, and more ballistic missile submarines than aircraft carriers. Figures in this table for aircraft carriers include the ex-Ukrainian carrier Varyag, which is likely to enter service before any new-construction indigenous carrier. The ONI report states on page 19 that China "will likely have an operational, domestically produced carrier sometime after 2015." Such a ship, plus the Varyag, would give China a force of 2 operational carriers sometime after 2015.

The graph on page 45 shows a combined total of amphibious ships and landing craft of about 244 in 2009, about 261 projected for 2015, and about 253 projected for 2015.

Since the graph on page 45 of the ONI report is entitled "Estimated PLA[N] Force Levels," aircraft numbers shown in the table presumably do not include Chinese air force (PLAAF) aircraft that may be capable of attacking ships or conducting other maritime operations.

CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES IN MARITIME SECURITY: SEA POWER AND REGIONAL ORDER IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS

Dr Alessio Patalano

Introduction

There is little doubt that in the contemporary world, East Asia – including in this paper its northeast and southeast parts – is on the rise. Today, we are witnessing a power shift – certainly economically, but also militarily – towards this part of the world. In the realm of economics, this shift is led by the emergence of China as the world second economy, and indeed as one of the primary international economic engines. In addition, it is important to stress that this part of the world is still home to the third world economy, Japan, as well as some of the most dynamic world economic realities, from Singapore to South Korea, to Vietnam and Brunei.

In military terms, the Chinese military modernisation process – ranging from the acquisition of new combat systems to the strengthening of policing and paramilitary forces – has the potential to reshape the regional order. But again, this is only one of a wider set of phenomena. Across East Asia, other state actors are slowly modernising their military forces – a long overdue process that in areas like Southeast Asia was slowed down after the financial crisis of the mid-1990s. Others, like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, are enhancing existing capabilities, and increasing interoperability with key strategic partners like the US. Equally important, these actors are developing greater expertise in the diplomatic uses of their military power to exert greater influence and promote multinational cooperation.

Taken altogether, this wide-reaching transformation of East Asia is a clear signal of its emergence to the international stage as an independent regional system. Less clear is the extent to which this emergence will be affected by substantial security challenges. There are in fact a series of issues in East Asia that have the potential to endanger adjustments within the regional order. Needless to say the repercussions for East Asia as much as for the rest of the international system would be disastrous. In an interdependent world, one where economies are intrinsically growing ever more interconnected, from North America to Europe, there is no more such a thing as an ‘isolated crisis’.

Within this context, this paper argues that the core of the challenges facing East Asia today is centred on the maritime realm. Seldom a week goes by without some sort of media coverage of the latest round of tensions regarding issues of territorial

and border disputes in the South and East China Seas. In particular, the year 2012 represented from this point of view a low point, with Sino-Japanese tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalating as never before, with paramilitary forces on both sides deployed in great proximity to each other, and violent protests in China with substantial damage reported against Japanese economic assets and properties, and assaults reported against Japanese citizens. In the SCS, the April crisis over the Bajo de Masinloc/Scarborough shoal, with the standoff between Chinese and Filipino forces, and the failure of ASEAN to come together to address the issue of the territorial disputes raised questions about the risks of the Chinese military assertiveness and of ASEAN's abilities as a politico-diplomatic security actor.

Why are these disputes so central to regional security? What makes them so significant? Why does maritime security matter in East Asia?

The answers to the above questions underpin the main arguments of this paper. In it, I argue three points. First, from a systemic point of view, maritime security is central to regional affairs because the sea is an essential feature of East Asia. Indeed, I would argue that one core feature sets the East Asian region apart from other regional systems that, throughout history, emerged to take the lead in international economic, political and military affairs. That is the 'maritime' nature of its geography. The heart of this regional system, stretching in its widest understanding from the shores of the Indian Ocean to those of the Sea of Japan, is made of salty water – not dry land. The highways that power the region's key economies, the fabric that offers precious living and non-living resources is blue – not green.

The second and third components of the paper's argument are symbiotically connected and unfold directly from the first. Insofar as the second component of the argument is concerned, in a region where the use of the sea is an essential feature of the regional system, the maritime realm becomes a primary place where national political ambitions are expressed. As a result, I would argue that because of the centrality of the maritime realm to the East Asian regional system, at sea and from the sea the regional power balance is being reshaped. In particular, it is for this reason that the spaces of the East and South China Seas (ESCS) – the primary basins of the analytical focus of this paper – are today the main battleground where regional actors seek to exert national sovereign rights and to redefine national power and status. Territorial and maritime disputes and in both theatres are the most evident examples of such a process.

This leads to the last component of the argument. In the context of the ESCS, sea power is going to play a crucial role in defining and reshaping regional order. Sea power – intended here as the ability to use the sea for strategic purposes – is not

merely about powerful navies, or racing a competitor in building the strongest naval force. Maritime forces have inherent constabulary, diplomatic and military functions. They can be used for diplomacy and cooperation as much as for deterrence and war. It is this wide range of functions that make them uniquely suited to be at the forefront of competition as well as the management of security issues and regional stability.¹

A Uniquely 'Maritime' Regional System

Is there anything 'unique' about East Asian security? This question attracted considerable attention in recent scholarly work on the international relations of East Asia. David Kang's ground breaking study on the Chinese 'tributary system' led the way in seeking to offer an 'Asian-centric' understanding of regional security.² In essence, he argued that the traditional structure of the East Asian international system (before the arrival of western powers in the 17th Century) was based on a hierarchical system with Imperial China at its centre and a group of 'tributaries', each with a particular position. In Kang's view, a strong China brought stability to the system.³ For this reason, today East Asian state actors are likely to follow a pattern of bandwagoning with China as the country rises to power. The current situation is a return to a system that existed long before Western powers arrived in Asia – he argued.⁴

Kang has certainly made a significant contribution to the debate on the evolving power balance in contemporary East Asia by investigating 'systemic features' that contribute to explain this region's characteristics.⁵ Yet, his analysis gave only limited attention to an even more fundamental systemic feature. East Asia is structurally a 'maritime system'. A maritime system is one in which the sea is central for the spread of ideas, for commercial opportunities and for the projection of military power and political influence at the regional level. This multilayered cultural, economic and political impact is directly related to the four attributes of the sea itself.⁶

French historian Fernand Braudel was among the first scholars to explore the notion of a 'maritime Far East'. He focused on the region's longstanding social, cultural and economic interactions to point out that since ancient times sea-routes helped the formation of a network of interconnected seafaring communities across adjacent sea basins. Recent scholarship on the subject, further confirmed the considerable degree of economic and cultural connectivity that existed among the various communities living along the littorals of Southeast and East Asia.⁷ Further proof of this was the phenomenon of piracy that, periodically, affected regional maritime communication especially in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow and the East China Sea.⁸

Braudel's idea of a maritime system holds true today. The ESCS have been essential to the industrial growth of regional economies, facilitating intra-regional exchanges as well as regional interdependence with the global economy.⁹ The SCS alone is estimated to deliver some 5.3 trillion US dollars in regional commerce, with two-way trade between ASEAN countries and China soaring from eight billion US dollars in 1991 to 231 US billion dollars in 2008.¹⁰ Along similar lines, US trade passing through the SCS yearly is estimated at 1.2 trillion US dollars.¹¹ In 2009, the top five world trade routes originated in East Asia, accounting for more than a quarter of the total shipping traffic of the top twenty world maritime arteries.¹² In 2010, seven of the world's top ten container ports were in East Asia, with the port of Shanghai holding a firm first place, handling 29.07 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). By comparison, this is almost a third more than the total number of TEUs handled by the first two non-Asian ports in the list, Dubai and Rotterdam, combined together.¹³

Growing energy imports are the single most important reason for the sharp rise in regional traffic. Japan, Korea and China account altogether for more than a quarter of the world's oil demand. Yet, The ESCS are not only crucial areas for the transit of energy resources. The seabed in the basins is considered to contain vast untapped reserves of hydrocarbon resources that would be invaluable to countries like China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea with heavy energy demands.¹⁴ Brunei is one example of a country that is fully aware of these circumstances. The sultanate is heavily dependent on oil export, amounting to 90 percent of total export earnings, especially to China - accounting for as much as one-eighth of its total crude exports.¹⁵

The SCS is often regarded by media analysts, especially in China, as the 'new Persian Gulf', estimating the presence of oil resources equal to a value between 105 and 213 billion barrels.¹⁶ In the East China Sea, Japanese and Chinese research teams estimated gas reserves in the range of 175 trillion to 210 trillion cubic feet in volume. Chinese exploration of the Okinawan Trough indicated 'proven and probable' gas reserves for some 17.5 trillion cubic feet, whilst the Chun Xiao reserves are estimated to be about 1.8 trillion cubic feet. In terms of oil, the Okinawan Trough is believed to possess the richest concentration of petroleum deposits, though these are made less accessible by the depth of the Trough. Whilst data about the actual reserves in the ESCS are far from globally accepted, what is certain is that a large part of resources is located in the proximity of highly contested maritime areas.

The question of the ESCS as key mediums for the transportation of goods and providers of natural resources leads to one last consideration on the maritime nature of the East Asian system. Unlike continental systems, where the process of territorialisation of space is as old as nation states themselves, territorialisation at

sea is a very recent phenomenon. One example is probably helpful to make this point. According to a popular legend, when Romulus decided to create a new city, he ploughed a furrow around the Palatine Hill in order to mark its boundaries. Shortly after, Rome was borne. At sea, this just does not happen and it never did. For centuries, the freedom of the seas was the core notion that applied to the maritime realm. Whilst this is perhaps an obvious point to many maritime specialists, it is nonetheless an important one since it gives a degree of perspective on the political significance of the animosities concerning the territorial claims of the past few years in the ESCS.

Such disputes are in fact the result of the processes of 'territorialisation' of the maritime realm prompted by the UNCLOS. UNCLOS is a relatively recent international agreement - originally concluded in 1982 - and that came into force only in 1994 with the aim to empower littoral states with the right to manage and exploit maritime spaces adjacent to their coasts. UNCLOS extended a coastal state's territorial waters from 3 to 12 nautical miles from their baseline along the coast. It established an EEZ that extended from the edge of the territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. It similarly defined a state's continental shelf as the natural prolongation of a state's land territory with the possibility to be extended up to 350 nautical miles, empowering states with exclusive use of the resources in the seabed.¹⁷

In the ESCS, the application of these definitions is proving problematic with territorial disputes focusing on both issues of sovereignty of groups of offshore islands and of definitions of boundaries.¹⁸ The key point is that the emergence of UNCLOS almost overlapped with the wider processes of political emergence and consolidation and economic development of the majority of the littoral states along the ESCS. This convergence of circumstances contributed to make the question of the definition of maritime frontiers a synonym for political, economic and international affirmation of regional nation states. After all, territorial disputes are directly related to the most vital of national interests - sovereignty.

The ESCS in the Age of 'Interdependent Nationalisms'

In the ESCS, the end of World War II and the subsequent decolonisation process brought about an end to foreign colonial rule in East Asia - from China to Southeast Asia. This process prompted the delineation of 'national' boundaries, the creation of spaces where new political, economic and military identities were forged. But of course, the delineation of national boundaries was much clearer on land than at sea. Provided the political reconfiguration of regional space, this lack of clear borders failed to provide what geopolitics experts defined as an adequate 'physical and cultural separation of one sovereign state from another'.¹⁹

At sea, this meant in many cases that imperial and colonial history had to be reviewed and re-written to serve the interests of the new nation states. Island features were physically occupied to substantiate territorial claims and define national boundaries at sea. This represented a real novelty within the reconfiguration of the East Asian landscape. The SCS was the first basin to witness this competition over asserting a national maritime space. Between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the 1980s, the Philippines, Vietnam (especially after its reunification in 1975) and Malaysia pursued assertive policies with the goal of forcing a new *status quo* that would limit the options of other neighbouring countries in relation to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. With the exception of Brunei, it is reported that today, all other claimant states occupy island features in the Paracels and Spratlys. Vietnam occupies 21 features, the Philippines 9, China 7, Malaysia 5 and Taiwan 1.²⁰

In the East China Sea, controversies over the territorialisation of the maritime realm started at a much later stage, largely because of China's more pressing need to define its land frontiers, and less immediate interests in this basin. Indeed, it was Taiwan the first party to claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 1969. Suffice to say that the possession of these islands was not at all controversial in the 1950s and 1960s. The first official Chinese claim to the islands dates to December 1971, but until the end of the 1980s Chinese authorities made clear to their Japanese counterparts that they preferred to shelf the question and leave it to future generations.²¹

Interestingly enough, new Chinese documentation emerged in the past weeks, would suggest that in the early 1950s Chinese communist party research specialists called the disputed islands according to their Japanese name 'Senkaku' and not Diaoyu – suggesting that they regarded them as Japanese territory, or that at the very least it was unclear to them that they were Chinese territory.²²

By the time UNCLOS was signed and the new international maritime regime started being implemented, the occupants of the islands in both maritime theatres had created a *fait accompli* in which 'their removal by anything short of military force (became) unlikely'.²³ Nonetheless, UNCLOS provided previously unavailable legal ammunition to charge territorial and border issues in the ESCS of a political value whereby each line drawn was seen as a statement to legitimate a nation's status and sovereign independence. In most cases, the disputes were (and are) of two types, territorial – revolving around issues of possession of island features, and of border delimitation – to define the maritime sovereignty and exclusive rights of the different littoral states in relation to particular parts of the ESCS known as EEZ.²⁴ Overlapping claims by China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, by China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and by Japan and the Republic of Korea

over Dokdo/Takeshima Islands offered examples of the former type of dispute. Chinese 'historical claims' for a large 'u-shaped area' of the SCS, the May 2009 joint Malaysia-Vietnam and the April Philippines submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, or for the Chinese use of the continental shelf as a parameter to define its EEZ in the East China Sea are examples of the latter type.

The main difference between the two consisted on the fact that the clarification of borders did not entail the 'possession of parts of the sea' in a way the sovereignty of an island does. Rather, sovereignty at sea empowered coastal states of the rights to use the resources of the maritime realm. For example, unlike on land, at sea, states must permit vessels from other countries freedom of innocent passage and transit in their EEZ (apart from internal waters). Notwithstanding this subtle distinction, it is perhaps important to note that in the past year, interactions at sea in the ESCS have become a very controversial affair. Domestic politics would seem to play an important role in the way each of them behaved in relation to territorial issues.

In China for example, the leadership transition process, coupled with the multiplication of actors with influence on foreign policy, affected the way government authorities responded to maritime crises. For example, recent clarifications by Chinese foreign ministry officials of the application of the Hainan law for the boarding of foreign vessels only within 12 nautical miles suggest a degree of domestic tension, or at least of limited coordination, among different political and economic players.²⁵ In Japan, few would question that the April 2012 announcement by conservative politician Shintaro Ishihara of his intention to buy the Senkaku islands was a primary factor in the escalation of Sino-Japanese tensions. Yet, Ishihara's subsequent move in October to resign as a governor of Tokyo to run for a prominent place in the national elections strongly suggest that his main motivation had more to do with voters attention than with the defence of the disputed islands.²⁶

The impact of domestic politics on these disputes is directly connected to what sovereignty entails for a state institutions in terms of both domestic legitimacy and international status. As such, in most recent cases, coastal states in the ESCS have had the tendency to assume more rigid stances, proactively seeking to make of the disputed areas an opportunity to make a point about the exercise of their sovereign authority.

The April 2012 Sino-Filipino standoff over Bajo de Masinloc/Scarborough Shoal, or the September-December 2012 Sino-Japanese standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, are the two obvious examples. In the first case, the presence of Chinese fishing vessels in a lagoon at the shoal located 124nm from the nearest coast of Luzon prompted the arrival of the Philippines largest warship – a former US

Coast Guard Cutter, which in turn generated the deployment of Chinese maritime surveillance ships to escort the fishing vessels.²⁷ The Philippines considered that the deployment complied with the requirements of the country's domestic legislation, whilst the People's Daily regarded the action as a serious violation of Chinese sovereignty.²⁸ The arguments set forth by both governments left little room for accommodating positions.

In the case of the Sino-Japanese confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China's deployments of patrol vessels from the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) in Mid-September 2012 were aimed at challenging Japanese actions unfolding from the purchase of the islands. In the past, China had sent vessels in waters adjacent to the islands, but never inside to avoid agonising relations with Japan. By sending for the first time ships inside the territorial waters of the islands, Chinese authorities sought to make a point about the contested nature of the sovereignty – a point that they sought to reinforce more recently by sending small patrol aircraft in the air space of the islands in the last days of December.²⁹

Sea Power and Maritime Security in the ESCS

These last incidents offer an opportunity to move to the last point this paper. Sea power – and maritime forces, both naval and constabularies – play today a crucial role in the way maritime security and regional orders are evolving in East Asia.

These last incidents offer an opportunity to move to the last point this paper. Sea power – and maritime forces, both naval and constabularies – play today a crucial role in the way maritime security and regional orders are evolving in East Asia. Maritime forces, especially constabulary and law-enforcement agencies are at the forefront of the management of security. Their role is central in the enforcement of national maritime rights. Patrolling activities with the consequent inspection and/or seizing of fishing boats and crews operating in the contested spaces are now a common currency in the ESCS. China is an exemplary case in point. From 2005 to 2010, authorities in Beijing stepped up the patrolling activities and the frequency with which foreign fishing vessels were seized and strengthened its constabulary forces and maritime enforcement agencies. This is an important point that reminds us that in the EEZ, the Chinese navy competes in its functions with five agencies - the China Coast Guard, the Maritime Safety Administration, the China Maritime Surveillance, the General Administration of Customs, and the FLEC - all organisations seeking to prove the relevance of their roles.³⁰

In the SCS, Chinese vessels detained Vietnamese trawlers in waters near the Paracels in December 2009, March and April 2010.³¹ In 2009, one Vietnamese source estimated that 17 vessels and 210 fishermen had been detained and


eventually released.³² In April 2010, two patrol vessels from the FLEC, Yuzheng 311 and Yuzheng 202, were dispatched from Hainan to escort the country's fishing vessels. This represented the first time China has done so outside the usual period of unilateral ban in the sea between May and August.³³ In the East China Sea, similar incidents involved South Korean fishing vessels and Chinese maritime authorities, and most notably in September 2010, the collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard cutters. What is important to stress about this is that the use of enforcement agencies instead of navies whilst a clear sign of the willingness of the different government to substantiate their claims, it is also a sign of their intention to seek to prevent military escalations.

This is particularly true in light of the wider 'maritime empowerment' of the Asia-Pacific region. For some time now, analysts suggested that the Asia-Pacific is entering a naval arms race that might have disastrous consequences for regional security. This topic is now mainstream in the international security debates and has been at the centre of a recent publication by the IISS.³⁴ State actors in Southeast Asia as well as China are regarded to be at the centre of this process. In the period 2005-2009, states in Southeast Asia have been credited to prioritise investments and step-up military purchases 'dramatically'.³⁵ Investments in new military hardware displayed the traits of a regional 'arms race' in the sense that 'one country buys something and others react to it, then the first one may itself react in turn'.

Yet, at a closer look, this wave of purchases was a sign of persisting regional rivalries as much as one of recovery from the economic crisis that invested the region the second half of the 1990s and of long-needed military modernisation.³⁶ Regional naval capabilities have constantly been expanding over the past few years, and according to recent data released by SIPRI, East Asia is one of the most dynamic areas in terms of military investments.³⁷ The ESCS are essential spaces for economic growth as well as territorial security, and provided that three decades ago most of the littoral countries in this area had very limited capabilities, the current phase of naval build-up is in part a process of replacement of old capabilities to perform missions essential to national security. (Figure 1)

In the ESCS, China stands out as the one regional actor that is undergoing the largest naval transformation.³⁸ Increased reliance on sea lanes for trade and energy resources, the uncompromising willingness to defend its territorial integrity, are all factors that scholars consider to have created a wider consensus for naval modernisation.³⁹ In all these narratives, the strategic importance of the ESCS to Chinese naval authorities is undisputed to the point that some authors have gone as far as to consider Chinese connection to the adjacent maritime theatres of the ESCS as engaging vital interests where 'dominant sea power' is an essential tool of statecraft.⁴⁰

Figure 1: Trends in Military Expenditures among Southeast Asian Coastal States



Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2010* (London: Routledge, 2000-2010).

It is not in the interest of this paper to review the much-debated military modernisation of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Suffice to say that this is a far-reaching phenomenon, encompassing all aspects of naval capabilities. The introduction of *Kilo* SSKs, of the the domestic-produced *Yuan* class, the development of anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) and antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) programmes, of shipboard area air defence (AAD) systems, and the introduction of modern missile guided destroyers including four *Sovremenny* DDGs from Russia, are regarded as the cornerstone of a strategy of robust sea denial, also known as A2/AD strategy, as it continues towards its modernisation and procurement of enhanced capabilities.⁴¹ These capabilities are complemented by a well-maintained force of more than 200 patrol and costal combatants, including the *Houbei* class of guided missile patrol craft, and almost 1,470 vessels belonging to various enforcement agencies.⁴² These would represent of the dragon's 'teeth' in the littorals of the ESCS and perhaps, beyond them.

This last point in particular is important because it says something about the fact that the current phase of Chinese naval modernisation is not just about procuring new capabilities to assert power and status in the immediate periphery. Maritime forces have functions beyond the role of combat. Because they operate in an environment that favours access and mobility, they are also important tools to showcase and project national ambitions and power. This is certainly true for

China, where the commissioning of every new major platform is celebrated as a major national event. Here the most telling example is that of the Chinese aircraft carrier. An old Soviet vintage platform, it took over seven years to the newly named *Liaoning* to be commissioned in 2012. The first aircraft to fly off her deck was celebrated widely, and cost the life of the chief engineer of the project. Whilst it is difficult to predict how long it will take for it to become a fully operational platform at the heart of an effective carrier battle group, it certainly achieved the important goal of raising the country's profile as a world major naval power.⁴³

Perhaps the clearest example of how navies contribute to project power and influence across East Asia is the US. Since the end of World War II, the US emerged as the major East Asian sea power – only limitedly challenged by the Soviet Union. The possibility to access naval bases both in Northeast and Southeast Asia made this possible, and two intense conflicts on the Korean peninsula and in Vietnam proved this point. Sea control in the ESCS was instrumental to sustain American war efforts, to implement the Cold War strategy in the region, and in the aftermath of the Cold War to retain the country's hegemonic position.⁴⁴ The main purpose of American maritime forces in East Asia has been and seems to continue to be to reproduce a security system that favours American strategic vision for the region. Indeed, insofar as the status of the sovereignty and the boundaries of the coastal states are concerned, the US sought to maintain a neutral position and supported peaceful solutions, though with some caveats in the case of security allies like Japan.⁴⁵

In all, it is undeniable that the political reconfiguration of the regional landscape brought about a major reconfiguration of military power and that maritime forces stand at the very centre of this process. What is important to stress is that this process has at the very least two dimensions. The first is that the build-up of maritime capabilities has been connected the willingness of coastal states to affirm their sovereign rights in the previously ill-defined spaces of the ESCS basins. For all the coastal countries involved in the territorial and maritime disputes the possession of island features and the question of the access to and exploitation of the economic opportunities offered by the bodies of water of the ESCS are a matter of crucial national security. The second component of the process concerns the contribution of maritime forces to shape regional order. In some cases, like for China, the procurement of certain major capabilities is the expression of a mix of expanded national security requirements and potential ambitions.

For other actors like the US, these capabilities are symptomatic of the willingness to maintain a certain status quo.

Conclusion

What then of the responses to the challenges in maritime security? One of the keys to answer this question is 'interdependence'. Beyond matters of territorial ownership and of rights to exploit marine resources, the actual use and management of the ESCS in all their attributes – from medium for navigation to source of primary resources – is and will be instrumental to favour a more stable regional security order. As such, the first order of priorities should concern basic frameworks of common behaviour in the maritime realm. In particular, the complexity of the uses of the sea, would suggest that more than one single comprehensive framework, ad hoc agreements seeking to address specific issues would probably be easier to pursue.

In the SCS – where tensions have gone through ups and downs in recent time – the implementation of the November 2002 DoC is a good example of an important first step to make sure that all parties involved commit themselves to the exercise of general principles like self-restraint. On the other hand, a more pragmatic agenda, focusing on less ambitious goals with the aim to address issues common to all actors in this basin, from fishery rights to measures to ensure safe navigation at sea, to the creation of hot lines at top and working levels, would more likely offer results. In this context, the ability of ASEAN to present a united front in debating such an agenda will be an important test for the organisation as well as for the future of regional maritime security.

In the East China Sea, before the events of the second half of 2012, positive developments in the Sino-Japanese disputes had taken place. In January 2012, the negative impact of the visit to several members of the Ishigaki municipal assembly to the Senkaku islands had been contained by the action of the two governments following the December 2011 agreement to establish a maritime crisis management mechanism to pursue 'pragmatic cooperation'.⁴⁶ Hot lines had been discussed between Chinese and Japanese parties, and one will have to see how these discussions will resume once the new political leaders settle down. Another important initiative would be the one concerning fishery activities in the disputed areas – a 'peace initiative' proposed by Taiwan.

In a maritime system, the sea has centre stage – and interactions happen on a constant daily basis, covering all sorts of activities. For this reason, in the ESCS, tensions and accidents, all expressions of different political ambitions are likely to continue in the near future. Whether an environmental issue, the isolated act of a dissatisfied fisherman, or a flotilla sailing through a contested area, different realities coexist at the same time in these two maritime basins. Yet, each of those acts has different political value – the individual acts of a drunken fisherman hitting a coast cutter is different from the provocation of a helicopter flying close to

a foreign warship, and this in turn is different from a coast guard cutter deployed in a disputed area. Maritime forces will be inherent parts of the various political exchanges among regional actors, and for this reason, regional actors should try to promote common mechanisms of behaviour to minimise the risks of unintended escalation.

This leads to another consideration. Countries like the US have crucial stakes in the stability of the ESCS. As an actor geographically positioned at the extremities of these basins the US can exert considerable influence – but their role has to be presented as part of an attempt to address issues that concern all stakeholders trans-nationally. Issues of sovereignty connected to territorial disputes are different from those of access and management of the maritime space and the role of Washington cannot be regarded as always essential.

In particular, this leads to another consideration. As a result of their naval bases in Japan, the US is an East China Sea power. Even official Chinese statements acknowledge this. By the same token, they are not a SCS power. This is not equal to say that the US does not have important strategic interests in the region as Secretary Hillary Clinton recently stressed in the ‘pivot strategy’. But it does mean that their actions in these two theatres are perceived differently, especially by China – the only coastal state in the ESCS with territorial disputes in both basins. According to some analysts, American military presence has a crucial role in the stability of the East China Sea disputes between China and Japan. In the SCS disputes, the role of the US is more complex and Southeast Asian officials should consider this as they invite the US to strengthen their presence and partnerships in the region, from the deployment of marines in Australia to that of warships in Singapore.

Provided the maritime nature of the regional system, retaining a degree of strategic flexibility seems a suitable way to offset the risks of escalating competition. Focusing on issue of practical concerns, like navigation, fisheries, exploration of gas and oil fields could offer that degree of flexibility to build basic trust. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that in the ESCS, issues requiring greater cooperation coexist with those that might bring about more aggressive national behaviours. In this respect, a combination of multilateral actions to create norms common to all stakeholders, combined with ‘practical’ initiatives to consolidate behaviours in regard to specific issues might well offer the right mix. In all, the key to the stability of the ESCS will be how political actions will contribute to strike the balance between the cooperative and ‘national’ functions that all maritime forces possess.

Endnotes

¹ For a brief presentation of the uses of navies, cf. Ian Speller, 'Naval Warfare', in David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck and C. Dale Walton, *Understanding Modern Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 165-172; on the use of navies to further either cooperative or competitive forms of behaviour, Geoffrey Till, *Seapower. A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (2nd Edition, London: Frank Cass, 2004), 7.

² David C. Kang, 'Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks', *International Security*, Vol. 27, 2003:4, 57-85; and D. C. Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

³ Kang, 'Getting Asia Wrong', 66-67; Kang, *East Asia Before the West*, chapter 2.

⁴ Kang, *East Asia Before the West*, 158-171.

⁵ Kang's original article attracted also a degree of criticism. On this subject, Amitav Acharya, 'Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?', *International Security*, Vol. 28, 2003/04:3, 149-164; see also Kang response, D. C. Kang, 'Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations', *International Security*, Vol. 28, 2003/04:3, 165-180.

⁶ Till, *Seapower*, 6-18.

⁷ François Gipouloux, *La Méditerranée Asiatique: Ville Portuaires et Réseaux Marchands en Chine, au Japon, et en Asie du Sud-est, XVIe-XXIe Siècle* (Paris : CNRS Editions, 2009).

⁸ Stephen Turnbull, *Pirate of the Far East, 811-1638* (Oxford: Osprey, 2007).

⁹ This point is explained in detail in Philippe Pelletier (eds.), *Géopolitique de l'Asie* (2nd Edition, Paris: Nathan, 2009), 310-12.

¹⁰ Peter Dutton, 'Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 64, 2011:4, , 55.

¹¹ Ian Storey, 'US Concerns in the South China Sea Dispute', *The Straits Times*, 18 April 2012, available electronically at <http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=7568>, accessed on 20 April 2012.

¹² World Shipping Council, <http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/trade-routes>, accessed on 10 January 2012.

¹³ In the year 2010, these two ports handled 11.60 and 11.14 million TEUs respectively. Data from the World Shipping Council, <http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports>, accessed on 10 January 2012.

¹⁴ On the evolution and implications of China's oil imports policy, see Andrew B. Kennedy, 'China's New Energy-Security Debate', *Survival*, Vol. 52, 2010:3, 137-158.

¹⁵ Ian Storey, 'China's Thirst for Energy Fuels Improved Relations with Brunei', *China Brief*, Vol. 5, 2005:24, [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews\[ttnews\]=31139&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=195&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[ttnews]=31139&tx_ttnews[backPid]=195&no_cache=1), accessed on 29 December 2012. Also, Rachel Tien, Bandar Seri Begawan, 'Brunei to Increase Oil Exports to China', *The Brunei Times*, 24 November 2011, <http://www.bt.com.bn/news-national/2011/11/24/brunei-increase-oil-exports-china>, accessed on 11 March 2012.

¹⁶ Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, *The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions* (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2009), 8.

¹⁷ This could extend up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles and give exclusive rights to the coastal state over all mineral and non-living materials in the subsoil or attached to it.

¹⁸ In the ECS, the most crucial are: The Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute (Japan/PRC/Republic of China - ROC); the Liancourt Rock dispute (Japan/Republic of Korea - ROK). In the SCS, territorial disputes concern the Spratly Islands (Brunei, PRC, Malaysia, the Philippines, ROC, and Vietnam); and the Parcel Islands (PRC, ROC and Vietnam).

¹⁹ Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics in a Changing World* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 32.

²⁰ According to data by Prof Rommel Banlaoi, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, reproduced in Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, *The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions* (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2009), 10. Different sources suggested that the number of island features occupied by Vietnam is 27, whilst those under Chinese control are 9.

²¹ Akio Takahara, 'The Senkaku Trawler Collision Incident, September 2010', in Mike Mochizuki (ed.), *The Okinawa Question: Regional Security, the US-Japan Alliance, and Futemma* (Washington, DC: Sigur Centre for Asian Studies, forthcoming 2013). I wish to thank prof Takahara for sharing with me a draft of his chapter. Also, Yusuke Anami, 'Japan-China Discord and Cooperation over the East China Sea', *Japan Foreign Policy Forum*, No.12, November-December 2012, <http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/archive/no12/000370.html>, accessed on 29 December 2012.

²² Jiji Press, 'China 1950 Paper Says Senkakus are Japan's', *The Japan Times*, 29 December 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121229a1.html>, accessed on 30 December 2012.

²³ Leszek Buszynski and Askandar Sazlan, 'Maritime Claims and Energy Cooperation in the South China Sea', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.29, 2007:1, 147.

²⁴ All littoral states in the ESCS are parties to UNCLOS, with the exception of non-UN member Taiwan. UNCLOS empowers littoral states with maritime jurisdiction over the 12 nautical miles breadth territorial waters from their baseline along the coast, with an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to 200 nautical miles as well as continental shelf rights. The text of the convention can be accessed at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm, accessed on 15 September 2011.

²⁵ 'China Explains New Controversial Laws over South China Sea', Press TV, 31 December 2012, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/12/31/281121/china-explains-new-controversial-laws-over-south-china-sea/>, accessed on 01 January 2013. For an overview on the regulations, cf. Taylor M. Fravel, 'Hainan's New Maritime Regulations: A Preliminary Analysis', *The Diplomat*, 01 December 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/hainans-new-maritime-regulations-a-preliminary-analysis/>, accessed on 10 December 2012.

²⁶ Masaya Kobayashi, 'Shintaro Ishihara, Japan's First Post-war Far-right Party Leader', *Asia & Japan Watch Forum*, 14 December 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/forum/politics_and_economy/east_asia/AJ201212140001, accessed on 17 December 2012.

²⁷ Editorial Department, 'Philippine Warship in Standoff with China Vessels', *The Guardian*, 11 April 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/11/philippines-china-stand-off-south-china-sea>, accessed on 14 April 2012.

²⁸ Ding Gang, 'China's Sovereignty is Inviolable over South China Sea Issue', *People's Daily*, 16 April 2012.

²⁹ Eleanor Warnock, 'China Patrols Continue near Disputed Islands', *Japan Real Time - The Wall Street Journal*, 9 October 2012, <http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2012/10/09/china-patrols-continue-near-disputed-islands/>, accessed on 10 October 2012.

³⁰ Goldstein, *Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea*, 30-33; or for a brief overview, Lyle J. Goldstein, 'Chinese Coast Guard Development: Challenges and Opportunity', *China Brief*, Vol. IX, 2009:23, 5-6. Also, Cole (2010), *The Great Wall at Sea*, 78-82; and Christian Le Mièrre, 'Policing the Waves: Maritime Para-Militaries in the Asia-Pacific', *Survival*, Vol. 53, 2011:1, 133-146.

³¹ Ian Storey, 'China's "Charm Offensive" Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia [Part I]', *China Brief*, Vol. 10, 2010:9, 3.

³² Edward Wong, 'Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave Off China's Reach', *The New York Times*, 4 February 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/asia/05hanoi.html?_r=1, accessed on 20 April 2010.

³³ Storey, 'China's "Charm Offensive" Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia [Part II]', 3.

³⁴ Geoffrey Till, *Asia's Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?* (Adelphi Book 432-33, Abingdon, OX: Routledge for IISS, 2012).

³⁵ This assessment is based on a recently released study by SIPRI. Kathrin Hille and Tim Johnston, 'SE Asia Arms Purchases Fuel Fears of Clashes', *Financial Times*, 14 March 2010.

³⁶ Robert Karniol, 'Arms Resurgence in South-east Asia', *The Straits Times*, 15 March 2010.

³⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Background Paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure data*, 2010 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2011).

³⁸ There is a conspicuous literature looking at China's growing naval power and strategy. See for example, Bernard D. Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea: China's Enters the Twenty-First Century* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Peter Howarth, *China's Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy's Submarine Challenge* (London: Routledge, 2006); James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan* (London: Routledge, 2007); Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010).

³⁹ Robert S. Ross, 'China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response', *International Security*, Vol. 34, 2009:2, 46-81; Xu Qi, 'Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-First Century', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 59, 2006:4, 47-67;

⁴⁰ James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, 'China's "Caribbean" in the South China Sea', *SAIS Review*, Vol. 26, 2006:1, 85.

⁴¹ Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, 'Near Seas "Anti-Navy" Capabilities, not Nascent Blue Water Fleet, Constitute China's Core Challenge to U.S. and Regional Militaries', *China SignPost*, N.55, 6 March 2012, 4, http://www.chinasignpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/China-SignPost-55_Strategic-Horizon_1A_Near-Seas-Are-The-Real-Challenge_20120306.pdf, accessed on 06 March 2012. Similar conclusions are set forth in Ronald O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

⁴² Data on the Chinese maritime enforcement agencies in National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), *NIDS China Security Report 2011* (Tokyo: NIDS, 2012), 6.

⁴³ Edward Wong, 'As Regional Tensions Rise, China Lands Jet on First Carrier, *The New York Times*, 25 November 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/china-lands-jet-on-its-first-aircraft-carrier.html?_r=1&, accessed on 10 December 2012.

⁴⁴ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 320-331, and chapters 14-15.

⁴⁵ In the case of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands, under Article V of the 1960 bilateral Treaty, the United States committed itself to defend territories under Japanese administration in case of attack, including the disputed Islands. Taylor, M. Fravel, 'Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute' in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi (eds.), *Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 148.

⁴⁶ Paul O'Shea, 'Beijing and Tokyo Calming Senkakus Dispute', *Japan Times*, 17 January 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ea20120117a1.html>, accessed on 20 January 2012.

CONTRIBUTORS



Dr Johan Saravanamuttu

Visiting Senior Research Fellow
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore

Johan Saravanamuttu is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He was formerly professor of political science at Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) in Penang where he served as Dean of the School of Social Sciences (1994-1996). In 1997, he was the Visiting Chair in ASEAN and International Studies at the University of Toronto. His publications include *New Politics in Malaysia*, ISEAS, 2003 (co-editor), *March 8: Eclipsing May 13*, ISEAS, 2008 (co-authored), *Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*, Routledge, 2010 (editor), *Malaysia's Foreign Policy, the First 50 Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, ISEAS, 2010 (author), *The New Economic Policy in Malaysia: Affirmative Action, Ethnic Inequalities and Social Justice*, NUS Press, 2013 (co-editor).



Professor Seok-soo Lee

Director General
Research Institute on National Security Affairs,
Korea National Defense University,
South Korea

Professor Seok-soo Lee is a Director General in Research Institute on National Security Affairs at the Korea National Defense University. Prior to joining Korea National Defense University, he was a Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) (1985 – 1998), then a Senior Research Fellow at Kim Dae-Jung Peace Foundation (1994 – 1997). He was also, previously, a National Intelligence Officer at the National Intelligence Service (2005 – 2007).

He has written in numerous publications (in English) including “Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) since 1993: A Comprehensive Review,” *The Korean Journal of Security Affairs*, vol 14, no. 1 (June 2009); “North Korea’s Transition from Survival to Development: Conditions, Needs and External Resources,” *KNDU Review*, vol. 6, no. 1, (June 2001); “Dismantling Cold War Structure on the Korean Peninsula,” *KNDU Review*, vol. 5, no. 2 (December 2000); “Kim Jong Il Regime and the Structure of Crisis: Its Sources, Management and Manifestation,” in Chung-in Moon ed. *Understanding Regime Dynamics in North Korea*. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1998; “The Post-Cold War Security Agenda of Korea; Inertia, New Thinking and Assessment,” *Pacific Review*, vol 8, no. 1 (1995).



Dr Mark G. Rolls

Senior Lecturer in Asian Politics & Security
and Co-Director
International Relations and Security Studies
Programme
University of Waikato, New Zealand

Mark G. Rolls is a Senior Lecturer in Asian Politics and Security and Co-Director of the International Relations and Security Studies Programme at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. He has an MA in Defence and Security Analysis from Lancaster University and a PhD in South-East Asian Studies from the University of Hull. He has held posts at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, where he was the Swan Hunter International Fellow in South-East Asian Studies. Dr Rolls is the co-editor of *Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Frank Cass, 1994, 2000) and the author of *The Arms Dynamic in South East Asia during the Second Cold War* (Ashgate, 2002). He contributed the chapter on East Asia to *New Zealand in World Affairs IV 1990-2005* and is currently working on a book on New Zealand's relations with South Asia for which he received 2008 and 2010 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Historical Research Grants. His most recent publication, an article on ASEAN and Regional Security, appeared in *East Asia* (2012) 29. His research interests include ASEAN, the emerging East Asian regional security architecture, arms procurement, non-traditional security issues and New Zealand - Asia relations. Dr Rolls is a regular participant for New Zealand in the Track II process of political, economic and security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. He is a Fellow of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).



Dr Ron Huisken

Senior Fellow
Strategic and Defense Studies Centre
Australian National University

Ron Huisken joined the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University as a Senior Fellow in 2001, after nearly 20 years in government with the departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs & Trade, and Prime Minister and Cabinet. His research interests are focussed on US security policies, the security order in East Asia, non-proliferation and arms control, and China's foreign and security policies. Prior to his career in government, he worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1968-76), the University of Malaya (1970-72), the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (1979-81), and was a Visiting Fellow with the SDSC (1976-77). In 1995-96, he was a member of the secretariat for the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. He holds a Bachelor of Economics (First Class Hons) from the University of Western Australia, a Master of Social Science (Economics) from the Royal Stockholm University, and a PhD (International Relations) from the Australian National University. His publications include *Arms Uncontrolled*, (with Frank Barnaby, 1975); *The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile*, (1981); *The Road to War on Iraq* (2003); *Rising China: Power and Reassurance* (ed, 2009); *Introducing China: The world's oldest major power charts its next comeback* (2010).



Dr Alessio Patalano

Lecturer
Department of War Studies
King's College London, United Kingdom

Dr Alessio Patalano is a Lecturer in War Studies at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and specialises in East Asian security and Japanese naval history and strategy. He is also Research Associate at the King's China Institute.

Since 2006, he has been Visiting Lecturer in Naval Strategy and East Asian Security at the Italian Naval War College (ISMM), Venice. In Japan, Dr Patalano has been a Visiting Scholar at Aoyama Gakuin University and at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), both in Tokyo, and currently is Adjunct Fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan.

Dr Patalano's publications appeared in academic and professional journals in English, Japanese and Italian languages. He regularly comments on East Asian affairs on *Radio Monocle 24* and he contributes to the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*. Since 2004, Dr Patalano was awarded some 16 Grants for research and Conference projects, with the last of these focusing on the regional security implications of the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake. Dr Patalano is fluent in four languages and his publications appeared in English, Italian and Japanese. His first book *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to post-9/11* was published by Brill/Global oriental in 2012. He is currently preparing a book titled *Security, Disaster Relief and the Great East Japan Earthquake: Inside the Japanese Military Experience*, forthcoming by Palgrave in 2013.

